



# **ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A MODERNIZING STATE: A CASE STUDY OF EGYPT UNDER NASSER**

**ABSTRACT  
THESIS**

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**IN**

**WEST ASIAN STUDIES**

**(POLITICAL SCIENCE)**

*By*

**SAHBA JAMAL**


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## *ABSTRACT*

Bureaucracy is an idea as well as an embodiment of a structural arrangement. It has been defended as a necessity and at the same time vigorously condemned. As a result of controversies surrounding it, bureaucracy, has come to mean different things to different people.

Bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon. It existed in elaborate forms thousands of years ago in Egypt and Rome and in rather sophisticated forms in China and India in ancient times. With the dawn of modern era, the trend towards the process of bureaucratization had greatly accelerated. In contemporary society, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution, indeed the institution that epitomizes the modern era.

In a more traditional sense, the term 'bureaucracy' is derived from the Latin word 'bureau' which means 'desk' and Greek word 'cracy' which means 'rule'. Thus, it means desk rule or desk government. In French 'La Bure' means a cloth used on table of public authorities. From tablecloth, the table covered by cloth got the name 'bureau' Later 'bureau' began to be used for the office room where table is kept. Thus, by 18<sup>th</sup> century the term began to be used to refer to a place where officials work. The suffix 'cratic, is derived from the Greek word which means 'rules'. Thus, 'bureaucracy' refers to rule by officials.

A bureaucratic system is monastic with a single line of command and control. It is characterized by a hierarchy of superior and subordinate relations in which a person at the top assumes all authority and issues general orders to initiate actions. Orders reach to the lowest subordinates through a series of layers or ranks. A status and reward system closely follows these hierarchies. A bureaucracy is an activity by a group of officials arranged on the basis of activity to be performed in an accountable & responsible manner. It is a hierarchical chain organized vertically, disciplined and depending on the degree of centralization. In essence, bureaucracy is a rational distribution of activities in which there is a complete authority to issue the command and in a manner laid down by the rules. Written documents and files are important elements in bureaucracy it is a system, which induces officials to be methodical, prudent and disciplined, and whose behavior is highly reliable. The obligation of an office and the relationship among officials are impersonal.

The modern state is a welfare state, which has to make an arrangement for education, health, housing and various others amenities for the people. With the expansion of the activities of the state, bureaucracy has also expanded the spheres of administration of a country depending upon the caliber and integrity of the bureaucracy.



Max Weber (1864-1920) a German Sociologist was the first social scientist to have systematically studied the bureaucracy. He provided a structural identification of the bureaucratic form of organization and discussed facets of its behaviors. In nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, he drew the picture on studies of ancient bureaucracy in Egypt, Germany, Rome and Europe. For his study, he used an ideal type approach. The ideal type is neither a description of reality nor a statement of normative preference. Max Weber was the first to observe and write on bureaucracy, which developed in Germany during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He considered them to be efficient, rational and honest, a big improvement over the haphazard administration that they replaced.

From the perspective of the officials, Weber observed that office holding is a “vocation” that it is a calling, requiring prescribed courses of training for a long period of time and having examinations which are a prerequisite for employment. He is to be loyal to the office he holds, not to a patron. By virtue of his position the officials enjoy high social esteem. The official is appointed by a superior official. He is not elected normally; he works for the agency for life. He receives a salary and pension when he retires. The official pursues a career within the bureaucracy, moving up to more responsible positions according to his experience and ability.

Max Weber developed a typology of authority and distinguished three pure types, traditional, charismatic and legal. He regarded bureaucracy sustained, legal, and sanctified by purest type of exercise legal authority as the most effective form of organization.

Weber sets out an ideal type of bureaucracy, characterized by an elaborate hierarchical division of labour directed by explicit rules impersonally applied, staffed by full time life time professionals, who do not in any sense own the means of administration or their jobs or the sources of their funds and live off a salary and not form income derived directly from the performance of their jobs. These features are normally found in the public service in the offices of private firms, universities and so on.

Weber used the method of interpretative understanding for constructing ideal type. These are made use of for comparing complex events and processes. Weber placed his ideal type within a broader framework. He defined sociology as the study of social action. Within this context, power means the ability to enforce one's will on others despite resistance on their part. Authority means legitimate and regular use of power. Thus, the capacity to exercise control is justified and it appears to be fair. Various types of authorities are based on different types of social actions. The traditional authority may be patrimonial or feudal in nature. The charismatic

authority has traits of a revolutionary leader as he changes everything in his own way.

Egypt has a very colorful history. The pharaohs were considered divine and they ruled over a highly stratified society. The first pyramid was built in the 27<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Over the next 500 years the movement only got grander. Monarchical power was at its greatest during the 4<sup>th</sup> dynasty when Chops and Mycerinus built the Great pyramid of Giza. Pharaonic Egypt was the cradle of bureaucratic systems with levels of hierarchies and division of labor. Under the Pharaohs who considered themselves as endowed with divine attributes, Egypt reached the zenith of its achievements during the old kingdom which began, with the unification of upper Egypt with the lower by Menes. A highly centralized government with the divine Pharaoh at the top assisted by a minister and helped by a 'government council' and an elaborate hierarchy which practiced considerable delegation and specialization, was able to create engineering marvels like the pyramids besides controlling and directing the flow of and flooding of the Nile, irrigating the farms and increase the fertility of the soil. In those glorious achievements the officialdom that participated consisted of mixture members of the royal family, Priests holders of various administrative positions. Certain degree of professionalization and training to master reading and writing and arithmetic

was there. Some offices had a tendency to become hereditary and were often subject to purchase. Efficiency must have been the secret of their success. There were also evidence of inefficiency in this period, red tape, abuse, bribery, extortion and laziness. Above all there was the concept of total ownership of the land and the people including the officials by the God King, the pharaoh.

The second most important period of administrative significance was the Arab-Islamic period which began in 639 AD and ended with the Ottomans by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which was characterized by an appointed Diwan or a wali, a kind of viceroy ruling on behalf of an external Caliph or sultan. During this period various services began to emerge under the auspices of the state from time to time showing distinct hierarchies of army and other services 'men of sword and men of pen' During the mamluks the native military hierarchy developed often in conflict with other bureaucrats owing allegiance to the sultan. Allegiance to a civil or a military hierarchy was common, despite the fact that all were in the name of the sate and often there was some overlapping. During the Ottoman rule from 1517 AD the rulers and the higher level bureaucracy were controlling large number of Egyptian scribe's solders and revenue collectors. Centralization of authority and suppression of any initiative from the lower ranks was the

practice as the ruler was virtually far away. Real loyalty and allegiance was to the local hierarchical superior in the employment of an emerging modern state.

The distinct influence of modern European state on the emergence of a state bureaucracy was felt after the short lived Napoleon occupation (1778-1801) A revival of national sentiment with the ideas of political and administrative reform at all levels of the government open to Egyptians on equal footing on the basis of intellectual and ethical criteria was the result of this European exposure.

Mohammed Ali who ruled for years after French occupation first came as a viceroy of the Ottomans and later emerged as the proponent of a developmental nationalism. He was also the initiator of a series of administrative reform. However, like the pharaohs and later rulers, he too felt the need for centralized authority. This was because immediately before his arrival the country was in a state of confusion. Mohammed Ali was able to launch an era of reconstruction, improved irrigation systems and redesigned and rationalized administrative hierarchies all owing allegiance to him.

Mohammad Ali sought to transform rural agricultural Egypt into an industrial society with a modern military apparatus. He mobilized nation's

human and material resources into his own hands, creating a state controlled economy in the near east with Egypt as its center. To manage his varied enterprises he wanted an efficient but subservient civil service. Detailed division of the country into administrative units under generational jurisdiction with deeper and wider hierarchies took place. His periodic inspections tours of the countryside checking on cultivation, irrigation, conduct of civil servants, public accounts, and every detail of what may be called the beginnings of a development administration in Egypt set the tone for a modern authoritarian state. Administrative responsibilities were carried out by six principal departments (diwans) interior, treasury, marine, public instruction and public works, foreign affairs and commerce. As he launched his industrialization projects a new diwan was appointed to supervise textile industry Extension of industrial revolution to many areas with state initiatives led to the creation of a new class of 'public sector employees.

In an effort to draw upon the Egyptian population for his technical and administrative staff he set up schools in Egypt and sent several hundred young men to European institutions to study civil administration. Recruitment for higher education on the basis of competition and merit rather than on ethnic origin or religion was emphasized. Training was emphasized especially for technical subjects and specialization, which

became part of the expanding state machinery. Though Mohammad Ali's vision did not continue after his death, the foundation of an educated merit oriented civil service was laid down firmly during his regime.

Mohammad Ali proceeded to impose a new order in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The new order became the basic framework for that country's drive towards modernity for the next hundred years. It aimed first at the organization of a modern army, and required reform and innovation in several areas of state activity, agriculture, administration, education and industry. Mohammed Ali inaugurated policies that changed the patterns of landownership and agriculture in order to increase productivity and yield greater wealth to the state. He introduced a system of state education in order to provide the trained and skilled manpower required by the service of his state, and especially his armed forces. He reformed the administration in order to secure efficient, strict and economical control over the functions of state and government. He embarked upon an ambitious programme of industrialization which produced the first state factories in Egypt in order to make his armed forces self sufficient in materials and supplies.

Mohammed Ali's method of government and administration were absolute and strictly centralized. All power delegated by authority of the

Sultan in Egypt was vested in him. Contrary to previous Ottoman governors appointed by Sultan to Egypt, Mohammed Ali appeared original in so far as he imposed his authority over all other power groups in the country. There were no longer such contenders for power with viceroy as the Shaikh-al-Balad, the mamluk chief, or the religious leader from the Azhar, Instead of delegating the command of his troops to Albanian or other officers, Mohammed Ali placed his sons. Tossun, Ibrahim and Ismail at their head. His youngest son Saeed Pasha, commanded the naval forces; his grandson; Abbas was in charge of the Cairo government. Other members of his family filled military and civil administrative positions in the conquered dominions, especially Syria and Hijaz. He centralized the control of the various provinces in Egypt by reorganizing their administration into governors, subgovernors, inspectors and mayors in a chain of command relationship.

It is commonly under said that Europeans began their penetration of Egypt in earnest, by financial manipulation and exploitation of the local ruler's extravagances and ambition. His successors, Ismail did little to alter the administrative habits of Egypt, for he soon became embroiled in international financial controversy to a degree that brought the European powers closer and closer to political control over the country.



British occupation which began in 1882 gradually found the need to produce clerks for the civil service towards which the education system was reoriented. Higher echelons of the bureaucracy excluded Egyptians who were to be content with lower level government positions. Throughout his long tenure of office Lord Comer sedulously kept down every independent Egyptian and filled all the high posts with ciphers, with the result that the natural leaders of the people had no opportunity of leading the people. In 1898 of the 10,600 Egyptians in the Civil Service only 45 received a monthly salary of 70 Egyptian pounds or more. Whereas 47 out of 455 Britons received that much. However unlike in India, the British were satisfied by having a tight control at the center and left the provinces to the Egyptians who were for centuries used to such arrangement.

The growing nationalist movement and the accompanying grants of autonomy meant the steady elimination of foreigners from the civil service and its Egyptianization. This process was accelerated by the British declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922. By the time of independence. Egypt was in full control of most of public employment and the educational system was geared towards producing civil servants for the state. There were conscious efforts to improve the recruitment system which culminated in inviting A.P. Sinker who was the chairman of the British Civil Service

Commission to study the Egyptian system of governance. As a result of his report a Civil Service Commission was established in October, 1951, with a mandate to regulate personnel recruitment.

As far as Egypt is concerned it is probably common place that on the eve of the 1952 Revolution the need for serious administrative reform was widely felt. After the revolution, problems of the bureaucracy became more complicated, since, in addition to its traditional and rather mechanical tasks the administration was now charged with new and increasingly development oriented responsibilities that required flexibility, innovation, and the application of higher levels of technology. The heavy burden of traditions and the rising expectations of the people added to the complexity of the situation and made the need for radical reforms even more urgent.

In 1952, the first step in this direction was the consolidation of the Diwan Al Muwazafin as a central civil service commission. It was given the right to refer to the legislature in case of dispute with the Ministry of Finance to which it was attached, and from which it attempted to gain independence. The Diwan produced several reports of benefit and 1957 and 1958 prepared plan for the classification of posts and for work simplification. To fulfill the latter task a central administration was created by the Diwan to be helped by local committees in all ministrers but its

performance was not found satisfactory. To revive this, The whole Diwan was affiliated to the presidency in 1959 and its entire role was reconsidered. It was now called upon not just to confine itself to problems of the *implementation of laws and improvement of procedures, but also to proceed* to the preparation of able civil servants and the raising of performance rates in the administration .

A significant development took place in February, 1963, when the Presidential Council commissioned a General Committee and a Technical Secretariat to reconsider the structure and functioning of the government machinery and to recommend projects for its reorganization. One of the results merging from the efforts of this team was the creation of a new central body under the name of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, (C.A.O.A.) in 1964 which was meant to be more powerful in status and possessing a wider sphere of competence than its predecessor.

In order to be able to carry out these functions CAO A was given the right to supervise the application of laws and statues relating to personnel affairs and the activities of organs engaged in personnel training. It was also granted right to check proposals for organization and reorganization and proposals for budgetary arrangements related to personnel, before their final endorsement. It could also take part in designing organizational charts and

specifying performance rates. It could demand, and inspect, data and statistics from different public bodies.

A new kind of training need however, was becoming increasingly persistent with the Egyptianization and nationalization of the late fifties and early sixties. This was the need to train personnel of the new public bodies in entrepreneurial (or business) administration. For this purpose, the National Institute for Management Development (NIMD), was created in 1961 aiming at conducting training programs in areas related to management development. While its main task was to train business and industrial managers in general and specialized areas, it was also to carry out research and provide consultancy. Three types of training programs were offered by the NIMD, top management programs, specialized programs and sector programs. Until 1969 N.I.M.D. had offered training to 966 administrative officers. A management consultancy section was created to diagnose problem and suggest alternative solutions, and follow them up.

Yet another type of training appeared in the mid sixties. A committee was created in 1965 to plan and direct Executive Conference Programmes (ECP). These were tailor made programmes drawn up according to the needs and interests of the participants. They dealt with certain Problem area's through exposition of experts views and discussion of possible solutions.

A Central Agency for training was established in 1967 to supervise technical and vocational training. Training was also offered at the Institute of Labour Administration, the Institute of Banking Studies, the Arabs Society for Business Administration, the Arab Center for Research and Administration, the Public Relation Society and by other professional and associational institutes.

The post revolutionary phase also saw an expansion in the role of bureaucracy as Egypt embarked on a major nationalization drive and the expansion of the public sector. The economic profile before 1952 showed that Egypt's economy was dominated by agricultural sector. Early attempts at industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries failed. Foreign indebtedness was a serious problem, and the British power integrated Egypt as an agricultural colonial unit into an international political economic system. By discouraging industrial growth and the conservation of scanty natural resources, foreign occupation and dynastic rule based on vested interests severely handicapped the growth of Egypt's economy before 1952.

In the beginning of the post revolutionary era the revolutionary government's economic policies were directed at balanced development and growth of the countries human, agricultural and industrial resources.

Persistently high rates of population growth greatly intensified the demand for basic goods and services such as food products, which constituted a sizable portion of Egypt's import trade and health and educational services, which were declared to be basic rights of all Egyptians. Thus, the expansion of public services and agricultural development was accorded special attention in the 1950's. Success in these sectors, together with improvements in transportation and communication, provided valuable support to the more fundamental goal of developing light and heavy industries.

The first four years of the post revolutionary phase from 1952 to 1956. Saw the economy almost entirely in private hands with the state's role limited to infrastructure investments and the provision of social services. From 1957 to 1960, policy options changed and there was a decided new impetus towards progressive nationalization of the economy. In this period the major foreign owned enterprises were nationalized. During the period 1961-1973 infrastructure, mining and basic manufacturing banking and insurance, all imports and three-quarters of exports came under the control of the public sector. Domestic commerce, real estate, construction and light industry remained in the hands of the private sector. An important innovation of this phase, perhaps the one that more than any other would condition subsequent development, was the implementation of a policy of

social welfare devised to govern income distribution and guarantee a minimum subsistence level to the population. During the same period, the Egyptian economy became an almost completely planned system and the private sector was relegated to a marginal role. In this period emphasis was placed on the productive sectors, with priority being given to industry.

On Nasser's death his successor, Anwar-Al-Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt in 1971. After pledging to continue Nasser's policies, the new government altered its course towards Sadat's own agenda. The largest change made to government structure was the drafting of the 1971 permanent constitution which laid out Egypt's future. The constitution defined Egypt as a democratic socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people. It further called on Islamic jurisprudence to be the principle source of legislation in the country, and the President was defined as the most powerful member of the government.

The power of the President stemmed, in great part, from the enormous constitutional authority and customary prerogatives in his office. Perhaps the foremost key to the President's power in Egypt in his wide powers of appointment and dismissal; most important was the right to appoint the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the Chief of the armed forces, but in a highly bureaucratic society, President patronage extended over a much wider scope

of positions including public sector managers, newspaper editors, judges and party leaders. Sadat's right to appoint loyal followers to the strategic levers of state power and to dismiss those who incurred his displeasure was a main source of elite deference to the President. As chief executive the President also stood at the top of a legal chain of command which entitled him to obedience from the civil and military bureaucracies. The Prime Minister was merely the President's Chief assistant and the Cabinet a 'staff' expected to turn his general policy into detailed legislation and executive action.

In 1973 Sadat initiated the famous Open Door Policy the *Infitah*, wherein the economic policies of the Nasser era were completely reversed. Since the Open Door economic policy was formally adopted in the mid-seventies, the role of the Egyptian public bureaucracy has undergone several changes. Such changes, however, do not amount to a retrenchment of the state as some observers have interpreted them. The state bureaucracy is still large and expanding, both in terms of personnel and expenditure, and the control functions assumed by the bureaucracy have by no means declined. In the economic sphere, the public sector has not really given way to the private sector (except in the special case of commerce and finance), but the state has merely chosen to cooperate with international capital. This has signified a transformation of the state role from a developmental one to a production-



oriented one (seeking profit and cutting down on welfare activities within the joint public sector/ international capital enterprises). However, the welfare functions of the state bureaucracy towards the society at large (education and health, food subsidies, etc.) have not been significantly curtailed although the state has become increasingly dependent on external sources for financing them.

Bureaucracy both in terms of size and the low performance were the new feature of the well entrenched Egyptian bureaucracy. However during the seventies and especially following the war of 1973 quantitative growth and qualitative decline both accelerated simultaneously and to an unprecedented degree that threatens to produce very serious organizational and political repercussions. This situation has, created at least two major ironies. The first is in the fact that the impetus of bureaucratic growth (which acquired sizeable dimensions under Nasser) is now continuing under its own momentum, even though the role of the state especially in the economic field has declined noticeably under the open door policy. The other irony is that, for a variety of organizational and political reasons, the performance of the Egyptian bureaucracy has declined sharply in quality, just at a time when the desire, under unfaith, to encourage investments-especially from Arab and

foreign sources-actually requires a more innovative, flexible and efficient bureaucracy.

It can be concluded that, the open door policy notwithstanding the Egyptian bureaucracy has continued to expand in terms of personnel and expenditure. This expansion, however, has been more remarkable in areas related to the "control" or repressive functions of the state of the state than it has been in areas related to its "service" or socio economic functions. The figures surveyed above confirm that the role of the state bureaucracy has by no means declined, although it has witnessed some important changes.

President Mubarak inherited a complex legacy from the Nasser and Sadat eras, with its mélange of policies and institutions that date back to the period of socialist transformation or else to the days of the open door policy. The social base of the state that Mubarak inherited can not be separated from the realignment of classes that took place under *infitah*, and which brought to the fore an alliance between elements from the pre-revolutionary semi-aristocracy, the state bourgeoisie of the 1960's and the commercial/financial cliques of the *infitah* era. Yet it should be clear that the role of the state bourgeoisie has not really been seriously reduced, since the state continues to allocate to itself a significant proportion of national resources. In particular a large expansion in the control and repressive organs of the state

has been taking place since the 1970s as already indicated, e.g. the Central Security Forces. State Security Courts and 'Morals' Courts, the Public Prosecutor's functions as well as the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the state information machine in general. Furthermore, much of the country's growth in bureaucratic expenditure in recent years has been directed to the country's higher political and administrative echelons.



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
**DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY**

**ALIGARH (INDIA)**

**2008**



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*DEDICATED*  
*TO MY FATHER*  
*LATE MR. JAMAL RASHEED*

**CENTRE OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES**  
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Dated :...9/.4/2008...



***CERTIFICATE***

This is to certify that **Ms. SAHBA JAMAL** has completed her thesis entitled "*Role of Bureaucracy in a Modernizing State: A case study of Egypt under Nasser*" under my supervision and is in my opinion suitable for submission for the award of Ph.D. degree in West Asian Studies (Political Science) of the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh .

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J Iqbal".

**(DR. JAWAID IQBAL)**  
Supervisor

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(SAHBA JAMAL)

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## PREFACE

This study is an effort to analyze the role of bureaucracy in a Modernizing state i.e. Egypt. Bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon. It existed in elaborate forms thousands of years ago in Egypt and Rome and in rather sophisticated forms in China and India in ancient times. With the dawn of modern era, the trend towards the process of bureaucratization greatly accelerated. In contemporary society, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution, indeed the institution that epitomizes the modern era.

The term is being used with different meanings to signify different things. There is no precise definition of bureaucracy. The term bureaucracy is derived from the Latin word “bureau” which means “desk” and Greek word ‘Cracy’ which means ‘rule’. Thus, it means desk rule or desk government. In French ‘La Bureau’ means a cloth used on the table of Public authorities. Later ‘bureau’ began to be used for the office room where table is kept. Thus, by the 18<sup>th</sup> century the term began to be used to refer to a place where official work is done. The suffix ‘cratic’ is derived from the Greek word which means ‘rules’. Thus, ‘bureaucracy’ refers to rule by officials.

Bureaucracy was originally conceived as a negative or perverse concept. It was a Frenchman deGurney, who first coined the term ‘Bureaucracy’ in the middle of 18<sup>th</sup> century. The important conceptual

innovation by deGurney was identification of a group of rules and methods of governing. In the word of H.J. Laski, "Bureaucracy" is a term usually applied to a system of Government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of the officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of the ordinary citizens. According to Kingsley and stahle, "bureaucracy" is characterized by a hierarchical administrative structure in which each official act each official acts like in cog in a complex. In this organization, nothing is left to change. All important relationship are defined in advance and the pyramid of authority is divided horizontally into levels of responsibilities".

The first chapter is basically theoretical wherein an attempt has been made to trace the origins & evolution of bureaucracy. The works of famous German sociologist Max Weber on bureaucracy has also been analysed in this chapter.

The second chapter traces the origins and growth of modern bureaucracy in Egypt. It focuses on the distinct influence of European States in the emergence of State bureaucracy since the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon. It their goes on to examine the development of bureaucracy under Mohd. Ali, British occupation, and finally after the 1952 Free Officers revolution.

The third chapter begins with a discussion of reforms and achievements during the Nasser's era, and the role played by the bureaucracy in implementing those reforms. The revolution of 1952 was not only a milestone in Egypt's long history but also exerted powerful influence on the Arab world and many of the emerging nations of the third world. Gamal Abdul Nasser became the most popular hero in Arab history, when he successfully led the Egyptian Revolution of July, 1952.

The fourth chapter deals with the economic development during Nasser era and the role of bureaucracy. Despite some progress in the scope and intensity of economic activities and rise in national income during the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Egyptian economy was not growing at what could be considered a reasonable rate.

With the revolution of 1952, the Egyptian economy witnesses a turn around as Nasser initiated a massive programme of industrialization. The Egyptian bureaucracy was required to play a positive and proactive role in all spheres of economic activity in order to make Nasser's five year plan a success.

The fifth chapter analyses role of bureaucracy in the Post Nasser's era. Under Sadat Egypt changed course from a state controlled economy to a liberalizing one. The Egyptian bureaucracy consequently had to adopt itself

to the new situation wherein private enterprise was given precedence over the public sector.

It is a source of pleasure to acknowledge the assistance extended to me by many during the research & writing of this thesis.



# *CHAPTER-I*

## **CHAPTER-I**

### **Bureaucracy: Theoretical Background, Origins and Evolution**

#### **(i) Concept of Bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy is an idea as well as an embodiment of a structural arrangement. It has been defended as a necessity and at the same time vigorously condemned<sup>1</sup>. As a result of controversies surrounding it bureaucracy, has come to mean different things to different people. To a layman it means the contribution of red tape, inefficiency and abuse of power in the contact of official client relationship within an organization or established structured setup. To a sociologist a bureaucratic organization is one which does not learn from its own mistake and repeats them often because of its static and inflexible nature. To a political scientist bureaucracy can mean a system of government where departmental officials at upper levels have these voices heard and given due consideration.<sup>2</sup>.

Bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon. It existed in elaborate forms thousands of years ago in Egypt and Rome and in rather sophisticated forms in China and India in ancient times. With the dawn of modern era, the trend towards the process of bureaucratization had greatly accelerated.

In contemporary society, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution indeed; the institution that epitomizes the modern era<sup>3</sup>.

Today especially in the eyes of the uninitiated, the term continues to be one of abuse, even if it is in a mild intensity. Not so infrequently, this term is used in a derogatory sense and is supposed to connote mindless application of the letters of the rules without any compassion, judgement or empathy.

Bureaucracy has emerged as a dominant feature in the contemporary world. Virtually, everywhere in public or large private organizations, developed or developing nations, bureaucratic structures are the universal phenomenon. As Hans Rosenberg has rightly observed that, “for good or evil, as essential part of the present structure of government consist of its far-flung system of professionalized administration and its hierarchy of appointed officials upon whom society is thoroughly dependent. Whether we live under the most totalitarian despotism or in the most liberal democracy, we are governed to a considerable extent by a bureaucracy of some kind”<sup>4</sup>.

The term bureaucracy is being used with different meanings to signify different things. There is no precise definition of ‘bureaucracy’. It is used variously to identify an institution or a caste, a mode of

production, an ideology, a way of viewing and organizing society, a way of life, a social category etc. Taking into consideration the variety in its nature and ambiguity in meaning. It can rightly be considered as the most controversial word of our age. Abrahamsson, in order to explain this concept, takes the example from Nordic Folklore where one encounters the mythical being 'huldra', a beautiful young woman who tempts the forest wanderers to approach her and then suddenly vanishes by turning her back on them. He says that, in social sciences, the concept of bureaucracy has played a role similar to that of huldra fascinating and seductive , but evading capture at the very moment when the observer analyst believes he has grasped its true character<sup>5</sup>.

In a more traditional sense, the term 'bureaucracy' is derived from the Latin word 'bureau' which means 'desk' and Greek word 'cracy' which means 'rule'. Thus, it means desk rule or desk government. In French 'La Bure' means a cloth used on table of public authorities. From tablecloth, the table covered by cloth got the name 'bureau' later 'bureau' began to be used for the office room where table is kept. Thus, by 18<sup>th</sup> century the term began to be used to refer to a place where officials work. The suffix 'cratic, is derived from the Greek word which means 'rules'. Thus, 'bureaucracy' refers to rule by officials<sup>6</sup>.

A bureaucratic system is monastic with a single line of command and control. It is characterized by a hierarchy of superior and subordinate relations in which a person at the top assumes all authority and issues general orders to initiate actions. Orders reach to the lowest subordinates through a series of layers or rungs. A status and reward system closely follows these hierarchies<sup>7</sup>.

The Bureaucracy consists of paid officials serving in a government administrative department. These officials receive specialized knowledge of administration and they receive high salaries from the states governments. They are called public servants or Civil servants. It is the duty of a good civil servant to provide all amenities and help of every sort to the people. The public servants are called 'bureaucrats' because they follows rules and procedures two strictly<sup>8</sup>.

The modern state is a welfare state, which has to make an arrangement for education, health, housing and various others amenities for the people. With the expansion of the activities of the state, bureaucracy has also expanded the spheres of administration of a country depending upon the caliber and integrity of the bureaucracy. Actually, Bureaucracy is the professional class of technically skilled persons who

are organized in a hierarchical way and serve the state in an important manner<sup>9</sup>.

There is no doubt that bureaucracy plays an important role in modern government. The term bureaucracy is being increasingly used to denote the dominance of the civil service cadre. In all modern states the business of government is so complex that it is mostly managed by officials who have the knowledge and competence to handle problems and complicity of administration.

A bureaucracy is an activity by a group of officials arranged on the basis of activity to be performed in an accountable & responsible manner. It is a hierarchical chain organized vertically, disciplined and depending on the degree of centralization. In essence, Bureaucracy is a rational distribution of activities in which there is a complete authority to issue the command and in a manner lay down by the rules, written documents and files are important elements in Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a system, which induces officials to be methodical, prudent and disciplined, and whose behavior is highly reliable. The obligation of an office and the relationship among officials are impersonal.<sup>10</sup>

### **Definitions of Bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy was originally conceived as negative or perverse concept. It was a Frenchman de Gurney, who first coined the term 'Bureaucracy' in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. It seems that de Gurney used the term in a criticizing tone. This is evident when he said that "*officials are not appointed to perform public interests, but public interest is established so that offices might exist*". The important conceptual innovation by de Gurney was identification of group of rules and method of governing<sup>11</sup>.

Before we reach to an acceptable definition of the term, let us consider some of the definitions given by the eminent writers on the topic. In the words of H.J. Laski, "Bureaucracy" is a term usually applied to a system of Government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of few officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of the ordinary citizens<sup>12</sup>. Marshall E. Dimock identified Bureaucracy, "with institutions and large scale organization in society<sup>13</sup>".

According to Kingsley and Stahle, "Bureaucracy is characterized by a hierarchical administrative structure in which each official acts like a cog in complex machine. In this organization, nothing is left to change. All important relationships are defined in advance and the pyramid of

authority is divided horizontally into levels of responsibilities <sup>14</sup>. However, amongst all, Martin Albow has given a comprehensive definition of the term. He has brought competing concept of bureaucracy under seven broad categories. Those are (as follows)

- (i) Bureaucracy as rational organization.
- (ii) Bureaucracy as organization efficiency.
- (iii) Bureaucracy as rule by officials.
- (iv) Bureaucracy as public administration.
- (v) Bureaucracy as administration by officials.
- (vi) Bureaucracy as the organization and,
- (vii) Bureaucracy as modern society.

The idea of the relationship was adopted by Max on whom Peter Balue comments, “Weber concerned Bureaucracy as social mechanism that tends towards the inefficiency and also as a form of social organization with special characteristics. Both these ideas cannot be a part of definition since the relationship between the attributes of social institutions and their consequences, is a question of empirical verification and not a matter of definition<sup>16</sup>. He goes on to define Bureaucracy as an organization that maximizes efficiency in administration.



Francis and Stone pointed out to the make of organization which is especially adapted to maintaining stability and efficiency in bodies that are large and complex. In the same way Peter Leonard called it a rational and clearly defined arrangement of activities, which are directed towards fulfilling the purpose of organization. The idea of efficiency has appealed to many people.

The concept of Bureaucracy as inefficient organization needs no scholarly treatment. Marshall Dimock has used the concept as the anti-thesis of administration vitality and managerial activity offer the growth of factors, which make it a hallmark of inefficiency viz (a) Big size (b) proliferation of rules (c) Group introversion (d) to great emphasis on age and security<sup>17</sup>. Inefficiency is inherent in the structure and functioning of big organization. The symptom includes over or emphasis devotion low precedent, lack of initiatives, proliferation of performance, duplication of work and departmentalization. Crosier in his book “the Bureaucratic phenomenon” describes it as behaviour by lending from its error.

Rule by official is said to be the original concept of bureaucracy. It was in this sense that deGourney and Mill called this bureau mania, an illness of Fiancé, which bids fair to play havoc with the people. He went to complain “the offices, the clerk, the secretaries the inspector, are not

appointed to benefit the public interests”, indeed the public interest appears to have been established so that officer might exist<sup>18</sup>. Democracy has been viewed not as a rule for the good of the people. In the scheme, bureaucracy is shown to be compatible with or even necessary to democracy. The concept, rule of officials has been extremely used. Herald Laski says, “Bureaucracy” is the term usually applied to a system of government. The control of which so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens<sup>19</sup>. A student of the French Civil service. S.R. Sharp called it the exercise of power by professional administration.

In his essay, “How Bureaucracy develop and Functions?” Arnold Brecht defines bureaucracy, “as government by officials<sup>20</sup>. He separates two types, the legal right to give orders and the power to get something done. These two types of power are possessed wherever there are officials, they have these in small or big measures. At the heart of the government apparatus are the officials. Martin Albrow thinks that seeing public Administration in power complex is only a partial view.

Bureaucracy as an organizational structure was a Fascist's programme which kept the state above the society. Hence the emphasis was upon the group discharging function rather than on the function

themselves. BF Heselitz emphasizing on the pressure group activity of bureaucracy has observed: A civil services is engaged in meeting the systematic goals of society as a whole. Bureaucratic apparatus is one of the institutions through which goal gratification activity is performed<sup>21</sup>.

The activities are not visible but the group is identifiable. Some authors have classified bureaucracy into classes such as: Caste bureaucracy, where the recruitment is confined to classes; Merit bureaucracy where the recruitment is through competitions. The French and the British have developed a deep sense of corporate identity and each in a striking manners several a correspondent between the character of bureaucracy and the political traditions of society.

Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy was confined to public administration, The idea of office, hierarchy, appointment, prestige, and social stratification are the central part of the concept of bureaucracy<sup>22</sup>. Riggs has analyzed public administration in a framework. He concludes that the idea of administration in accordance with the policies laid down by a legislature is too limited to industrial societies. He suggests a definition of public administrative system, as structure for allocating goods and services in a government. In the administration of the developing countries like India, bureaucrats are government officials. The

characteristics of complex and large administration are hierarchy of authority, rule system of records and specialization. But some authors have found bureaucracy as much outside as inside the government.

In common sense, it is normal to talk of any large organization. On bureaucracy, Tolcott Persons, in his "structure and process in modern societies, says, one of the most salient structural characteristics of such a society is the main part of relatively large scale organizations with specialized functions, what rather loosely tend to be called bureaucracy<sup>23</sup>.

Bureaucrats and political executives are not much different. The institutions they control have the same behavioral pattern. James Burnham makes no distinction between bureaucrats and officials. The societies where the dominant working class having specified organizational role exists the whole structure may be seen as bureaucracy. Karl Mamherm has argued that change in the social structure in the twentieth century have made opposition of the concept of state and society outdated as he saw no differences between private and public organizations in respect of power, method of recruitment and public responsibility that is necessary in the whole structure at the same level. S.N. Eisenstadt makes a distinction between the growth of bureaucracy and bureaucratization of parts of environment. The growth of the organization involves in

bureaucratization of society and that is the necessary thing for society becoming bureaucracy<sup>24</sup>. Some times the term is applied with an opprobrious connotation and symbolizes a man eminent for experience, knowledge, responsibilities and neutrality. The term bureaucracy is considered to be eager in usurping more and more power and encroaching upon individual liberty.

Harold Laski in an often-quoted passage adopted many features of the popular concepts as characteristics of the bureaucratic phenomenon which according to him basically derives from rule by officials, as he puts it.

*“Bureaucracy is the term usually applied to a system of government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials, that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens. The characteristics of such a regime are a passion for routine in administration; the sacrifices of flexibility to rule, delay in the making of decision and a refusal to embark upon experiment. In extreme case the number of a bureaucracy may become a caste manipulating government to their own advantage<sup>25</sup>.”*

The Bureaucratic system was found in Prussia. The Prussian civil services constituted a distinct career like those of army and navy which had a rigid discipline and had adequate provisions for training and formed

separate and privileged class in society. In the nineteenth century British civil service was aristocratic in the sense that there were sharp distinctions between different grades of personal and it was not easy to rise from the lower to the higher grade. Democratic personal system was found in America. The American civil service by traditions has not been a profession. There was no rigidity about age limits and no preference to graduates of particular institutions.

### **MAX WEBER AND THE CONCEPT OF BUREAUCRACY**

Max Weber (1864-1920) a German Sociologist was the first social scientist to have systematically studied the Bureaucracy<sup>26</sup>. He provided a structural identification of the bureaucratic form of organization and discussed facets of its behaviors. In nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, he drew the picture on studies of ancient Bureaucracy in Egypt, Germany, Rome and Europe. For his study, he used an ideal type approach. The ideal type is neither a description of reality nor a statement of normative preference<sup>27</sup>. Max Weber was the first to observe and write on Bureaucracy, which developed in Germany during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He considered them to be efficient, rational and honest, a big improvement

over the haphazard administration that they replaced. Weber saw that modern officialdom functioned according to six principles:-

1. Fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are ordered by rules that is laws and administrative regulations.
2. Hierarchy and levels of graded authority where the lower offices are supervised by the higher ones.
3. Management is based on official documents.
4. The officials have thorough and expert training.
5. It requires the full time work of the officials.
6. Management follows rules<sup>28</sup>.

From the perspective of the officials. Weber observed that office holding is a "Vocation" that it is a calling, requiring a prescribed course of training for a long period of time and having examinations which are a prerequisite for employment. He is to be loyal to the office he holds, not to a patron. By virtue of his position the officials enjoy high social esteem. The official is appointed by a superior official. He is not elected normally, he works for the agency for life. He receives a salary and pension when he retires. The official pursues a career within the Bureaucracy, moving up to more responsible positions according to his experience and ability<sup>29</sup>.

According to Weber “A Bureaucracy established a relation between legally installed authorities and there are subordinate officials. Which is characterized by defined rights and duties, prescribed written regulation authority, relations between position which are ordered systematically appointment and promotion based on contractual agreement and regulated accordingly, technical training or experience as a normal condition of employment. Fixed monetary salaries, a strict separation of office and incumbent in the sense that the official does not own the means of administration and cannot appropriate the position and administrative work as full time occupation<sup>30</sup>.

Max Weber developed a typology of authority and distinguished three pure types, traditional, charismatic and legal. He regarded bureaucracy sustained, legal, and sanctified by purest type of exercise legal authority as the most effective form of organization. Bureaucracy is a form of organization, which has certain essential characteristics:

1. Separation of office and its incumbent.
2. Selection by merits.
3. The office is subject to discipline and control while performing his official work.
4. Hierarchy of offices.



5. Allocation of authority required to discharge these activities.
6. Strict adherence to rules etc.
7. Fixing remuneration of officials <sup>31</sup>.

Further more, Weber himself says the present type of exercise of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff, only the supreme chief of the organization occupies his position of authority by virtue of appropriation of elections or of having designated for the succession. But even his authority consists in a sphere of legal competence. The whole administrative staff under the supreme authority then consists in purest type of individual officials who are appointed and function according to the following criteria.

1. They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal officials.
2. They are organized in clearly defined hierarchies of officials.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of the competence in the legal sense.
4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus in principle there is free selection.

5. Conditions are selected on the basis of technical qualification. In the most rational case this is tested by the examination, they are appointed not elected.
6. The office is treated at the role or at least the primary occupations of the incumbent.
7. The officials work is entirely separated from the ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
8. They are rewarded by fixed salaries in money for the most part with a right to its pension only under certain circumstances does the employing authority specially in private organization have a right to make the appointment but the officials are always free to resign.
9. It constitutes a career. There is a system of promotion according to the seniority or to achievement or both promotions are depended on the judgment of superior.
10. They are subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the officers<sup>32</sup>.

Bureaucracy is rule conducted from a desk or office, i.e. by the preparation and dispatch of written documents or, these days, their electronic equivalents. The records of communications sent and received

are kept in office in files or archives are consulted in preparing new ones. It is the servant of government a means by which a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy or other forms of government rule. Those who invented this term wanted to suggest that the servant was trying to become the master. Weber is of course aware of this tendency; in fact he attacked the pretensions of the Prussian bureaucracy to be an objective and neutral servant of society, above politics and emphasized that every bureaucracy has interest of its own and connection with other social strata (especially among the upper classes). But formally and in theory the bureaucracy is merely a means and this is largely true also in practice: someone must provide policy direction and back the bureaucrats up with force<sup>33</sup>.

In the Middle Ages the most effective kings ruled from horseback: they traveled round the country, armed, accompanied by armed men, and enforced their will. They were prepared, if necessary to enforce their will on their armed companions by personal combat, though their prestige was such that this was seldom required. Clerics accompanied the king also; i.e. clergy, who could read and write, who took along a chest containing records and writing material; the modern bureaucracy has evolved from this earlier practice. In modern countries, the rulers do not fight in person or travel round much. He or she rules by sending messages, through a

bureau. The messages were complied by the people as they are backed by force, by a staff of police or soldier. According to Weber the armies in the world have been bureaucratized in the past. While Napoleon had to watch his battle from horseback, the modern Generals communicate through modern ways of communication. Napoleon had once staff officers who galloped off with written message; the modern army has a general staff, who were in Weber's time regarded with pride. This was one of the key institutions of the German Empire and in Weber's term, it was bureaucracy. He also pointed out that, not only the government services but also political parties, churches, educational institutions, private businesses and many other institutions had bureaucracies. They all have a professional staff for keeping records and sending communications, which are regarded at least by other staff of the same institutions, as authoritative directives. Bureaucracies were found in ancient Egypt, ancient Rome and in the middle ages. Weber believes that bureaucracy is a pervasive feature of modern societies, ever growing in importance<sup>34</sup>.

### **Weberian model of bureaucracy**

Weber sets out an ideal type of bureaucracy, characterized by an elaborate hierarchical division of labour directed by explicit rules impersonally applied, staffed by full time life time professionals, who do

not in any sense own the means of administration or their jobs or the sources of their funds and live off a salary not from income derived directly from the performance of their jobs. These features are normally found in the public service in the offices of private firms, universities and so on<sup>35</sup>.

Weber used the method of interpretative understanding for constructing ideal type. These are made use of for comparing complex events and processes. Weber placed his ideal type within a broader framework. He defined sociology as the study of social action. Within this context, power means the ability to enforce one's will on others despite resistance on their part. Authority means legitimate and regular use of power. Thus, the capacity to exercise control is justified and it appears to be fair. Various types of authorities are based on different types of social actions. The traditional authority may be patrimonial or feudal in nature. The charismatic authority has traits of a revolutionary leader as he changes everything in his own way<sup>36</sup>.

### **Weber's Rational Bureaucracy**

Since Weber was a German, he was very familiar with Moltke's development of the General Staff. Furthermore, Germany had been an early leader in developing a civil service. At the same time German

industry was beginning to adopt the organizational method developed in the United States. Surveying this scene; Weber attempted to isolate the elements common to all of these new organizational methods developed in the United States<sup>37</sup>.

Weber points out that all these new large-scale organizations were similar in their bureaucracy. Today many of us regard bureaucracy as a dirty word, representing red tape, inefficiency and officiousness. Weber's purpose, however was to define the essential feature of new organizations and to indicate why these organizations. So much better than traditional ones. Let us examine the features that were found in bureaucracy<sup>39</sup>.

For Weber the term bureaucracy was inseparable from the term rationality. Weber noted additional features of rational bureaucracies that are simple extension of the four just outlined. To ensure expert management appointments and promotions are based on merit rather than favoritism and those appointed treat their positions as full time primary careers<sup>30</sup>. To ensure order in decision-making, business is conducted primarily through written rules, records and communications.

Weber's idea of functional specialization applies both to persons within an organization and to relation between larger units or divisions of the organization. We can see how this is applied to Swift & Co within a

Swift packing plant. Work was broken down into many special tasks and employees were assigned to one or a few such tasks including the tasks involved in coordinating the work of others. (Such coordination is called administration or management). Furthermore, Swift was separated into a number of divisions each specializing in one of the tasks in the elaborate process of bringing meat from the crunch to the consumers. Weber argued that such specialization is essential to rational division from another must be fixed by explicit rules regulations and procedures.

For Weber it was self evident that coordinating the divisions of large organizations requires clear lines of authority organized in a hierarchy. All employees in the organization must know who their Boss is? And each person should always respect the chain of command i.e people should give orders only to their own subordinates and receive orders only through their own immediate superiors. In this way , the people at the top can be sure that directives arrive where they are meant to go and know where responsibilities lie<sup>40</sup>.

Furthermore hierarchical authority is required in bureaucracies so that highly trained experts can be properly used as managers. It does little good to train someone whose training is in advertising. Rational bureaucracies can be operated as Weber argued, only by developing

managers at all levels that have been selected and trained for their specific jobs. Persons picked up for top positions in bureaucracies are often rotated through many divisions of an organization to gain firsthand experience of the many problems that their future subordinates must face.

Finally, Weber stressed that rational bureaucracies must be managed in accordance with carefully developed rules and principles that can be learned and applied and that transactions and decisions must be recorded so that rules can be reviewed. Only with such rules and principles can the activities of hundreds of managers at different levels in the organization be predicted and coordinated<sup>41</sup>.

### **Characteristic of Bureaucracy**

The last century saw the perfection of the bureaucracy a form of organization that has been enormously successful and is the result of thousands of years of trial and error evolution. Max Weber outlined the key characteristics of a bureaucracy. Modern officialdom functions in the following specific manner.

1. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional spheres which are generally ordered by rules specified by laws or administration regulations.



- (a) The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure, are distributed in affixed way as official duties.
- (b) The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal or otherwise which may be placed at the disposal of officials.
- (c) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed<sup>42</sup>.

In public and lawful government these three elements constitute bureaucratic authority. In private economic domination, they constitute bureaucratic management. Bureaucracy thus understood is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, in the private economy only and in the most advanced institutions of capitalism. Permanent and public office authority with fixed jurisdiction is not the historical rule but rather the exception. This is not even in large political structures such as those of the ancient orient, the Germanic and

Mongolian empires of conquest or of many feudal structures of state. In all these cases the ruler executes the most important measures through *personal trustees, table companions or court servants*. Their commissions and authority are not precisely delimited and are temporarily called into being for each case.

2. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers to govern the possibility of appealing the decision of a lower office to its higher authority in a definitely regulated manner. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principles of hierarchical office, authority found in all bureaucratic structure: in state and ecclesiastical structure, as well as in large party organizations and private enterprise. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called private or public.

When the principle of jurisdictional competency is fully carried through hierarchical subordination-at least in public office does not mean that the higher authority is simply authorized to take over the business of the lower. Indeed the opposite is the rule. Once established having

fulfilled its task an office tend to continue in existence and be held by another incumbent.

3. The management of the modern offices is based upon written documents, which are pressured in their original or draught form. There is therefore a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials actively engaged in a public office along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files make up a bureau. In private enterprise the bureau is often called the office.

In principle the modern organization of the civil service separates the bureau from the private domicile of the officials and in general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life. Public monies and equipments are divorced from the private property of the officials. This condition everywhere is the product of a long development. Nowadays it is found in public as well as in private enterprises in the latter the principle extends even to the leading entrepreneur. In principle the executive office is separated from the household, business from private correspondence and business assets from private fortunes. The more consistently the modern type of business management has been carried through the more are these separations the

case<sup>41</sup>. The beginnings of this process are to be found as early as the middle ages.

It is the peculiarity of the modern entrepreneur that he conducts himself as the first official of his enterprise, in the same way in which the ruler of a specifically modern bureaucratic state spoke of himself as the first servants of the state. The idea that the bureau activities of the state are intrinsically different in character from the management of private. Economic offices is a continental European nation and by way of contrast is totally foreign to the American way.

4. Office management at least all specialized office management and such management its distinctly modern usually presupposes thorough and expert training. This increasingly holds for the modern executive and employee of private enterprises in the same manner as it holds for the state official.

5. When the office is fully developed official actively demands the full working capacity of the officials, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited. In normal case this is only the product of a long term development, in public as well as in private office. Formerly in all cases the normal state of affairs was reversed: official business was discharged as a secondary activity.

6. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable more or less exhaustive and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning, which the official possesses. Its involves jurisprudence or administrative or business management <sup>42</sup>.

The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature. The theory of modern public administration for instance assumes that the authority to order certain matters by commands given for each case but only to regulate the matters abstractly. This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual privileges and bestowals of favor, which is absolute by dominant in patrimonialism at least in so far as such relationship are not fixed by sacred tradition.

### **Public bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy which is governmental in nature or public in general have a stake in it, is called public bureaucracy for eg. Government departments, public enterprises, government controlled universities etc. for a clear view of the public bureaucracy, private bureaucracy is required to be understood<sup>45</sup>.

**Private bureaucracy**

Similarly bureaucracy which is private in nature or in which a single person, family or group of persons own and command the overall operation of the organization without the government playing any role in its organizational functioning is called private bureaucracy. For example MNCs well-organized NGOs church bureaucracies etc.

Public bureaucracy differs from private bureaucracy in the following ways:

- a) Public bureaucracy is less business like' and market based.
- b) Public bureaucracy is directly subject to political influence and pressure where as private bureaucracy is not.
- c) There is inevitably more of red taps in public bureaucracy than in private bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy is rigid, controlled by rules and regulations, which limit freedom of action, where as private bureaucracy is flexible in its operation.
- d) Public bureaucracy is more service oriented whereas private bureaucracy is profit oriented.

- e) Activities of public bureaucracy are mandated by constitutional; statutory or executive authority. Private bureaucracy enjoys a much larger measures of freedom of action and behaviors.
- f) Private bureaucracy has more freedom in personal administration elaborately drawn laws, rules and regulations, control personnel in public bureaucracy.
- g) Public bureaucracy is slow to adapt itself to quick change in the environment because of the complexity of the environmental factors, private bureaucracy is more quick to change.
- h) Public bureaucracy necessarily operates in a highly complex social economic and political environment, which makes it very difficult, sometimes nearly impossible to measure programmed effectiveness and organizational performance.
- i) Public bureaucracy is more pervasively subject to concern of ethics, social equity, justice, fair play etc. than private bureaucracy.

- j) Public bureaucracy is engaged in direct performance of activities which are critical for national survival and economic development underpinned by social justice<sup>46</sup>.

These mentioned differences do not remain in isolation in their respective setting of public and private bureaucracies. Along with them also lie similarities between them and some of the thinkers like Henry Fayol, Mary parker, Follet and Urwick, are of the opinion that public and private administration (since public bureaucracy is associated with public administration and private bureaucracy with private administration) both pairs of them of kind<sup>47</sup>. In his address to the second International Congress of Administrative Science, Fayol said:

“The meaning which I have given to the word administration and which has been generally adopted broadens considerably the field of administrative science it embraces not only the public séance, but also private enterprises of every size and description, of every form and every purpose. All undertakings request planning organization, command co-ordination and control and in order to function properly all must observe the same general principles. We are no longer confronted with several



administrative sciences, but with one which can be applied equally well to public and to private and top private affairs<sup>48</sup>.”

There are many skills, techniques and procedures, which are common to both public as well as private bureaucracies. For example accounting statistics, office management and procedures, purchases, disposals and stocking etc. It is evident from the fact; that there is flow of personal from public bureaucracies to private bureaucracies, mostly after retirement and vice versa during nationalization, moreover in ancient times business practice and standards have exercised a profound influence upon public bureaucracies specially in matters like office management and running of the commercial enterprises. The whole idea of the public cooperation and companies is to import into public bureaucracy the organization and management of private bureaucracy like big business organization to have been influenced by governmental practice in such matters as staff welfare, superannuation benefit etc.<sup>49</sup>.

There is a certain kind of hierarchy and administration set up both in public and private bureaucracies both have some kind of organizational structures, higher and lower status employee and both have clear demarcation of work, duties and responsibilities. In both the cases we find

that there are people who are responsible in taking policy decision while others, are there to implement them.

Both the branches of administration improve upon procedure and techniques to carry on research work and investigation simultaneously in order to become more effective and to know about the needs and necessities of the people, whom they are required to serve, carry on public relation functions.

However it has been contended by many that the concepts, managerial tools, skills and ideology of private administration may not be imported to public administration, as they are quite dissimilar.

The dissimilarities between public and private bureaucracies are not very insignificant. Indeed there are many that forcefully argue that there are more differences between small and large bureaucracies than between private and public bureaucracy. Also the character of private bureaucracy is no longer such as to distinguish it completely from public bureaucracy. The private component of private administration is seen to be decreasing, thereby narrowing the distance between private and public administration.

#### **TYPES OF BUREAUCRACY:**

In spite of its homogeneity, and at different point of tie in history, the bureaucracy has taken different shakes forms based upon social

economic influence. Each bureaucracy is likely to see itself as a type and to behave accordingly in broader outline; it is possible to distinguish at least, several types of bureaucracies depending on the predominance of certain characteristics. Bureaucracy is categorized into four types by Morstein Marx viz. Guardian Bureaucracy, Caste Bureaucracy, Patronage Bureaucracy and Merit Bureaucracy<sup>50</sup>.

### **1.The Guardian Bureaucracy**

The guardian bureaucracy may be defined as a scholastic officialdom twined in right conduct according to the classes". This type of bureaucracy regarded itself as custodian of public interest, independent, incorruptible and right on the one hand but authoritarian on the other. Plato's concepts of the philosopher king is & an example of the guardian bureaucracy such bureaucracy also existed in China before 960 AD and in Prussia between 1648 and 1740 AD. According to Plato, guardians were not simply meant to go about doing things as directed but most important was their capacity for; the essence of the public interest. In this sense they were meant to be custodians of the ideal and assumptions about justice and welfare that held together the city state. The social system of ancient china made its on first duty of each official to demonstrate to example of life, this was a matter of knowledge rather than a judgement. Therefore

bureaucracy was a scholastic officialdom trained in right conduct according to the classes rest on the highest organ of the government, the emperor<sup>51</sup>.

## **2. Caste Bureaucracy**

This bureaucracy is the result of class connections of these in this recruitment is made only from one class or caste. An early example of caste bureaucracy can be found in the history of Roman Empire. The last Emperor was a forceful reform of government. The legal fiscal and administrative reforms introduced in between 289 and 304 AD. Enabled the Christian empire after him to line on. But his successors have shown the shadows rather than the substance. Eventually on all pervading public status system pulled down the entire economy<sup>52</sup>.

At first only the officialdom was affected by the spirit of caste. A precisely defined separation of functions degenerated in to a large scheme of ranks and titles, until in the ends of a vastly enlarged bureaucracy spent most of its time inventing and enforcing minister distinction in official standing. As time passed the conversion of private enterprises to public function extended across the entire body of society. The British rulers introduced the class characters in the Indian civil service as well. In ancient Indian, only Brahmins and Kashatriyas could become higher

officials In England, for example aristocratic classes were preferred to the civil service positions. The civil services during the early Roman Empire, Japanese civil services under Majic constitution, French civil services in 1950s are a few example of the caste bureaucracy.

### **3. Patronage Bureaucracy**

Another kind of bureaucracy is patronage bureaucracy. This type of bureaucracy is also called 'spoils system' under this system the protégés of the politicians are nominated to the civil service. Its traditional development began from the U.S.A. and U.K. till the middle of the nineteenth century this type of civil service exists where the public jobs are given as a personal favour or political award. The patronage was an exercise of democracy. The patronage bureaucracy was a dangerously affecting instrument of government at a time, when government has been the instrument of free economy that it was of the most important that the government acquire the expert touch the patronage bureaucracy, stood condemned as an anarchism for its lack of technical competence, its in discipline, its erratic ways its want of spirit<sup>53</sup>.

### **4. The Merit Bureaucracy**

The merit bureaucracy is simpler than guardian, patronage and caste system. In this system recruitment is based on qualifications and is

governed by objective standards. In merit system intelligence is judged of the people. The merit bureaucracy is control as governed by objective standards specially by the principles of admission on the bases of prescribed qualifications as attested by the outcome of a written examination, thus most qualified and competent candidates having the chance to enter into the public service. They remain free from political pressure; particularly they are left free to devote themselves to the promotion of the common goods.

Therefore, the merit bureaucracy has its base on the merit of public officials and its own efficiency of the civil service. In other words this is an attempt to recruit the best men for the public service. This method is usually used in all civilized countries. Appointments to public service are no longer governed by class consideration. The civil servants in a modern democracy are really officials in the service of the people and are recruited on the basis of prescribed qualifications and tested objectively. The merit bureaucracy also draws compensation on the basis of a salary schedule, this amount concerned by each subordinate or for the various worthy causes including the local party organizations. In modern time merit bureaucracy puts stone emphasis on political control over the administrations system which was not the case in other of bureaucracy.

.This bureaucracy has a distinguished advantage over others due to its sense of rationality in administrative behaviour.<sup>54</sup>

While concluding we may say that the importance of bureaucracy can not be discarded i.e. Only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the administration of a rational law concentually systematized on the basis of such enactment as the latter Roma Impirical period first created with a high degree of technical perfection. During the Middle Ages this law was received alone with the bureaucratization of legal administration with displacement of the old trial procedure which was hound to tradition by the traditionally trained and specialized experts.

#### **MERITS OF BUREAUCRACY:**

There are various merits of bureaucracy at the first place its contribution to governmental administration is not insignificant infact it has made administration more efficient rational impartial and consistent than was the case in the earlier time in the words of Herbert Morrison “Bureaucracy is the price of parliamentary democracy”.

Generally speaking the merits of bureaucracy may be designed as below “

**(1) Bureaucracy is efficient**

It is helped by men and women who devote full time to their narrow specialties. They have developed a method which beyond question, is technically superior to administration by amateur or dabblers, bureaucrats have the background and know-how to get things done in modern world. There is the universe of large scale organization and centralized control that a money economy has helped to create everywhere.

**(2) Bureaucracy is predictable**

Since it proceeds from categorical rules and principles, operating from within a content of tight authoritarian discipline and hierarchical status top officials have every reason to expect that order will not be difficult to be carried out.

**(3) Bureaucracy is Impersonal**

To administer a modern institution is to be objective, not to be influenced by any primary group sentiments, to be emotionally blank. Sub due all personal and biases, at best all personal vagaries and biases, at best to approximate the impartiality of a judge on the bench and thus to be fair.



**(4) Bureaucracy is fast**

Uniformity of rules makes it possible for the modern administrators to process thousands of cases with general formulas. The speedy disposition of innumerable cases would be impossible if each one had to be considered on its individual merits<sup>57</sup>.

Bureaucracy has both good and bad aspects, in fact it is not in itself a bad thing; some elements of its are indispensable. What is needed is to guard it against its characteristics, defects and to subject it to a continuous stream of instructed and effective criticism Bureaucracy in brief has to be kept under control. Someone has remarked that Bureaucracy is like fire invaluable as a servant, ruinous when it becomes the master. So it has all the good and bad aspects. It is found in all the civilized countries.

**DEMERITS OF BUREAUCRACY:**

We can sum up the deficiencies of bureaucracy under the following heads:

**1. Unresponsiveness**

Bureaucracy is not usually responsive to the public needs. It follows its old standards and rarely reacts to the changing demands and environment. It regards itself a separate and the superior class and close

not recognize the proper relationship between the Governors and the government, which is an essential consciousness in bureaucracy tends to self importance. In the words of pfitter: "Routine procedures breed inflexibility, while a passion for accountability fosters legalism and delay. The officials of necessity becomes specialist, intellectually isolated, oriented towards, techniques rather than people<sup>58</sup>". It also tends to develop a negative psychology perpetually prone to prohibitions. Owing to excessive routine and over emphasis on institutionalized activities the civil servants develop anti-pathies and become mentally myopic.

## **(2) Red-tapism**

Unfortunately; red tape is usually associated with the Bureaucracy, which gives un-due emphasis to procedure through proper channel, and precedents. However, it must be conceded that for providing safety and control, red tapism to a reasonable limit is essential. Strict conformity to the established procedures and legal regulations is required by law of government. Though the prescribed produces are not in its self had put its blind attachment kills, efficiency for the case is decided on the old and out-dated precedent instead of merit. As Bayehot puts it. "It is an inevitable defect and bureaucrats will kill care more for routine than for

results<sup>59</sup>. Or as Burks says, that they will think the substance of business not to be much more important than the forms of it<sup>60</sup>.

### **(3) Departmentalism**

Bureaucracy promotes the splitting of administrative units into further isolated units each pursuing its own ends without adequate coordination with the other. This approach to the problems by modern states is futile. The entries is one unit and pursue end ie. Welfare of the community. Exercise emphasis on departmentalism or fighting for ones own department is an evil.

### **(4) Self Perpetuating**

In bureaucracy “officials make work for each other” and in this way their number steadily rises. As they consider themselves as a class they tend to multiply and expand their class. This necessitates the operation of Parkinson’s laws and makes the administration Hobby sluggish with great loss to public exchequer and an additional burden on the taxpayer. Men of lower caliber and poor quality come into administration and the whole system degenerates. Dilution of standards causes political and economic instability, demoralization and moral and intellectual decline.

### **(5) Conservationism**

Excessive formality is an inherent virtue of bureaucracy which lessens their sense of judgement and initiative and makes them conservative. Their keenness to confirm to rules makes them insensitive to the merits of the case.

Although these evils are inherent in bureaucracy but the term is very often used in derogatory sense. The term by itself does not have had connotation .There is the psychological background against this concept. The government as we say is a necessary evil, hence it requires that its rules are to be followed run through they are disliked some time memory of the past when despotism reigned supreme plays some parts in associating present day administrations with its historical evils. Red tanis is always to be disliked particularly when an enthusiastic public servant goes beyond his jurisdiction in promoting public interest and legislature pushed into the background, it is also disliked and desisted by the public. Nobody questions the importance of administration. But that is not all other branches of the government are also important.

There are certain remedies that can cure the evils of bureaucracy if they are applied effectively such as effective political control, decentralization of authority, integration of civil servants in the society, non-official participation in administration etc. Similarly from top to

horror the administration must be given a democratic popular orientation<sup>61</sup>.

To sum up we may say that the importance of bureaucracy can not be discarded i.e. only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the administration of rational law conceptually systematized on the basis of such enactments as in the latest roman empirical period first created with a high degree of technical perfection.

During the middle Ages this law was received along with the bureaucratization of legal administration with displacement of the old trial procedure which was bound to tradition by the traditionally trained and specialized experts.

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## **CHAPTER-II**

### **POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EGYPT BEFORE THE ADVENT OF NASSER:**

Egypt is an outstanding example of a country, whose destiny and economic development has been vitally affected by her physical geography and strategic position. It has a unique position of being situated at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and Europe. The stories of her magnificence and splendors as also the most convenient trade routes lying across her lands have always fascinated the great empire builders and conquerors of the world. Being the front gate of two continents, its geographic importance has become more than just physical.<sup>1</sup>

The history of Egypt is highly fascinating Egypt's, corridor position and the presence of the Nile has greatly shaped the events of its history. From time immemorial the irresistible beauty of the Egyptian countryside attracted people far and beyond<sup>2</sup>.

To understand the social and political condition prevailing in Egypt in 1952 one must understand the history of Egypt. The Assyrians who were the first to annihilate the Pharoehs in 671BC, and their successors, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs and the Turks, were all irresistably drum to the valley of the Nile for the simple

reason of its vital strategic situation and resources they all know that Egypt was the pivot of world power status. The European Power of the modern era also recognized that the possession of Egypt was of great advantage in any contest for supremacy in the world<sup>3</sup>.

### **Advent of Mohammad Ali:**

The Egyptian People had no history beyond that of submission and suffering for centuries. During this period the Egyptians lost all the attributes of a nation but they never lost their consciousness of separateness from all other and of self identification. The sense of separateness from other and self-identification of the Egyptians with each other is the most important element in the re-emergence of the nation for its imported to the nation struggles an underlying consistency<sup>4</sup>.

The struggle for freedom and against foreign interference and domination can be traced back to the rise of Mohammad Ali the founder of 'Modern Egypt'. Albanian by birth, Mohammad Ali was appointed by the ottoman sultan as viceroy of Egypt in 1805. Mohammad Ali founded the last of the foreign dynasties to rule over Egyptians. The dynasty established by Mohammad Ali in 1805 ruled until 1953. Under this rule many engineers turks. Albanians and circassians came to Egypt and occupied important positions in the government. Mohammad Ali was

originally the deputy commander of the Ottoman army which had been sent to Egypt by the Sultan of turkey to repulse the French invasion. After the return of Napoleon; Mohammad Ali managed to stay in Egypt and become its governor under the Ottoman empire. He established himself as the master of Egypt and set his adopted country in the path of progress through education and industrialization. He almost detached Egypt from the ottoman empire<sup>5</sup>.

Mohammad Ali utilized Egypt's supremacy in the Arab world for the purpose of furthering his own ambitions in the area. In his quest for Arab Empire, independent of the Ottoman Sultan and under Egypt's hegemony. He used the methods of military conquest with an emphasis on Arab character of Egypt and the traditional and cultural affinities between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world in Asia and Africa.<sup>6</sup>

He played a very important role in the early development of modern Egypt and dominated its national life for the first half of the nineteenth century. He was a great reformer; politically he could be described as a benevolent autocrat. He created a very powerful army which began to adopt the techniques of modern European warfare. The military aspect of Ali pasha's reforms was perhaps the most important, especially his realization that only by imitating European methods of war

did Egypt stand a chance of defending herself from later European dominations. The principal purpose of his political and financial measures was to create a sturdy structure wherein he could build up a strong army.<sup>7</sup>

Mohammad Ali proceeded to impose a New Order in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The new order became the basic frame work for that country's drive towards modernity for the next hundred years. It aimed first at the organization of a modern army, and required reform and innovation in several areas of state activity, agriculture, administration, education and industry. Mohammed Ali inaugurated policies that changed the patterns of landownership and agriculture in order to increase productivity and yield to greater wealth to the state. He introduced a system of state education in order to provide the trained and skilled manpower required by the service of his state, and especially his arms forces. He reformed the administration in order to secure efficient strict and economical control over the functions of state and government. He embarked upon an ambitious programme of industrialization which produced the first state factories in Egypt in order to make his armed forces self sufficient in materials and supplies<sup>8</sup>.

Mohammed Ali gave Egypt the organizational basis and the human cadres for the emergence of a modern state. He effected a revolution in

internal government and administration by becoming the sole landowners and only merchant in the country. To manage as large a form as Egypt itself, as well as his commercial and industrial monopolies, he developed an effective bureaucracy<sup>9</sup>. To control the countryside and maintain order he divided Egypt into provinces to which he appointed governors. These became members of a new aristocratic political class.

Mohammad Ali was the first ruler in Islamic lands to undertake massive economic development he embarked upon the transformation of the Egyptian economy. This he tried to do by expanding agriculture, which constituted the major source of the country's economic strength, while at the same time introducing large scale industry by revolutionarizing agriculture methods he expanded cultivation to increase production and by establishing manufacturing industries he wished not only to increase trade and commercial capabilities but also to increase tax revenue and to ensure the potential economic independence of his state<sup>10</sup>.

Before his accession to power, most of the land belonged to the state. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, state ownership was rendered a legal fiction by the wide spread of the illtizam, or tax farming system. Throughout the sixteenth century, the tax farmers were mainly ocaklis, who held state land in return for the payment of a set



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land tax. They were however, permitted to retain any amount over this tax they could extract from the peasant farmers who worked on the land. Beyond this financial arrangement, the tax farmer virtually ruled the peasants on his iltizam land in as much as he could exact forced labour from them and in so far as he settled any disputes that arose between them<sup>11</sup>.

Within ten years of his coming to power, Mohammed Ali succeeded in virtually nationalizing land in Egypt by destroying the agrarian position of the privileged classes he found in the country.

Mohammed Ali's major concern during the early years of his rule was not over the improvement of Egyptian agriculture. Rather his first priority was the creation of a strong army to secure his power. Mohammed Ali made the building up of a strong army equipped and trained on European lines, the foundation of his new order. Soon this army became the basis for all reforms in the country.

Communication and transport, especially canals, were developed to facilitate foreign trade. He bought crops from farmers at fixed low prices and resold them to foreign exporters at great profits. By this time he had also created the nucleus of a growing government and state apparatus namely, an army, a navy and a strong bureaucracy.<sup>12</sup>

Mohammed Ali's method of government and administration were absolute and strictly centralized. All power delegated by authority of the Sultan in Egypt was vested in him. Contrary to previous Ottoman governors appointed by Sultan to Egypt, Mohammed Ali appeared original in so far as he imposed his authority over all other power groups in the country. There were no longer such contenders for power with viceroy as the Shaikh-al-Balad, the mamluk chief, or the religious leader from the Azhar, Instead of delegating the command of his troops to Albanian or other officers, Mohammed Ali placed his sons. Tossun, Ibrahim and Ismail at their head. His youngest son Saeed Pasha, commanded the naval forces; his grandson, Abbas was in charge of the Cairo government. Other members of his family filled military and civil administrative positions in the conquered dominions, especially Syria and Hijaz. He centralized the control of the various provinces in Egypt by reorganizing their administration into governors, subgovernors, inspectors and mayors in a chain of command relationship.<sup>13</sup>

In the central administration executive heads of departments were responsible for specialized functions of the government. These ministers were close and immediate collaborators of the viceroy, directly responsible to him, and loyal only to his person, not to a system. Their

staff consisted of officials recruited both from among Europeans and from the native population that was now receiving education and training under the viceroy's modern scheme. Mohammad Ali continued to conduct his government and administration in the Turkish language, and to appoint to high civilian administrative and military command positions only those among his Albanians and Turks who were most loyal to him, as well as white Mamluk slaves.<sup>14</sup>

At the request of the Ottoman, Sultan Mohammad Ali brought the Arabian Peninsula under his control in 1808. His next Arab exploit in the Arab East was directed against Syria, which had always figured in the expansionist ambitions of Egyptian rulers. Thus, in 1827, Mohammad Ali made a request to Constantinople for the addition of Syria to his Viceroy ship, but the request was rejected by the Sultan, who was becoming suspicious of the viceroy's increasing power in the area. However Mohammad Ali ignored the Sultan's order and in a series of brilliant military campaigns, the Egyptians under Mohammad Ali's son Ibrahim Pasha routed the Turkish armies in 1832 and established total control over Syria. Only the interference of the European powers particularly Russia prevented the Egyptians from entering Constantinople<sup>15</sup>. Between 1832-1840, Mohammed Ali extended his empire far and wide in the Arab east,

which included the cities of Macca, Madina, Jurusaelam and Damascus.<sup>16</sup>

During these years both Mohammad Ali and his son advocated the Arabic culture of Egypt as a means of making Syria and Arab East more susceptible to the idea of an Arab State ruled by Mohammad Ali and his dynasty.<sup>17</sup>

To the south, Mohammad Ali had hoped to get gold for his treasury and recruits for his army from the Sudan. He also wished to trace the source of the Nile to which way he turned his attention. Therefore he sent his first expeniditions to Sudan under the Command of his son; Ismail in October, 1820. Ismail conquered Barber and Shendi and penetrated deep into Sonnar. In the following year Ismail was joined by his brother Ibrahim. In his third expeditions, Mohammad Ali annexed Khordofan in 1822, founded Khortoum and subjected the surrounding country to Egyptian rule.

By 1842, Egypt had extended its frontiers to include territories with which it had no religious affinity. Egypt in fact had become an empire.<sup>18</sup>

However, not until the reign of Khedine Ismail in 1866 did the Ottoman Sultan officially recognize Egypt's hereditary control over Sudan. This concession was an acknowledgement on the part the Sultan of Ismail's pursuit of Mohammad Ali's goal to restore Egypt's ancient

Sudanic Empire. By the end of the Ismail's rule the boundaries of Egypt had extended south ward to the equator, including the lakes of Albert and Victoria with the territory lying between them. Egypt's domination also extended to the shores of the Gulf of Aden from Bab-ul-Mandab to cape Cordaful and to cope Hafoun. The Egyptain empire extended west ward to the kingdom of Wadai, which lay to the west of Darfour with this expansion Egypt got herself involved in European politics<sup>19</sup>.

When Mohammad Ali died in 1848 he left behind him an Egypt which was militarily and politically independent with a sound and expanding industrial base and administrative infrastructure. His ambitious modernization projects included irrigation, roads, buildings and expansion of economic activity had only been achieved with the influx of large number of European experts and advisers. They brought with them customs and attitude which rubbed off on growing Egyptian bourgeoisies, and over a few decades became a serious destabilizing influence. None of the series of relatives who succeeded Mohammad Ali, were capable of continuing his work<sup>20</sup>.

Most economic activity in Egypt at this time was the result of European investment projects which demanded financial returns. Under Ibrahim Abbas and Said the Egyptian financial system slipped in to the

hands of Europeans. An already large bureaucracy expended still further while the land owning class which had been encouraged by Mohammed Ali became wealthier and increasingly imitative of European life style and manners.

Ismail Pasha, the grandson of Mohammad Ali, who succeeded in 1863, was so enamoured of the new culture that he borrowed heavily from abroad to finance extravagant European style boulevards and public building, bridges, roads and railways. It was under Ismail that the Egyptian Museum was founded and that Europeans became interested in Egypt's culture. He was a talented and interesting character, but a disastrous ruler for Egypt at a crucial point in her history. During 1863 to 1875, because of Ismail's financial irresponsibility, Egypt became entirely subject to European financial creditors, Ismail's extravagance involved Egypt in foreign debts<sup>21</sup>.

Ismail was succeeded by his son Tufik and for the next three years Egyptians internal affairs continued to deteriorate rapidly. Tufik was a weak character, utterly unsuited for the historic role imposed upon him. He became the victim of increasing criticism from intellectuals, nationalists and landowners for whom he represented the twin evil of foreign domination and autocratic palace government.<sup>22</sup>

**British Occupation and Rise of Arab Nationalism:**

Egypt made tremendous progress during the reign of Mohammed Ali, but he could never become popular because of his autocratic method and political whim<sup>23</sup>. While he adopted a policy of modernization in selected fields, his successors, Said and Ismail tried to make Egypt a part of Europe. In 1856, Saeed Pasha obliged his engineer friend Ferdenand de Lissepe of France, by granting him permission to construct the Suez canal on terms, which proved to be most harmful and burdensome for Egypt.<sup>24</sup> After the canal was opened for navigation in 1869. Britain became greatly interested in the political aspects as the new water channel had largely reduced the time and expanse of shipping to and from India, then British's most lucrative colonial outpost, as compared to the arduous and tiresome journey via the Cape of Good Hope.<sup>25</sup> Therefore it became a cardinal principle of British diplomacy to acquire maximum control over this most strategic waterway and the country which owned it.<sup>26</sup>

The bankruptcy of Ismail Plasha provided the godsend opportunity for Britain to purchase the Suez canal shares in 1875, which enabled Britain to become a large shareholder and provided the excuse to intervene in Egypt's domestic matters and eventually to forcibly occupy her in 1882.<sup>27</sup>



Selling away his shares to the British government was a confession of the Pasha's bankruptcy and an admission of his inability to manage his country's economic affairs. The British and the French who had a financial interest in stabilizing Egypt's economy, first imposed a joint control to look after the financial matters of Egypt and finally when Ismail resisted the interference, they persuaded the sultan to depose him and appoint his son Tawfiq Pasha in his place<sup>28</sup>. The new khedive being installed in office with the blessing of the two powers, could not, indeed he did not wish to become independent of their interference. He was just a figurehead acting upon the advice of British and French, agents, who did not wish to encourage native participation in their country's affairs.<sup>29</sup>

The British occupation of Egypt was triggered by an uprising calls the 'Orabi Revolt' in 1881, the first Egyptian revolt in modern times against the foreigners both of the Ottoman origin and the Europeans. Orabi was an ordinary Egyptian soldier of peasant stock who was bold to present the khedivs with a petition from a groups of soldiers for the remedy of certain grievances and for the dismissal of the unpopular circassian 'Minister of War' His objective was purely nationalistic.<sup>30</sup> In the same year Colonel Ahmad Orabi revolved against the hold of outsiders over the palace and public affairs and the self interested ruling

class. The revolt of Orabi was the first expression of Egypt nationalism. The British were alarmed by the rise of nationalistic upsurge and suppressed the revolt, describing it as anti European and captured the political authority of the world's most important country. Orabi was arrested but he was subsequently released by comrades in arms, who broke up his court martial. This forced the government to appoint Orabi 'Minister of War'. The revolt was however crushed and the British occupied Egypt in 1882.<sup>31</sup>

The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 created untold problems for nearly one hundred years. British had invaded Egypt to defend the Khedival regime from certain defeat at the hands of a disorganized but popular Egyptian nationalist movement. This movement would not have honoured claims to financial compensation by foreign business and would have been an unstable and probably hostile force controlling a waterways of crucial imperial importance to Britain.

From 1882 to 1956 British had great difficulty in justifying its presence in the country, and yet it could not contemplate withdrawal, and over the years this became a matter of national prestige. They did not declare Egypt a colony or even a protectorate until 1914 on the outbreak of the first world war. Britain did not know what to do with it in the long

term. In short term their brief was clear to put Egypt's finance in order. So from 1883 until the outbreak of the first world war, Egypt was effectively ruled from the British residence on the Nile in Cairo.<sup>32</sup>

The British agent Lord Cromer ruled over Egypt from 1883 to 1907 with the iron hand mainly serving the British interest, though Mohammad Ali's descendants continued to reign. Lord Cromer adopted an autocratic style of management and he restored Egypt to sound economic health by the turn of the century. While Egyptians held executive posts in government ministries, British advisers held total political control, and they derived their authority directly from British force of arms. Cromer was undoubtedly an efficient and diligent administrator.<sup>33</sup>

At the turn of the twentieth century, nationalist movement was led by Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, but it was not successful. With the beginning of the world war I, which the Ottoman empire entered on behalf of Germany and against Britain the latter terminated Ottoman connection with Egypt and established its own protectorate on the country. It was a period of great misery and suffering for the Egyptians both politically and economically.<sup>34</sup>

The British occupation also affected Egypt-Africa policy, which was now based on British interests and requirements as seen from Cairo.

Once in Egypt, Great Britain felt the need for safeguarding the source of the Nile, particularly when other European powers were also in the field. Considering it as a threat to its interests. It supported the Egyptian demands for reconquering the Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian army under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener was interested with this task. Kitchener won a decisive battle over the Mahdi in September 1898.<sup>35</sup> The British now demanded "by right of conquest" a share in the administration of the country. Thus an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed on January 19, 1899 establishing the joint sovereignty of the two countries over the Sudan, called the condominium<sup>36</sup>.

### **Establishment of Protectorate and Partial independence:**

At the outbreak of world war in 1914, Egypt's political status underwent a sudden change, Britain's formal declaration of war on Germany on August 4 had placed Egypt owed allegiance to the suzerain the sultan of Turkey who was intending to join the side of Britain's enemy.<sup>37</sup> while practically it was already under the occupation of Britain. In the events of Turkey siding with Germany all his subjects including the Egyptians were to be considered at war with Britain and their hostile acts were to find a legal justification. To override the creation of such an awkward and difficult situation Britain declared to be a protectorate, free from the

suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan.<sup>38</sup> The alternatives of annexation or independent from their viewpoint.

However, the Egyptians were annoyed by the establishment of the protectorate Britain therefore, under pressure from the nationalist, declared on February 28, 1922, that the British protectorates over Egypt was terminated and Egypt was declared to be an independent sovereign state.<sup>39</sup> But her majesty is government retained control over certain matters.<sup>40</sup> The commission appointed to draft the construction of independent Egypt recommended that the sultan of Egypt should be named as 'the king of Egypt and the Sudan.'<sup>41</sup> But the British government did not accept the recommendation and threatened to review the recent declaration. King Fuad yielded to this threat and assumed the title of 'The King of Egypt' only.<sup>42</sup>

The new constitution of Egypt was promulgated in 1923. From that time onwards the politics of Egypt mainly revolved round a triangular struggle between the King; the wafd party and the British; the last maintaining substantial control over Egypt. The wafd was mainly middle class party which neither touched the King nor the feudal class.<sup>43</sup> The Egyptian nationalist refused to accept the limitations on their sovereign independence involved in the reserved subjects. Zaghlul Pasha, the

Egyptian Prime Minister, although disappointed later persuaded himself and his followers to accept it as a useful forward step towards the attainment of complete independence. But the relation become soon tense when on November 19,1924, Sir Lee Stack, Governor General of the Sudan and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian armed forces was assassinated in Cairo.<sup>44</sup> Britain acted on this incident very strongly. Lord Allenby, on behalf of the British government delivered an ultimatum to the Egyptian administration in Sudan as provided under the condominium of 1899. The only thing left for Egypt in the Sudan was the Egyptian flag.<sup>45</sup>

With the death of Zaghlul in 1927 the leadership of wafd party passed to Nahas Pasha, who and many other leaders of the wafd party became gradually corrupt. It lacked social control and hardly cared for the peasants. However wafd was the most important party during the inter war period. The other parties on the right were various small and feudal oriental or upper middle class parties, supported by the king and on the left was the communist party whose leadership was mainly in the hands of the non-Muslims. The Muslim brotherhood was a lower middle class religious organization with considerable influence among the peasants. In strict sense it was not a political active organization.<sup>46</sup>

In 1937 Egypt became a member of League of Nation, thus claiming to be independent. In 1937 king Fuad was succeeded by Faruq, who was an exceptionally weak and coward man. He was like Ismail before him he was badly cast in his historic role, a key figure in bringing about collapse of the system upon which his authority was based. He was ignominiously exiled in 1952. In 1939 the Anglo Egyptian treaty formally terminated British occupation but empowered Britain to station its forces in the Suez canal zone.

The World War II (1939-1945) brought further miseries to the Egyptian as the British used the country for the military and communication purposes in their war against axis powers. The general atmosphere in the country for historical reasons was anti British and pro German. In 1942 when the war situation in North Africa became critical for the Allies, the British wanted to have a Prime Minister in Egypt who would be subservient to them. They consequently imposed Nahas Pasha on king Faruq by encircling the Abdin palace with military tanks and threatening to depose him if he did not accept Nahas as his Prime Minister during the period. This action further discredited the wafd party in the eyes of the Egyptians, Nahas was dismissed with the war nearing its end and the palace became more influential. The Palestine question was

becoming critical with UN debate and partition of the country in mid 1940. In 1948 Israel was Established and the Egyptian army along with other Arab armies, entered Palestine. But they were defeated on account of lack of leadership and defective arms provided by the corrupt clique around the King. This created a great frustration and bitterness in Egypt; particularity among military officers.<sup>47</sup>

### **(ii) EMERGENCE OF MODERN BUREAUCRACY IN EGYPT:**

Egypt has a very colorful history. The pharaohs were considered divine and they ruled over a highly stratified society. The first pyramid was built in the 27<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Over the next 500 years the movement only got grander. Monarchical power was at its greatest during the 4<sup>th</sup> dynasty when Chops and Mycerinus built the Great pyramid of Giza- Pharaonic Egypt was the cradle of bureaucratic systems with levels of hierarchies and division of labor. Under the Pharaohs who considered themselves as endowed with divine attributes, Egypt reached the zenith of its achievements during the old kingdom which began, with the unification of upper Egypt with the lower by Menes, the first Kingdom which began, by 3200 B.C. and ended in 2180 B.C. A highly centralized government with the divine Pharaoh at the top assisted by a minister and helped by a 'government council' and an elaborate hierarchy which



practiced considerable delegation and specialization, was able to create engineering marvels like the pyramids besides controlling and directing the flow of and flooding of the Nile, irrigating the farms and increase the fertility of the soil. In those glorious achievements the officialdom that participated consisted of mixture members of the royal family, Priests, holders of various administrative positions. Certain degree of professionalization and training to master reading and writing and arithmetic was there. Some offices had a tendency to become hereditary and were often subject to purchase. Efficiency must have been the secret of their success. There were also evidence of inefficiency in this period, red tape, abuse, bribery, extortion and laziness. Above all there was the concept of total ownership of the land and the people including the officials by the God King, the pharaoh.<sup>48</sup>

The second most important period of administrative significance was the Arab-Islamic period which began in 639 AD and ended with the attamas by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which was characterized by an appointed Diwan or a wali, a kind of viceroy ruling on behalf of an external Caliph or sultan. During this period various services began to emerge under the auspices of the state from time to time showing distinct hierarchies of army and other services 'men of sword and men of pen'

During the mamluks the native military hierarchy developed often in conflict with other bureaucrats owing allegiance to the sultan. Allegiance to a civil or a military hierarch was common, despite the fact that all were in the name of the sate and often there was some overlapping. During the ottoman rule from 1517 AD the rulers and the higher level bureaucracy were controlling large number of Egyptian scribe's solders and revenue collectors. Centralization of authority suppressing any initiative from the lower ranks was the practice, as the ruler was virtually far away, real loyalty and allegiance was to the local hierarchical superior in the employment of an emerging modern state.<sup>49</sup>

The distinct influence of modern European state on the emergence of a state bureaucracy was felt after the short lived Napoleon occupation (1778-1801) A revival of national sentiment with the ideas of political and administrative reform with all positions at all levels of the government open to Egyptians on equal footing on the basis of intellectual and ethical criteria was the result of this European exposure.<sup>50</sup>

Mohammed Ali who ruled for year after French occupation first came as a viceroy of the Ottomans and later emerged as the proponent of a developmental nationalism. He was also the initiator of a series of administrative reform. However, like the pharaohs and later rulers, he too

felt the need for centralized authority. This was because immediately before his arrival the country was in a state of confusion. Mohammed Ali was able to launch an era of reconstruction, improved irrigation systems and redesigned and rationalized administrative hierarchies all owing allegiance to him.<sup>51</sup>

Mohammad Ali sought to transform rural, agricultural Egypt into an industrial society with a modern military apparatus. He mobilized nation's human and material resources into his own hands, creating a state controlled economy in the near east with Egypt as its center. To manage his varied enterprises he wanted an efficient but subservient civil service. Detailed division of the country into administrative units under generational jurisdiction with deeper and wider hierarchies took place. His periodic inspections tours of the country side checking on cultivation, irrigation, conduct of civil servants, public accounts, and every detail of what may be called the beginnings of a development administration in Egypt set the tone for a modern authoritarian state. Administrative responsibilities were carried out by six principal departments (diwans) interior, treasury, war, marine, public instruction and public works, foreign affairs and Commerce. As he launched his industrialization projects a new diwan was appointed to supervise textile industry Extension of an

industrial revolution to many areas with state initiatives led to the creation of a new class of 'public sector employees'.<sup>52</sup>

In an effort to draw upon the Egyptian population for his technical and administrative staff he set up schools in Egypt and sent several hundred young men to European institutions to study civil administration. Recruitment for higher education on the basis of competition and merit rather than on ethnic origin or religion was emphasized. Training was emphasized especially for technical subjects and specialization, which becomes part of the expanding state machinery. Through Mohammad Ali' vision did not continue after his death. Foundation of an educated merit oriented civil service was laid down. Firmly during his regime.<sup>53</sup>

Mohammed Ali Egypt's rules seem to have began the familiar process of getting rid of the upper ranks of the civil service left by their predecessor. Thus the successors to the Abbas Ist seed replaced the higher functionaries left to him and substituted his own appoints. Moreover he tried to direct affairs himself, from matters of high policy down to questions of details. It was under said that Europeans Began their penetration of Egypt in earnest, by financial manipulation and exploitation of the local ruler's extravagances and ambition. His successors, Ismail did little to alter the administration habits of Egypt, for he soon become

embroiled in international finance to a degree that brought the European power closer and closer to political control over the country.<sup>54</sup>

British occupation which began in 1882 gradually found the need to produce clerks for the civil service towards which the education system was reoriented. *Higher Echelons of mostly excluded Egyptians* who were to be content with lower level government positions. Throughout his long tenure of office Lord Comer had sedulously depressed kept down every independent Egyptian and had filled all the High posts with ciphers. With the result that the natural leaders of the people had no opportunity of leading the people. In 1898 of the 10,6000 Egyptians in the Civil Service only 45 received a monthly salary of 70 Egyptians pounds or more. Whereas 47 out of 455 Britons received that much. However unlike in India, the British were satisfied by having a tight control at the center and left the provinces to the Egyptians who were for centuries used to such arrangement moreover Berger noted two important aspects of the British policy concerning civil service.<sup>55</sup>

1. The emphasis upon school certificate as an entitlement to a government post.
2. The reserving of the higher post for the Englishman.

Thus Cromer in 1885 noticed the beginning of the formation of a civil service. Later educational qualifications were further specified for various levels of administration. Attendant upon this contraction however was an increase mainly in the free services charged with the maintenances of public order, the police, the army, and the coast guard. The army, the financial departments and the public works department are mainly in European hand. In these departments a considerable numbers of French, Italian, Austrian, German, and Greek and subordinates where employed. The principle post were held by English, and the administrative systems of these departments distinctly bear the mark of English influence, on the other hand the home department and the department of justice were in Egyptian hands.

The number of British official in Egyptian civil administration was steadily increasing; by world war I<sup>st</sup> it had grown enormously. In 1920 the Milner mission found Egyptians in less than one quarter of the higher posts since 1905 it found that the proportion of Egyptian in all posts had increased from 45 to 51 percent.

In the higher post however Egyptian had declined from 28 to 23 percent, while proportion of the British in such posts had increased from 42 to 59 percent.

The growing nationalist movement and the accompanying grants of autonomy meant the steady elimination of foreigners from the civil service and its Egyptianization. This process was accelerated by the British declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922. By the time of independence, Egypt was in full control of most of public employment and the educational system was geared towards producing civil servants for the state. There were conscious efforts to improve the recruitment system which culminated in inviting A.P. Sinker who was the chairman of The British Civil service commission to study the Egyptian system of governance. As a result of his report a civil service commission was established in October, 1951, with a mandate to regulate personnel admission.<sup>57</sup>

The first report of the commission listed its tasks as.

1. Elimination of unnecessary posts and bureaus.
2. Classification of post with job description and appropriate grades and salaries.
3. Assignment of personnel to post for which they are qualified.
4. Proper distribution of work around the agencies of the government.
5. Establishment to training program for the service.

6. Strengthening of the commission's position in the government and enlargement of its jurisdiction.

The impact of the reforms was quite impressive and the regulations governing the civil service of Egypt "much like those of western countries with certain exceptions appointments based on written and oral examinations fixed, published salary scales with the schedule of increments; promotion by merit and seniority according to fixed proposition.

Two year later in 1952, after the extraordinary changes the army introduced following its seizure of power and the abdication of the king. Egypt had a civil service commission and the beginning of a new civil service establishment.<sup>58</sup>

### **III. FREE OFFICER'S AND ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURE BUREAUCRACY:-**

The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was a classic case of a third world movement against imperialism. In nearly 100 years of domination, western imperialism shaped Egypt to suit its own needs. Egypt's agriculture developed but its peasants did not land concentration and population growth produced a growing and impoverished landless class. Industrial development was stunned and delayed white business and



finance fell into the hands of foreigners. The introduction of western education and bureaucracy generated an Egyptian 'new middle' class but foreign control of the stunted modern sector limited its opportunities and frustrated its aspirations as population growth, urbanization and education exceeded the absorptive capacity of a retarded economy. Unemployment reached crisis proportion and was joined in the forties by great inflation while tiny upper class lived a life of luxury the mass standard of living fell continuously per-capita income dropping almost 50% in the first half of the century.<sup>59</sup>

The weak, narrow based monarchy proved incapable of coping with the rising social discontent. A political crisis engulfed Egypt. A protracted nationalist struggle kept Egypt in ferment while the failure of established leaders to dislodge the imperialist presence gradually robbed them of legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. Middle class counter titled the brother road, radical nationalist secular leftist entered the political arena demanding greater nationalist military and a redistribution of wealth and power. This failure of the regime to respond gradually alienated the middle class. It mobilized outside and against the political system. The antic regime violence was making Egypt ungovernable.<sup>60</sup>

This combined social and national crisis precipitated the emergence of an anti regime movement among middle class army officers. These officers soon developed into a force with capacity to topple the ancient regime and break the impasse into which the country had fallen. The disaster of Palestine was which boringly exposed the bankruptcy of the establishment made them determined to act, and on 23 July, 1952 the Egyptian army overthrew the monarchy by a coup d'etat that the free officer's wanted to break the domination of imperialism the foreign minorities and the landed upper class over they wanted to open up opportunities for the Egyptian middle class to do something for peasants and create a modernized Egypt. The officer's were led by a man who could fairly be considered the founder of the modern Egyptian state, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser.<sup>61</sup>

The collapse of monarchy set off a power struggle in which various political forces bid for a share of power. The leader of Egypt's veteran Nationalist Party the Wafd, and those of various radical movements by virtue of their links with free officers all made a claim. The goals of free officers were initially confined to cleaning up the army and the state. The main target however remained nationalistic in character. The Egyptianization of Egypt, the restoration of national dignity and pride; the

consolidation of comprehensive independence, and the achievement of self assertion on the international horizon.

The decisive factor in all this was Nasser forceful leadership inside Free Officer's council, his ability to keep the core of the officer movement together and through it control the army. Step by step all dissident political forces were repressed. Bourgeois political parties disbanded, leftwing workers smashed and finally the Muslim brotherhood crippled but this was achieved at the cost of alienating much of the politically active population. If the new regime was to survive it had to break out of this political isolation and forge a base of popular support.<sup>62</sup>

The Free Officers were remarkably successful in doing this. The decisive factor in this achievement was Nasser's growing stature as a charismatic leader. The masses accepted him as a national and popular hero who could do great things and be trusted with their confidence. Land reform was probably the one issue on which the free officers were united despite their intellectual differences.

The free officers formed a cohesive team entrenched at the levels of a growing security apparatus and a state machine habituated to obey whoever occupied its command posts. Thus, Nasser won a free hand to transform Egypt.

The case of the Nasserist programme was nationalism, the new leader sought to create a strong, modernized Egyptian state. Nationalism in foreign policy translated into a drive to end Egypt's political and economic subordination to the west, to restore its Arab Islamic identity diluted by a century of westernization and to replace western imperialism with Egyptian leadership of a non aligned Arab world.

Nasser's Egypt rested on more than coercion and charismatic legitimacy. Between leaders and masses the new regime shaped a huge bureaucratic state. Nasser dominated and energized the system. He made the Presidency an activists, interventionists, and innovating force in the service of his vision of the common good.<sup>63</sup>

Around Nasser was a core elite whose members served as vice president in ministerial or party posts. This group was exclusively military, recruited and replenished from the free officers movement. The military scattered across the height of the state apparatus functioned as a relatively cohesive political cadre which decided and enforced the regime's policies. The new team at the top represented a major social transformation in the composition of the elite from the upper class king's men and landlord, lawyers of the old regime. The Free Officers were of modest social background, chiefly from a salaried middle class. Many

developed leadership and organizational skills and some were military engineers of technical competence. They possessed the discipline, determination and coercive resources to impose reform against resistance from vested interest and to establish a new order out of sociopolitical breakdown. The civilian technocrats and professionals were recruited from upper and middle class families. They rose to the top not through wealth and family name, but through the bureaucracy and universities on the basis of education, skills, experience and the patronage of Free Officers. This military technocratic team was suited for a country undergoing a phase of state building and forced modernization.<sup>64</sup>

Nasser dominated all process of Egypt because in the authoritarian bureaucratic state there were personal rivalries, barely institutionalized. Nasser's office, dynamism and popular stature raised him above other elites. In the mid sixties; the Free Office's core functioned as a collegial leadership.

The top elite rested on a vast bureaucratic sub structure made up of the ministerial bureaucracy, the armed forces and a huge public sector. The new ruler who cultivated a new breed of upper middle-class technocrats in an effort to infuse their base with a modernizing dynamic leadership. Educational and bureaucratic expansion opened new paths of

opportunity for the middle and even lower middle class to move upward. The new regime aimed to enhance the efficiency and expand the functions of bureaucracy. It tried to sweep out the nepotism, corruption and lethargy typical of the old regime. It also forged a multitude of functional ministries and public organization entrusted with growing new tasks.<sup>65</sup>

Gamal Nasser was an upper Egyptian and the son of a post officer who married the daughter of a Saidi. He was born in 1918 and for eight years from the age of ten went to secondary school in Halwan, Alexandria and Cairo. Towards the end of his school life he became involved in politics.

Nasser was always attracted to the military life. His heroes were Prophet Muhammad, and Gandhiji, man whose lives had most impressed him. When Nasseer joined the Military Academy in 1937, he formed some friends of fellahin origin, who were eager to try to achieve the renaissance of Egypt. Their main concern was to plan to get rid of the British, the landowners and the Pashas.<sup>66</sup>

After graduating from the Military Academy Nasser was posted as a second lieutenant to Mankabad where Anwar Sadat and Zakariya Muhiuddin had also been posted. Here young Gamal found his regiment working alongside and in collaboration with British offices. The senior

Egyptian leaders were lazy, corrupt and they were almost inclined to agree with the English men. He was infuriated, moreover by the way they paid court to the British military mission. Almost instinctively Gamal Abdul Nasser began to rebel. Some of his brother officers shared his feeling. Among them were Anwer Sadat and Zakaria Mohjieddin.<sup>67</sup> At that time the country was a helpless mess, run by foreigners, who exploited the Egyptians. The fellahin were oppressed by the land owners, many of the Wafd party politicians were corrupt, elections were rigged and parliament did very little effective business. The young king Farooq who had succeeded his father in 1936 did not fulfill the expected promise. Because of 1936 treaty the British dominated the land and Egypt was trapped in a network of political and military obligations which were against its real interest and from which it could not free itself. In 1939 the officer of Menkabad founded a secret revolutionary group consisting of nine officers. They were Abdul Latif Baghdeadi, Hasn Ibrahim, Hussain Fiqr Sabri, Abdul Muneim, Abdul Rauf, Wagih Abaza, Ahmad Saudi and Hassan Izzat, Anwar Sadat joined them later. These officers were motivated and impressed by Nazi organization. They had a common concern and discontent about which they continued to keep in touch

during the years to come, though they were scattered to different posts and duties.<sup>68</sup>

In 1937 Nasser was posted from Mankabad to an Egyptian infantry battalion in the Sudan. He spent nearly three years in Sudan, much of the time out at the Jebel Aulia dam on the white Nile. There he developed his close friendship with Amer. At the outbreak of world war II Nasser found himself in a situation which aroused mixed feeling of frustrations and relief. He was serving in an army which was incapable through lack of equipment. Nasser's own view of the war was that Egypt should remain neutral. In 1940 some of the nationalist officers chiefly Anwar-el Sadat began secret contacts with the Italians. Their aim was to plan a coup in Cairo. For this purpose Sadat on the instructions of his Revolutionary Committee got in touch with the leaders of "Muslim Brotherhood" Hasan al Banna and Aziz al Misri.<sup>69</sup>

These plans led to no serious action and by December 1940, Sadat established between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser's group of army officers a long, important and finally violent relationship. Sadat became one of the principal links between the two groups. By that the Muslim Brotherhood had ceased to be merely a religious or moral revivalist movement. It had begun to see itself as apolitical force with a large mass



influence and formed a secret paramilitary organization. Sadat found Al Banna at once fanatical and clear thinking with a surprising grasp of the problems facing Egypt.<sup>70</sup>

Nasser and his friends dreamed and planned reform and revolution for Egypt. He returned to Egypt at the end of 1941. He was again nearer the center of events and able to be in closer touch with the other nationalist officers. In January 1942, the Egyptian government under Hussain Sirry Pasha broke off relations with Vichy France at British insistence. King Farouq was away from Cairo when the decision was taken. He objected that he had not been consulted and demanded the resignation of the foreign minister. The Hussain Sirry government resigned and political crisis developed. The British feared the king was planning to bring back Ali Maher, who was dismissed by the king under British Pressure in 1940, to head a more pro Axis or neutralist government or to control it from behind the scenes on.<sup>71</sup>

On 4<sup>th</sup> February 1942, the British Ambassador Sir Hiles Lampson, delivered an ultimatum to King Farouq, demanding the appointment of a government headed by Mustafa Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Party.<sup>13</sup> The British Believed that the Wafd was the only Egyptian Group able and ready to held the country in alliance with the British and to control

population unrest in the face of the growing axis threat. When the king did not comply, Lampson surrounded the Abdin Palace with British armour units and marched into the king's office. They read him a not demanding his abdication. The ambassador told the king he must appoint Nahas as Prime Minister or he must himself abdicate. After some hesitation king agreed to invite Nahas to form a government. For Egyptians this was a matter of a national humiliation and disaster and 4 February 1942 has since become an important date in their modern history. Nasser like other army officers reacted with fury to the palace coup; not because of any love for the king but he saw it as an insult to the whole country. General Mahammed Naguib later the public leader of 1952 and then a Colonel of infantry, sent a letter of resignation to Farooq, which the king refused to accept.<sup>14</sup> The period between 1942 to 1945, was one of heightened revolutionary activity in the army and among youth organizations throughout the country. One group of the revolutionary officers met in Cairo to discuss possible relations with the British but more cautious counsel prevailed. Nothing serious could be done. Nasser was determined that Egypt must never again suffer such a humiliation. The real revolutionary Conspiracy dates back to this time.<sup>72</sup>

On 4<sup>th</sup> February, 1942, Gamal Abdul Nasser began systematically planning revolution. Nasser concentrated quietly on recruiting officers for the underground revolutionary movement. Nasser had been involved in an army conspiracy in the late 1944 and 1945, but only in a minor role. He took over the responsibility of the secret movement within the army in November 1944 but did not begin to exert his organizational efforts seriously until after the Palestine war in 1949. In 1949 a constituent Committee came into existence comprising Nasser, Hassan Ibrahīm, Khalid Mohieḍdin, Kamaluddin Hussain, Abdul Monein and Abdul Rauf, all of them at one time or another connected with the brethren. The Committee was firmly under Nasser's control insisted on its complete independence from all other group within and outside the armed forces. In 1950 the Committee of the free officer formally adopted, the name of the "Society of free officers and an executive Committee of ten officers was set up which was to become the future Revolutionary Command Council. In 1950 Gamal Abdul Nasser was formally elected president of committee, but this was kept a closely guarded secret. The committee proclaimed that the army belonged to the nation and demanded radical reforms of state and society.<sup>73</sup>

In October, 1949 in a secret meeting at Amer's House the executive Committee agreed on a plan of action to prepare a revolution over the next five years. In this program the struggle against imperialism, meaning in the first instance the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt, was to have top priority. The program also called for a strong modern army and a democratic parliamentary system. At that time the free officer's were aiming to move into action some time in 1954 or 1955, and meanwhile they began to distribute their famous mimeographed tracts denouncing the regime which were written by Khalid Mulieddin under Nasser's direction and distributed both in the army and the civilians. The existence of the whole movement became widely known but not the name of its leaders. Nasser was aware that when the time of revolution would come they would need a senior officer with a well known name who could act their figure head and give their movement weight and respectability both at home and abroad. These qualities they found in the fifty years old Major General Muhammad Naguib, who won distinction by his personal coverage in Palestine where he had been seriously wounded. Contact was made through Abdul Hakim Amer and Naguib Became a free officer's.<sup>74</sup>

The liberalization policy of the Warf government in 1950-51 helped the free officer's movement to strengthen its organization and increase its

clandestinely published propaganda; the chief message of which was that the army belongs to the people. In the meantime the free officer's readily assisted any group operating against the British in the canal by supplying them with arms, ammunitions and training facilities. These activities of the free officer elicited a response from the palace and the government. A confirmation between them and the king become inevitable. The clash around over the elections of the officers club executive committee in late 1951, a contest which the free officers headed by Brigadier Muhammad Naguib.<sup>75</sup>

The free officer's proclaimed the aims of their intended revolution. The government of Revolution had six principles to guide it, destruction of imperialism, end of feudalism, ending of monopoly, and of the domination of Capital over government, establishing social justice; building of a powerful national army and setting up a sound democratic system.<sup>76</sup>

King Farouq feared and disliked Naguib's influence in the army and was enraged when, against his express operation Naguib was elected the president of the free officer's Executive Committee. The free officers had shown their strength inside the army and were challenging the palace.

The wafd returned to power in January 1950 and began its long drawn out struggle with British. The free officer gave it their enthusiastic support, by helping to train command to fight in the Canal Zone. On 26 January 1952, rioting started in Cairo, which the wafd government was incapable of controlling. On the Black Saturday much of the center of Cairo was set on fire, nine people lost their lives in the British 'Tarf club' and many British owned building were destroyed. After wafd its policy had led to the burning of Cairo, it soon became clear that the civilian political regime was crumbling. Several approaches by the free officer's to member of the wafd, had met no response and meanwhile the state security police seemed to be coming close to uncovering the free officer's secret organization.<sup>77</sup>

Nahas was dismissed by the king the day after Black Saturday and Ali Mahir was brought back from a decade in the wilderness to replace him. Ali Mahir tried to keep in touch with the wafd, the king and the British at the same time. The king's idea of restoring authority and national reconstruction was however, simply to take revenge on the wafd.<sup>24</sup> Ali Mahir was not prepared either to dismiss parliament or to be harsh enough with the wafdist. So he was replaced by Naguib el-Hilay an intelligent and honest ex-wafdist who had been a popular Minister of

Education and had resigned from the wafd by a drive against official corruption. He agreed to dissolve parliament and to exit the wafd? Secretary General. But the king found Hillary's corruption inquiries coming too near to his own interest.<sup>78</sup>

Hussein Sirry advised King to appoint General Naguib Minister of war. King Faruq rejected the proposal instead he ordered the dissolution of the free officer's Executive Committee. When the young officer's learned on 20 July, that the King was going to appoint their foe General Sirri Amir. As minister of war they decided that the moment of coup had come. Faruq had many spies in the army and they reported to their master that their day of doom was drawing closer. The corrupt monarch rushed to the national enemy of the Egyptian people, British imperialism seeking its support to crush the people of Egypt. So the revolutionary leader had to strike much earlier than they had planned.<sup>79</sup>

On 10<sup>th</sup> February, year a fortnight after 'Black Saturday' the Executive Committee of the free officer's had met and decided to carry out a coup on the following month. The officer's decided to bring forward the date of revolution to March 1952, but an unexpected setback occurred when Colonel Rashid Mahanna, an erratic free officer's whose troops according to the plan were to play an important role in the coup,

announced that he had been transferred to Gaza. The revolution was put off until the summer. The coup was planned for mid night of on July and the plan of the coup had been drawn up by Nasser and worked out in detail by Amer and Kemal ed din Hussai.<sup>28</sup> The operation was planed in three main stages, first to ensure control on the armed forces, second to take over civil government and appoint a new Prime Minister , and finally to get rid of the King Farooq.<sup>80</sup>

The Coup-d etat of July 23, 1952, was the first military challenge against established legal authority in Egypt since the Arabi revolt seventy years earlier. Egypt had been independent following the treaty of 1936, but it's Suez Canal Zone was still occupied by a British force. The free officer's consequently had to proceed with caution and moderation, for they feared the intervention of the British force. The preparations were made in secret and Nasser in person had to contact the leading participants and gave them instructions about their duties on the eventful night of 22 July. Some confusion and mishaps resulted from the fact that the officer's did not know who their other participating colleagues were due to the secrecy that surrounded the movement.<sup>81</sup>

Like most other coups, the Egyptian army movement was carried out in the first hours of the day between midnight. It's immediate aim was



to the Military Academy. At about the same time; Hussain-al Shafi with his tanks occupied the strategic points in Cairo: the broadcasting building, the telephone exchange, the railway station and the airports. The planes of the air force at the same time over the main city of Egypt its discourage resistance to the movement. The takeover was complete when the important garrison at Arish rallied and its headquarter was taken over by Salah and Gamal Salem at 4:30 a.m.<sup>82</sup>

General Naguib was brought to the general headquarters by two officers at 3:00 a.m., and was appointed commander in chief of the armed forces to lead the successful movement. The first communiqué about the coup apparently written by Amer, was broadcast at 7 a.m. July 23) by Anwar Sadat in the name of general Naguib. Its text had been communicated earlier to the press. It neither proclaimed a revolution, nor did it say that a coup d'état had just been carried out against the old regime of King Farouq, whose name it did not even mention. The statement was an apology for the military takeover and showed primarily the military motives behind the officer's action and their concern about the army's reputation. It spoke of the bribery, corruption and government instability that had a great influence on the army and contributed to defeat in the Palestine war. The statement reassured the people that the entire

to seize control of the army, occupy its general headquarters, arrest its higher commanding officers and secure control of the important centers of communications in Cairo including the broadcasting station. In contrast to most other coups; no plans were made in the first stage of the operation to arrest the king and Cabinet, who were in Alexandria, and occupy the royal palace. The action was scheduled to start at am. But two hours earlier a free officer of the Army intelligence; Saad Tawfiq, told Nasser that the king had been informed about the coup and the chief of staff, General Hussein Farid had been given order to all commanders to meet at the General Head-quarters at Kubri al Qabba, in order to deal with the plot. The free officers had consequently marched one hour earlier with forces estimated at some 3,000 soldiers. Nasser thought it was an excellent opportunity to arrest the commanding generals together in the building, but he had also to move fast to tell the officer's about the change in schedule. The entire military area between Abbasiya and Helispolis was blocked by the armored cars of Khalid Muhieddin. The general headquarters building was surrounded and taken by force at 1:45 a.m. after a brief resistance in which two guards were killed and two were wounded. Twenty generals and high ranking officers including the chief of staff and Ali Naguib, general Naguib's brother, were arrested and sent

army is today working for the interests of the fatherland within the Constitution and without any designs of its own. "And gave assurance to the foreign residents, "our brother", about the safety of their lives and property."<sup>83</sup>

The successful first stage of the officer's coup had to be followed by the nomination of a new government that was imposed on the king Nasser and his colleagues decided to stay in the back ground and appoint a civilian cabinet headed by Ali Maher Pasha, a former Primer Minister of Royal head of the cabinet, and an independent in politics. Ali Maher accepted the offer presented by Sadat Maher left for Alexandria on July 24, and the king immediately accepted the resignation of Hilali and appointed Maher officially and wished him "success in what is beneficial for the country".<sup>84</sup>

Egypt was entirely in the hands of the revolutionist. It was a bloodless coup-de-lat and Naguib who had taken no part in the coup itself was called to become President of the Revolutionary Command Council, on the eve of their victory. The free officers took days to force the abdication of king Farouq. The immediate pretext for their action was the rumors that spread in the first two days on Farouk's attempt to prepare a counter coup and his radio message to the British in the Canal zone asking

for military assistance. On July 24 Zakaria Muheiddin was sent to Alexandria with a battalion of motorized infantry supported by tanks, artillery and armored cars to besiege and if necessary attack the two royal palace on the evening of the following day. Naguib and Sadat left separately for Alexandria on July 25.<sup>85</sup> On 26, July 1952, an ultimatum was given to Farooq to quit the country. Farooq struggled hard, called the American ambassadors to his aid, but he had no alternative and signed the act of abdication in favour of his son Ahmad Fuad. Thus at six o'clock in the evening of 26, July 1952, the last chapter in the black history of Muhammad Ali dynasty ended, and with it ended the slavery in the life of Egyptian people who had continued for over a century. The man who came to power under the leadership of young Gamal Abdul Nasser aimed at a drastic change in the system of government by replacing absolute monarchism with a progressive republic.<sup>86</sup>

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# *CHAPTER-III*

### **CHAPTER –III**

#### **REFORMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE NASSER ERA & THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY**

The 1952 revolution was not only a milestone in Egypt's long history but was also exerted powerful influence on the Arab world and many of the emerging nations of the third world. Gamal Abdul Nasser became the most popular hero in the Arab history, when he successfully led the Egyptian Arab Revolution of July 1952. His revolution was not a routine change of government but a basic and historical change which inspired the Arab masses both in traditionalist-conventionalist, arab countries as in republican and left oriented countries. The principles for which Nasser stood did not concern Egypt alone but the Arab world at large.<sup>1</sup>

The political and social ideas of Gamal Abdul Nasser had a strong impact on the entire Arab world. By the end of 1954, Nasser was in an undisputed leader who had total control of Egypt. He consolidated his power, destroyed his opponents and secured the end of the British occupation of the Suez Canal area. The following year he began to devote his energy and attention to the regional environment and he further spread advanced the myth of Egypt's greatness and later of the Arab nation. By

1955 Nasser perceived that his country's security as well as his own prestige required closer relations with other Arab countries and thus he adopted the symbol of Arab unity.<sup>2</sup>

Middle Eastern leaders called upon the Bureaucracy not only to fulfill the conventional law and orders functions, but also to be involved in industry trade, education, culture and so forth. The Education bureaucracy was involved in industrialization projects and development's that took place during Nasser's period (1952-70). The bureaucracy had a number of outstanding achievements to its credit the special ministries and agencies set up under Nasser to build the aswan high dam to carry out agrarian reforms and to operate the suez canal. Among the outstanding achievements of Nasser, the most striking examples are the completion of Aswan High Dam, Nationalization of Suez Canal, agricultural reforms and administrative reforms.<sup>3</sup>

### **Building Of Aswan High Dam**

The High Dam project on the Nile was one of the most important programme of the revolutionary governments of Egypt. The building of Aswan Dam was surrounded by passionate national sentiments and exciting political events. The Dam becomes a symbol of national pride and dignity. It was a great achievement and was a gigantic endeavor, both

technically and organizationally. Once completed, it was expected to add to Egypt's agricultural wealth and would become a revolutionary symbol of hope in the struggle against a runaway growth of population. During the fifteen years of construction on the Dam, the total investments were estimated about \$ 1.3 billions. The first stage lasting about four years was to cost about \$70 million. This sum was to be given to Egypt as a free grant, \$56 million were to come from United States and \$14 million from Britain. The second stage was to be financed by a loan of \$200 million from the world Bank plus a loan of \$ 130 million from the United States and \$ 20 million from Britain. The sums were to be advanced in annual investments. The remaining \$760 million were to be provided by Egypt in man power, material and local currency. The amount furnished by the bank was to be repaid over 40 years at interest of 5 percent annually, those by the United States and Britain on approximately in similar terms.<sup>4</sup>

The new structure was to be 250 feet high at the center, and three miles wide. The lakes formed by the Dam were to be some three hundred miles long and run into the Sudan. The Dam would increase Egypt irrigated land by one third, and also multiply her electricity power resources eight times. The additional agriculture production would assist industrial development. An official spokesman of Egyptian government

revealed at a press conference that “The high Dam is expected to yield ten billion kilowatt per hour of electricity per annum.”<sup>5</sup>

Substantial technical preparation was needed for the project. Including such things as the transfer of equipment and machinery, the laying 15 km of railway line the construction of two principal paved roads and many side roads, the provision of electricity for the project’s site and the building of large housing units. The management of about 32,487 working people including about 200 Egyptian engineers and about 7000 Egyptian technicians and skilled workers.<sup>6</sup>

The Public Authority of the High dam set up a vocational training center in 1961 and conclude an agreement with V.S.S.R. for the provision of the equipment needed for it and 5,579 trainers including workers, engineers and technicians graduated from this center. The High Dam authority concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Education which provided for 850 students in final year of industrial secondary school to work on the project, about 213 engineers and technicians were also dispatched to the Soviet Union for training. The high dam authority also sent 647 employees on various administrative training programmes.<sup>7</sup>

The building of High Dam was a great achievement of the Egyptian bureaucracy in 1958, the higher committee for the high dam was

organized. The head the organization Naseer, personally choose Mohammed Yonus who had joined the army in 1937. Yonus had been an instructor colleague of Nasser at the Staff College in 1951. Ministries and public organizations were obliged to provide the committee with the employees, technicians, reports, studies information, and statistics that were required of them. The committee was not subject to the laws and regulations of government department or to the control of the state budget concerning all projects, nor was the committee subject to the dispositions of the law on public organizations.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the construction of the High Dam the land of the Nubian people would be drowned and it made necessary the urgent evacuations of the people their settlement was a huge task. The work done included comprehensive surveying of old Nubians and the preparations of New Nubians with lands houses and utilities; roads and means of transport, communications, schools and health services, supplies and security etc. Around 35,000 feddans were to be reclaimed and redistributed and no less than thirty three villages to be built.<sup>9</sup>

Within eight months about 60,000 Nubians had to be transferred to their own home, with about 400,000 bundles of possessions and 30,000 head of cattles. Meanwhile 39 villager were built with nineteen primary



schools, three preparatory teachers school, an agricultural teacher school, a central hospital, eleven health Units, four agricultural veterinary service centers, six public post offices and several private ones as well as the resettlement of the Nubians. The High Dam project made it necessary to embark upon a number of related tasks such as the rescue of Abul Symbol and other temples in upper Egypt and the construction of a high dam railway station and of two large ports for trade with Sudan. The work on the Dam became particularly energetic in 1962, with the appointment of a loyal and efficient technocrat engineers, M.Siddiqi Sulaiman as special minister for the High Dam whose organization had surpassed the status of a higher committee and that of a public authority to reach. The capabilities of the new ministers were considered responsible for a great deal of the success.<sup>10</sup>

Work of building the High Dam was directed and co-ordinated on the spot through a straight forward and sometimes personal approach. Execution staffs were given the rights in the formulations of executive plans whereas technical and administrative leaders work allowed a great deal of freedom of action. The organizations of the project were also kept flexible subject to frequent change as the need arose. Work was generally divide among several sectors, each headed by a director, who had a great

deal of liberty to decide and act the administrators involved themselves in productive activity and did not confine to 'desk work'.<sup>11</sup>

The great freedom which the Ministers enjoyed reflected itself in many aspects, of which the system of reward and incentives was of special significance. People working on the Dam and on related projects received additional allowances. Material and moral prizes were given to workers. People working in the High Dam projects had also special system for holidays. They were also provided with reduced fares on the railway and were able to communicate free of charges by telephones with their families, other privileges beside the normal benefits of social security and pension, included special provisions of exceptional pension who died during the work or those who retired from service because of complete disability. The levels of all workers were also insured. In short the workers were provided all facilities of life.<sup>12</sup>

**AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1952:**

Egypt has made considerable economic progress during the second half of the present century, especially in the field of industrialization. Agriculture, however, is still the main source of living for the majority of the population in Egypt. During the seventy five years since the beginning of the twentieth century, the cultivated area of Egypt has increased from about 5.1 to 6.5 million feddans. This accounts for less than 28 per cent increase, while the population has grown by more than 290 per cent (from 9.7 million in 1897 to 37.8 millions in 1975). As indicated in Table (3.1) and as a result of this unbalanced increase the per capita share in the cultivated area has dropped considerably, from about 0.53 to about 0.17 feddans during the seventy five years ending in 1975. Cropped area has, however, increased relatively more due to permanent irrigation system and use of fertilizers. On the eve of the Second World War the total cropped area, offering more than one crop per year, had reached about 8.5 million feddaes. Since then it has continued to grow, reaching 11.1 million feddans in 1975.<sup>13</sup>

During the decade 1960-1970, an amount of E 350 million has been invested in the agricultural sector and irrigation excluding the Aswan High Dam investments (€166 million). These investments covered

vertical and horizontal expansion of agriculture. As a result, the productivity per faddan has considerably increased. In 1952, the average production of the feddan of cotton was 4.5 Kentars and in 1971 it reached 6.7 Kentars. During the same period, that of wheat rose from 5.18 ardabs to 8.55 ardabs and maize from 6.3 to 11.0 ardabs.

Agriculture's continued dominance and high investment return in the above period were the result of sweeping institutional change brought about by the national government after the revolution. Aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production and improving the man/land ratio as also realizing capital for industrial investment, the government's agricultural development policy operated through three major programmes(1) agrarian reforms; (2) extension of cultivated acreage through land reclamation and irrigation; and (3) increased agricultural productivity through technological innovation and application.

**FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ENACTMENT OF LAW:****1.AGRAIAN REFORMS**

The pattern of landholding in Egypt prior to 1952 reflected the great gap between the small class of rich land owner capitalists, or PASHAS, and the mass of peasantry, or FELLAHIN. Owing to the near impossibility of making both ends meet, the FELLAH traditionally lived and died in debt; disease drained his energies, and ignorance and lethargy perpetuated his helplessness. It was in the hope of improving this state of affairs that made land redistribution the first reform of the Revolutionary Command Council. The Agricultural Reform Decree of September 1952 set a two-hundred feddan ceiling on individual land-holdings; drastic reduction in land rents, the establishment of agricultural cooperatives and credit facilities, and a new minimum wage for the fellahin followed. A second decree in 1961 extended the land reform programme, primarily by reducing the ceiling on individual holdings to one hundred feddans. Although its socio-economic objective could not be minimized, the Land Reform Law was, to a large extent, aimed at weakening the landed aristocracy of the previous regime. One observer noted that the fundamental objective of land reform was to break the Pasha's control over the country's economic and political life. The net effect of the

agrarian reforms, thus, was to punish the major landowners rather than the owners of medium sized farm units, whose social and political role actually grew as a result of the reform and who, subsequently, became in a position to radically change the Egyptian agricultural sector.<sup>15</sup>

The sudden cropping up of under sized holdings resulting I waste and inefficiency and thereby contributing to population pressures and sizeable exodus of idle labor from rural areas was, however, one of the negative aspects of these reforms. Table (3.2) gives the pattern of land ownership in Egypt after promulgation of the 1961 land Reform Bill limiting holdings to one hundred feddans per person and its subsequent position in 1975. It is clear from the table that following the promulgation of the first land Reform Bill in 1961, the governmental allocations regarding agricultural holdings have decreased with every subsequent land ceiling legislation. This, in turn, led to the gradual reduction in any tangible incentives for the involvement of capital in agriculture. The probable consequence of such a situation was low productivity.<sup>16</sup>

After the promulgation of the First Land Reform Bill in 1961, there were 2,919,000 land owners who owned an arable area of 3,172,000 feddans (each one of them had less than five feddans), but after the implementation of subsequent Land Reform Bills, the number of such

landowners increased to 3,190,000 while the total area owned by them decreased to 2,769,000 feddans in 1975 (Table 3.2 ). The number of land-owners who owned holding of 100 and more feddans was 5000 in 1961 as against: 2000 in 1975. The area owned by them was 500,000 feddan and 398,000 feddans in 1961 and 1975 respectively.

In terms of percentages we find that in 1961, 94.1 per cent landowners held 52.1 per cent of the area (each one having less than 5 feddans), while in 1975, 95.0 per cent of such land-owners shared 49.7 per cent of the total area. Again, in 1961, 0.2 per cent landowners (each having 100 feddans and above) owned 8.2 per cent of the area, while in 1975, their percentage reduced to 0.1 where as the percentage of the area owned by them reduced to 7.1.

Thus the total number of landowners increased from 1,101,000 in 1961 to 3,358,000 in 1975, where as the arable area distributed amongst them decreased from 6,084,000 feddans in 1961 to just 5m 572,000 feddans in 1975.

This factor coupled with the loss of arable land due to salinity and urban expansion further deteriorated an already worsening agricultural scenario caused by the a mounting population pressures on the limited cultivable area, and accelerated the rural-urban drift considerably.

However, agrarian reforms have their plus points too. The change in the tenure structure, the improvement in labour efficiency and in techniques of land production constituted improvements in the qualitative aspect of the population problem. In view of the fact that between 1952 and 1967 the status of 317,376 families changed from landless to landed and that during the same period 700,000 families enjoyed the security of tenancy, the living conditions of approximately one million families or five million individuals were greatly improved.<sup>17</sup>

An interesting observation was made by Saad Gadalla in relation to some peculiar social developments following the land reforms. In a study of the Demera, Zafran and Mania estates, Gadalla found that the general trend before the reform was towards a slight decline in the marriage rate. After the reform Law was enacted, and it was announced that these estates would be immediately requisitioned and redistributed among the inhabitants in holdings of from two to five feddans according to the size of the family, the marriage rate increased suddenly. Naturally, the farmers wanted to acquire as much land as possible, and the only feasible solution was to increase the size of their families by calling home all the members who were working away from the village, and by arranging marriages for their unmarried sons. The result was a substantial



increase in marriage during 1952 and 1953 in the three estates; after the land was redistributed, however, the marriage rates fell immediately. As a result of such manipulations the population continued to increase rapidly in the areas of land redistribution. Gadalla reported birth rates of 48 per thousand and death rates of 21 per thousand in some agrarian reform estates in 1960.<sup>18</sup>

## **2) LAND RECLAMATION AND IRRIGATION:**

Land reclamation and irrigation are the two most important projects of Egypt launched after the Revolution with the twin aim of bringing large and extensive new areas under cultivation, and intensifying the practice of multi-cropping. It should be remembered that Egypt basically is a desert country, and with the exception of the narrow stretch of Mediterranean coast line west of Alexandria it is almost without rainfall, therefore, almost all cultivated land needs to be irrigated by the Nile. Beyond the Nile Valley the only cultivatable area are the oases which are to be found in some of the larger depressionary regions (Kharja, Dakhla, Farafra, Bahariya and Siwa: the first two of these together are known as the New Valley).

The regulation of Nile waters and the upkeep of the irrigation system have historically been central objectives for Egyptian

governments, upon which has depended the economic prosperity of the country. The agricultural plan envisaged a short term and a long term programme for land reclamation.<sup>19</sup> The short term programme to reclaim 520,000 feddans in the Delta and Nile Valley and 300,000 feddans in desert areas was to be completed before the first stage of the Aswan Dam in 1965. This short-term programme depended on irrigation, some savings in the water requirements of crops, re-use of drainage water, and the installation of artesian wells. The long term programme was designed to be put into operation after the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970 and aimed at the reclamation of 1,200,000 feddans which depended on the water made available by the High Dam. It also included the conversion of 700,000 feddans from basin to perennial irrigation. The success of both programmes meant the reclamation of approximately two million feddans, an area of land equal to one-third the formerly cultivated acreage in addition to the 700,000 feddans to be perennially irrigated. Assuming that five feddans of land can support an average family of five persons, it is estimated that 400,000 farm families, a total of two million individuals, and at least 2,000 families engaged in small businesses and trades—grocers, butchers, carpenters, technicians, etc.- could be resettled on the newly reclaimed lands.<sup>20</sup>

Land reclamation still remains one of the government's priorities. In a recent document, the government stated that further plans have been made to reclaim 2.8 million feddans of land about half of which is to be found on the eastern side of the Delta, along the Canal and on the Mediterranean coast of Sinai. Most of the programme should be completed by 1990.<sup>40</sup> (See Table 3.3).

### **3) RISE IN PRODUCTION THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION:**

Since 1952, the Ministry of Agriculture has sought to raise production on the cultivated lands through technological innovation and improvements, including the introduction of more mechanical farming and better equipment, better seed selection, liberal use of fertilizers, and improved drainage and irrigation methods.<sup>21</sup> Since export requirements place a high premium on agricultural surpluses, there has been concerted effort to end dependence on one product, namely, cotton, and to diversify and intensify agricultural and livestock production.

**TABLE 3.1****CULTIVATED AND CROPPED AREA IN EGYPT,1897-1975**

Year	Population in millions	Cultivated area		Cropped area	
		Million feddans*	Per capita	Million feddans *	Per capita
1897	9.7	5.1	0.53	6.8	0.71
1907	11.2	5.4	0.48	7.6	0.67
1917	12.8	5.3	0.41	7.7	0.60
1927	14.2	5.5	0.39	8.7	0.61
1937	15.9	5.3	0.33	8.4	0.53
1947	19.0	5.8	0.31	9.2	0.48
1960	26.0	5.9	0.23	10.2	0.39
1966	30.1	6.0	0.20	10.4	0.34
1968	31.6	6.0	0.19	10.9	0.34
1969	32.4	6.0	0.19	10.9	0.34
1970	33.2	6.0	0.18	10.9	0.33
1975	37.8	6.5	0.17	11.1	0.29

\*One feddan = 0.42 hectares

Source: CAPMAS Publications

**TABLE 3.2**

**LAND OWNERSHIP IN EGYPT AFTER PROMULGATION OF  
THE 1961 LAND REFORM BILL LIMITING LAND HOLDING  
TO 100 FEDDANS PER PERSON AND IN 1975**

Year	Size of the holdings in feddans	Land owners in thousands	Area owned in thousands feddans	Percent land owners	Percent area Owned
1961	<5 Feddans	2,919	3,172	94.1	52.1
	5-10	80	526	2.6	8.6
	10-20	65	638	2.1	10.5
	20-50	26	818	0.8	13.5
	50-100	6	430	0.2	7.1
	100+	5	500	0.2	8.2
	TOTAL	3,101	6,084	100.0	100.
1975	<5 Feddans	3,190	2,769	95.0	49.7
	5-10	92	617	2.7	11.1
	10-20	44	586	1.3	10.5
	20-50	23	682	0.7	12.2
	50-100	7	520	0.2	9.4
	100+	2	398	0.1	7.1
	TOTAL	3,358	5,572	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, New York, 1979, pp.56-57.

**TABLE -3.3**

**LAND RECLAMATION: SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE LAND RECLAMATION PROGRAMME 1978-1999\***  
(In '000 feddans gross area)

Year	East delta	Middle delta	West delta	Middle Egypt	Upper Egypt	New valley	Total
1978	16.0	-	7.0	-	-	-	23.0
1979	21.0	7.0	20.0	5.0	23.3	4.5	80.8
1980	26.0	14.0	13.0	12.0	31.8	6.0	102.8
1981	33.0	20.4	24.0	19.0	20.0	16.0	132.4
1982	38.5	11.5	34.0	17.0	17.0	22.5	140.0
1983	52.0	8.0	39.0	12.5	16.4	28.5	156.4
1984	75.0	15.0	39.0	17.5	10.0	68.5	225.0
1985	95.0	15.0	35.0	15.0	10.0	68.5	238.0
1986	105.0	10.0	40.0	16.7	10.0	67.5	249.2
1987	115.0	10.0	40.0	5.0	10.0	64.5	244.5
1988	105.0	10.0	40.0		5.0	46.0	206.0
1989	105.0	10.0	19.0		5.0	38.5	177.5
1990	110.0	10.0	5.0			17.0	142.0
1991	110.0	10.0					120.0
1992	110.0	10.0					120.0
1993	40.0	7.5					47.5
1994	40.0						40.0
1995	40.0						40.0
1996	40.0						40.0
1997	45.0						45.0
1998	55.0						55.0
1999	72.0						72.0
TOTAL	1,448.5	168.4	355.0	119.7	158.5	448.0	2,698.1

Excluding 120,000 feddans that will be irrigated from Greater Cairo Sewage.

Source : Ministry of Agriculture, Cairo, 1981.

With the technological advancement it was realized that the best prospects for growth could be achieved from what is normally called vertical expansion, by which we do not mean more intense farming (for the level of intensity is already high in Egypt), but rather the use of more advanced technology especially as regards drainage, the use of fertilizers, and the introduction of a wide variety of crops. A recent report on this aspect concludes that 'the potential for further increasing the production of the areas already cultivated is enormous.'<sup>22</sup> Although yields in Egypt are high by international standards (Table 3.4), the figures 'do not take into consideration the unique nature of the Egyptian agricultural sector. In no other country is the agricultural system so dependent on irrigation. In no other country is the cultivated area so well served by high quality water. This unique situation is further favoured by the rich and deep alluvial soils which characterize the whole Nile Valley and Delta. Finally no other country can boast better climatic conditions for agricultural production.'<sup>23</sup>

The conclusion drawn is that the Egyptian agricultural yields should rather be compared to those of the irrigated territories in the United States (Table 3.5) and that they could become 'considerably higher than the current or potential irrigated yields in the US because the overall

environment for crop production is generally superior in Egypt to average irrigated conditions in the US,<sup>24</sup>



**TABLE 3.4****COMPARISON OF EGYPTIAN AND WORLD YIELDS OF 13  
FIELD CROPS ON THE BASIS OF 3-YEAR (1978/80) AVERAGES**

<b>Crop</b>	<b>World yield tons /hac</b>	<b>Egyptian yield tons/hac</b>	<b>Egyptian yield as of world yield</b>
Maize	3.126	3.884	124
Barley	1.977	2.682	136
Onion (Winter)	12.431	26.517	213
Sugarcane	56.533	82.681	146
Wheat	1.106	3.241	170
Broad Beans	1.001	2.190	219
Flax (fibre)	0.417	1.000	240
Flax(seed)	0.468	1.219	260
Rice	2.723	5.643	207
Groundnuts	0.964	1.683	175
Lentils	0.611	1.046	171
Sesame	0.294	0.898	305
Potatoes	12.294	15.295	107
Tomatoes	20.955	17.262	82

Source: Ministry of Agriculture- USAID, 1982

**TABLE-3.5****COMPARISON OF AVERAGE U.S. AND EGYPTIAN CROP YIELDS UNDER IRRIGATED CONDITIONS**

Crop	Average yields (mt/hac)	
	Egypt	U.s.
Maize	4.0	9.6
Sorghum	3.8	6.5
Rice	5.6	5.5
Barely	2.7	5.7
Soybeans	1.1	3.4
Sesame	0.8	2.0
Groundnuts	2.4	3.4

Source: Ministry of Agriculture- USAID, 1982.

In the past years there has been an increase in horticulture farming and the farming of berseem to the detriment of the main crops: cotton, wheat and sugarcane. Rice planting and production have also increased (See Table 3.6). This point is important for it suggests another possible strategy for developing the Egyptian agricultural sector: a shift in the relative importance of crops farmed.<sup>25</sup>

After this exposition it must be clear that the High Dam was not only built under special political conditions, but also under special administrative conditions. Completion of the Dam was a great achievement on which the Egyptian Bureaucracy prides itself. The Aswan Dam is not a unique example in which Egyptian Bureaucracy was involved but so many other cases resemble it in that respect. These successful projects had to be assumed by new administration which pervaded the regular administrative apparatus.

**AGRARIAN REFORMS LAW AFTER 1952:**

In 1952, when Revolution took place in Egypt and Nasser came to power, it soon became apparent that the "Free Officers" had not only achieved a successful coup, but has also aspired to generate a social revolution. The Agrarian Reform law was not immediately put into force by the first cabinet formed after the Revolution. On September 7, 1952; the Cabinet was removed and on the following day Free Officers began to put in effect the Agrarian Reform law. The Revolutionary regime enacted a land reform law in September 1952, six weeks after the coup-d'état. The immediate purpose of this act was to eliminate the miserable condition of Egypt's peasantry is the chief cause of the country's under development. But the problem grows more serious as the heavy emphasis on industrialization widens still further the gap between town and country.<sup>26</sup>

Egyptian agriculture is highly distinctive for several reasons. The land is the most productive in the world, but it is extremely limited in area (about six million acres, or three percent of the country's total area) and since the rainfall in Egypt is negligible except near the north coast, it is all irrigated, for these reasons it is expensive. Highly profitable and overcrowded, and because it is irrigated rather than rain fed; the rights of

individual ownership have always been limited by the powers of the Pharaoh Khedine, government or whoever has controlled over the source of irrigation, the River Nile.<sup>27</sup>

Under the Pharaohs, the Arabs and the Mamelukes, privileged groups notably the priests and military chieftains secured some de facto rights of property over the land, even to the point of transferring ownership gifts or inheritance, but the central power of the state was always able to recover its rights in time. Land ownership in Egypt remained essentially different both from the system in Europe and other countries conquered by Islam.

In the early seventeenth century the Ottoman devised the idea of the 'iltizam' (obligation) as a means of raising money. The 'multazamin' were required to raise a certain sum in taxes from the district allocated to them and in the periods when the central power was weak they acquired something of the status of feudal barons. In his struggle with the Mamelukes. Napoleon tried to establish private property rights for the Fellahin, but the French occupation was too short for the system to take root. A few years later, Mohammad Ali destroyed the Memelukes and re-established a strong centralized government, he then abolished the iltizam and established a cadastre for all Egypt's cultivated land, which at that time

amounted to two million acres. Part of this land he granted to the Fellahin in usufruct and in small plots of three to five acres, but he also leased vast estates to members of his family military chiefs and high state officials from the turbo Egyptian ruling class, he retained ownership of the land but the profits of farming now belonged to the cultivators.<sup>28</sup>

Muhammad Ali intentionally laid the foundations of a hereditary landed aristocracy which grew steadily power and wealth through the century and the great mass of the fellahin were incapable of preventing this from happening at their expense. The total amount of cultivable land was small, and individual farms were continually being divided through inheritance. After Muhammad Ali's death in 1849, Egyptian industries collapsed, so there was no alternative employment to absorb the surplus population on the land.<sup>29</sup>

After the deposition of the super extravagant khedive Ismail and the British occupation, the lot of the fellahin improved for a time. The corvée was abolished and replaced by paid labor taxes, were reduced through financial retrenchment and the area of land under permanent irrigation was greatly extended. For a brief period, production out placed the increase in population, but this did not last. Between 1897 and 1947 the cultivated area increased by fourteen percent and cropped area by thirty

seven percent, but the population doubled. In 1947 the per capita real income of Egypt's rural population was just about what it had been fifty years before, but the distribution of income had become still more uneven.<sup>30</sup>

Two 'feddans' of land constitute an absolute minimum from which a Fallahin family can make a living and in 1952, there were more than two million who owned less than one feddan. They were seventy two percent of all proprietors; and they owned thirteen percent of cultivable land. There were about 1.5 million families (about eight million people) who owned no land at all and lived by share cropping or casual labor. At the other end of the scale 280 proprietors owned 583,400 feddans (of which 178,000 feddans were the property of the royal family) power to big landowners. It aimed at correcting the maldistribution of landownership seen as a serious aspect of the more fundamental problem of growing poverty, the over population of the country, and it was conceived as an element of a development package including industrialization and reclamation. The Agrarian Reform was supposed to divert private capital from the land market to industry. Land Reforms, reclamation and industrialization were all expected to contribute in

different ways to employment, the growth of income, and greater equality.<sup>31</sup>



**PROVISION OF LAND REFORMS LAW:**

- (1) The land Reforms law of 1952 fixed two hundred feddans as a maximum limit of ownership and empowered the government to requisition any land holdings in excess of this maximum limit within a period of five years. Owners could however transfer 100 feddans to their children. They were allowed to retain, within the ceiling the part of the estate of their choice and to sell land to their tenants in small plots. Private mort main (waqf ahli) was abolished. Exceptions were made for industrial companies with holdings necessary for industrial development and for societies or individuals engaged in the reclamation of land for the purpose of ultimate sale. The landowners may within a period of five years after the enactment of the law transfer the ownership of his land in excess of the maximum limit in the following manner: to his children at a maximum rate of fifty feddans per child, provided that the total transferred to his children does not exceed one hundred feddans:
- (2) According to 1952 Land Reforms law, compensation is paid to landowners for land expropriated by the government in the form of nominal treasury Bonds bearing 3 percent interest and redeemable

within thirty years. The rate of compensation equals seventy times the basic tax plus the value of fixed and mobile installation and trees.

- (3) The requisitioned land is to be distributed by the government in lots of not fewer than two feddans and not more than five feddans each. A person eligible to acquire land must be an Egyptian of age not convicted of any dishonorable crime, working in agriculture and must own fewer than five feddans.<sup>32</sup>

The plan of distribution is based on the assumption that the land belongs to its tillers. Priority in acquiring land is given to those who actually cultivate the land, then to peasants having the largest families in the village, then to those possessing less wealth among their fellow villagers, and finally to non residents of the village.

- (4) The law provides that no land can be rented except to a tenant who will farm the land himself. The rent of agricultural land must not exceed seven times the basic tax assessed upon the land. In case of crop sharing rent, the owner's share must not exceed one half the crop after deduction of all expenses. Agricultural land may not be leased for fewer than three years and the contract must be in writing, regardless of the amount involved.

- (5) An Agriculture Co-operative Society was established and farmers who acquired the requisitioned land were obliged to join co-operative society established to render agricultural and social service to the members. The primary responsibilities of the society included providing its members loans, seeds, fertilizers and machinery. Principal products and crop, and collection of annual installments of the price of the land. The co-operative societies perform these functions under the supervision of an officer chosen by the higher committee for Agrarian Reforms.
- (6) The law provides that the wages of agricultural labourers in various agriculture districts should be fixed every year by a committee appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. This provision does not apply to labourers who perform duties in the public interest according to special laws. The law also gives agricultural labours the right to form trade unions to further their common interest.<sup>33</sup>

In 1958, the second land Reforms law put the maximum ownership of 300 feddens for the persons together with his wife and dependent children. The third law in 1961 lowered the maximum limit to 100 feddans per person without mentioning the family. Then in July 1969, it

was decided that the maximum ownership should be 50 feddans per person and 100 per family but a transitional period of two years was allowed for its implementatin.<sup>34</sup>

**ADMINISTRTION AND THE SUPERVISED CO-OPERATIONS :**

Wherever small farmers acquired new land under the Agrarian Reform, Special co-operatives were established and these differ in many important respects from the ordinary agricultural co-operatives in the rest of the country, which are mainly concerned with credit and supply. Membership of Agrarian Reform co-operative was made compulsory. They advance loans to members and provide them with seed, fertilizers, livestock and agricultural machinery together with storage and transport of crops. These supervised co-operatives have been a striking success. They have been honestly administrated under the supervision of Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.<sup>35</sup>

The administrative machinery of land reform is composed of Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, the Executive Agency and the Judicial Committee. The Agrarian Reform Authority set up to implement the reform measures concentrated on the requisition and distribution of land and further the organization of co-operatives. The Authority grew into vast bureaucratic institution. It's supervision of co-operatives was quite impressive as becomes an independent body. By 1957, its name having been changed to General Authority for Agrarian Reform programme. The administration had become top heavy and more

inflexible, beneficiaries of Agrarian Reform were compelled to join a co-operative in which the authority/ representatives organized production and the marketing of crops. The co-operatives became the suppliers of credit fertilizers and seeds. The new institutions of combined Rural limits, co-operative and other services were really an extension of the state bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup>

The Agrarian Reform Authority was from the beginning placed under dynamic and competent leadership. The Authority concentrated its efforts on the requisition and distribution of land. The Authority choose a course which led to a vast unwieldy co-operatives organization, every year it increased the scope and nature of its work. The whole pattern of socio political relations in the village remained deeply centralists and hierarchical. The officials had to help with their administrative and professional expertise to the big landowners and rich farmers concerned.<sup>37</sup>

The Agrarian Reform Authority, administers land directly by pending distribution. A supervised co-operative was created from the outset, their role was to fulfill two important functions, previously assumed by the landlords the organization of production and the marketing of the crop. They were managed by a board under the direction of an official appointed by the authority. A pyramidal structure was also

created with local co-operatives. These associations were placed under general co-operative society. The Minister of Agrarian Reform in Cairo exited the final control. It is true that a bureaucracy interested with the accomplishing of an agrarian reform programme will be inclined to give it a technical perspective.<sup>38</sup>

The Executive Agency carries out the various operations of the land reform programme. The agency is comprised of several specialized departments for land requisition, land distribution, land survey, farm management, engineering co-operation, technical research press, legislation and general administration. The judicial committee handles all disputes arising between land owners and the Higher Committee and is composed of a counselor from the National Courts, a technical official from the council of states a member of the higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, and a representative from the survey Department. The decision of the judicial committed is subject to the ratification of the Higher Committee. The Agrarian Reforms laws reflect an awareness of the main aspect of the agrarian problems, distribution of land ownership, disparity of income required a successful reform. The Agrarian Reform programme had presented some serious challenges to the quasi feudal socio economic relations prevalent in the Egyptian country side.<sup>39</sup>

**FAILURE OF NASSER'S LAND REFORM:**

Nasser inherited the unwieldy British colonial bureaucracy and immediately set about lacking it away, either by replacing key leaders with his military allies or by forming new institutions with similar functions as the old institutions had. In addition to all the typical problems associated with bureaucracies, such as entrenched attitudes, shiftlessness, lack of vision and over rigid hierarchies, Nasser found himself unable to effectively change the bureaucracies for two key reasons.

First, his military allies were unqualified to oversee changes. They had neither the education nor the experience to oversee major ministries. Secondly he did not have enough allies to change the organization and leadership structures of the bureaucracies he attempted to form as remould. As a result, Nasser increasingly found himself dependent on a bureaucracy whose leaders used their posts as fiefdoms to entrench their own power and fight other governmental organization or they even outrightly disagreed with Nasser.<sup>40</sup>

Indeed one of the thrusts of the land reforms was to establish even more bureaucracy. Councils, Co-operatives and other local bodies found their ranks filled with very people whose power they were supposed to reduce, the upper and middle classes. Though political participation



among peasants did increase, the evidence suggests that the peasants were not upset over the arrangement in the early years of reforms. Their relations with village officials were not hostile and village officials provided for many of the peasants' needs. Simply, Nasser was unable to institute a bureaucracy that did better job controlling the peasants than the local strongmen. The national bureaucracy was unsupportive and local officials were correctly able to recognize the lack of a central organizational authority.<sup>41</sup>

Nasser's reforms thus, established a flow of wealth from rich capitalists to poor peasants and back to rich capitalists. Wealth that had been held by the rural elite was given to rural poor and the wealth they generated flowed to urban elite was given to rural poor and the wealth they generated flowed to urban elite. As a result the rich got much richer the poor got a little better off and urban middlemen made fortunes because of centrally controlled prices. In other words development did not go from core to periphery but vice-versa. The rich land owners even relinquished control of their properties when infact many simply transferred their holdings to relatives or their foremen explaining why so little land was redistributed. The Middle class people under the land-owning limit received a windfall when they used they spare capital to buy

up land. The new organization of the national bureaucracy merely gave upper and middle classmen another chance to exercise political power the opposite of Nasser's intention.<sup>42</sup>

**ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS:**

Achievements can rarely match expectations and as expectations were rising in Egypt and the performance of the bureaucracy lagging behind, there was indeed a growing feeling that administrative reforms were needed. Reforms mean simply change for the better. Although this may take place by accident, the term “reforms” is usually only applied to changes which are consciously, intentionally and purposely designed and executed by people. More specifically, administrative reform is a process that involves planned change in the operations of the executive and the administrative arms of the government.<sup>43</sup>

As far as Egypt is concerned it is probably common place that on the eve of the 1952 Revolution the need for serious administrative reform was widely felt.

After the revolution, problems of the bureaucracy became more complicated, since, in addition to its traditional and rather mechanical tasks the administration was now charged with new and increasingly development oriented responsibilities that required flexibility, innovation, and the application of higher levels of technology. The heavy burden of traditions and the rising expectations of the people added to the

complexity of the situation and made the need for radical reforms even more urgent.<sup>44</sup>

In 1952, the first step in this direction was the consolidation of the Diwan Al Muwazafin as a central civil service commission. It was given the right to refer to the legislature in case of dispute with the Ministry of Finance to which it was attached, and from which it attempted to gain independence. The Diwan produced several reports of benefit and 1957 and 1958 prepared plan for the classification of posts and for work simplification. To fulfill the latter task a central administration was created by the Diwan to be helped by local committees in all ministrers but its performance was not found satisfactory. To revive this, The whole Diwan was affiliated to the presidency in 1959 and its entire role was reconsidered. It was now called upon not just to confine itself to problems of the implementation of laws and improvement of procedures, but also to proceed to the preparation of able civil servants and the raising of performance rates in the administration.<sup>45</sup>

A proposal to form a unit for 'government organization' within the Central Planning Commission was not however, put into practice. But the Deputy president for Production Affairs forms a Central Committee and a Technical Bureau for the Organization of government machinery. These

were assisted by teams of experts and research workers, and were supposed to cooperate with local committees and units of organization in the ministries and public authorities. A significant development took place in February, 1963, when the Presidential Council commissioned a General Committee and a Technical Secretariat to reconsider the structure and functioning of the government machinery and to recommend projects for its reorganization. One of the results emerging from the efforts of this team was the creation of a new central body under the name of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration, (C.A.O.A.) in 1964 which was meant to be more powerful in status and possessing a wider sphere of competence than its predecessor.<sup>46</sup>

The assumption behind the creation of C.A.O.A. was that the government machinery would be dealt with as one entity, which would be organized hierarchically, from the top onwards. The responsibility for this should lie with an independent Central agency that should be attached with the higher leadership of the state. The functions of C.A.O.A. were to revolve around three areas: administrative planning, administrative organization and follow up and control. To fulfill this, the agency was also given the right to supervise and coordinate the activities of the

institutes involved in Administrative Inspection Department. More specifically the C.A.O.A. was assigned the following tasks

- 1) Suggesting law and regulations concerning personnel in the public service, and offering advice on personnel matters.
- 2) Laying down training policies and plans for state employees, and coordinating training activities.
- 3) Supervising the preparation and implementation of position classifications systems.
- 4) Initiating policies and plans for administrative reforms.
- 5) Establishing inspections and follow up systems to ensure efficiency in the field of production and services.

In order to be able to carry out these functions C.A.O.A. was given the right to supervise the application of laws and statutes relating to personnel affairs and the activities of organs engaged in personnel training. It was also granted right to check proposals for organization and reorganization and proposals for budgetary arrangements related to personnel, before their final endorsement. It could also take part in designing organizational charts and specifying performance rates. It could demand, and inspect, data and statistics from different public bodies.<sup>47</sup>

The agency was presided over by an official engineer of ministerial status and was affiliated to Council of Ministers. It was to be formed of five central administrations responsible for personnel, training, job classification, organization and inspection and follow up. From its creation, the agency endeavored to recruit well-qualified and experienced staff who examine many of the urgent administrative problems and designed programmes for their solutions. One of the most important works was to seek a coordinate and co-operative relationship with other public bodies involved in related spheres of legislation manpower and training and to achieve effective liaison with the different administrative bodies of state.<sup>48</sup>

#### **ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING:**

Administrative training is usually regarded as one of the most important methods of administrative reform. This is usually based on the argument which concerns the impact that education can have on the productivity of work and thus on economic development. Every public employee needs some kind of training. The emphasis may be on improving behavioral qualities and abilities, such as in background and ideological types of training or training on decision making and problem solving etc.

In Egypt, training was highly regarded as a device for administrative reform after the Revolution. In January, 1953, training institutes were set up. The Council of Ministers approved the establishment of an Institute of Public Administration (I.P.A.).<sup>49</sup>

Until the end of the fifties, most of the I.P.A. activities revolved around a general program for training middle management and another for first line supervisors. Other experimental or special programs were also offered, with teaching continued in English and Arabic. In the sixties and with the basic change in government organization, the growth in demand for training and the emergence of other training bodies, the activities of the I.P.A. acquired a new dimension. The institute underwent internal organizational changes in 1963. It also started to expand its activities until the end of the sixties it was offering some twenty programs per year.

The I.P.A. was conducting general training programs for directors, executives and for first line supervisors, as well as programs for higher and middle professionals. Other programs for higher and middle professionals experiment with the training of groups of professionals working in related sector of the economy and involved in developmental administration(e.g. agriculture, irrigation , education, public health, and social services etc.)<sup>50</sup>



A new kind of training needs however, was becoming increasingly persistent with the Egyptianization and nationalization of the late fifties and early sixties, This was the need to train personnel of the new public bodies in entrepreneurial (or business ) administration. For this purpose, the National institute for Management Development (NIMD) was created in 1961 aiming at conducting training programs in areas related to management development. While its main task was to train business and industrial managers in general and specialized areas, it was also to carry out research and provide consultancy. Three types of training programs were offered by the NIMD, top management programs, specialized programs and sector programs. Until 1969 N.I.M.D. had offered training to 966 administrative officers. A management consultancy section was created to diagnose problem and suggest alternative solutions, and follow them up.<sup>51</sup>

Yet another type of training appeared in the mid sixties. A committee was created in 1965 to plan and direct Executive Conference Programmes (ECP). These were tailor made programmes drawn up according to the needs and interests of the participants. They dealt with certain Problem area's through exposition of experts views and discussion of possible solutions. The E.C.P. held four types: development

conferences, public policy conferences, conferences and alumni conferences. Between 1965 and 1970, 466 undersecretaries, director generals or chairmen of organization and companies attended these conferences, 313 of them from the civil services and 153 from the public sector.<sup>52</sup>

All these training institutes were closely and directly tied to the executive branch of the government which they served. As far local officers training course were organized for them by the ministry of local administration training from executive development programs to the training of clerical and office workers. In 1967 an Institute for local administration several other bodies provided various kinds of training for public servants. A Central for Clerical secretarial training of the civil servants was able to train about 9200 them by 1969. There was also the institute of National Planning, established in 1960, which offered varied programmes to senior and junior officials and specialists. A Central Agency for Training was established in 1967 to supervise technical and vocational training. Training was also offered at the institute of Labour Administration, the Institute Of Banking Studies, The Arabs Society for Business Administration, the Arab Center for Research and

- Administration, the Public Relation Society and by other professional and Associational Institutes. 53

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# *CHAPTER-IV*



## **CHAPTER IV**

### **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING NASSER ERA AND THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY**

#### **Development : A conceptual perspective**

Over the years, there has been much discussion on the idea of “progress” which is very much akin to the idea of “development”. The concept of development however, in the sense of the process of national growth is of fairly recent origin. While the idea of progress has been rather controversial, the idea of development has been widely accepted and even considered as being worthwhile to act upon. It has been generally accepted that development is both an ‘economic and social process’.<sup>1</sup> It is recognized that development concerns not only man’s material needs, but also the improvement of the social conditions of his life and his broad human aspirations. Development is not just economic growth, it is growth plus change.<sup>2</sup> Thus, development is a complex phenomenon involving shifts among different stages of technology standard of living, level of education, mode of thinking etc. The process of social and economic development involves a variety of interrelated factors leading to change. These factors may operate singly or in combination, through a number of different models of casualty (simple

direct effect, indirect effects, requirements and complementariness, mutual reinforcements, conditioning milieus etc)<sup>3</sup>. For example a marked reduction in the birth rate in a country with a previous high birth rate could start a chain of effects concerning several socio-economic aspects. It could reduce the population growth rate and relieve society from the burden of non-productive new entrants. It could affect the age structure of the population and bring about changes associated with a reduction in young dependency. Various changes might take place in the socio-economic milieu of a society as a result of a significant increase in women's education. As a result, a higher production of women might participate in the labour force; fertility rates might fall; a change might come about in the traditional role of women as housewives and mothers; socialization pattern of the children might improve; there might be better planning of every aspect of life by educated, emancipated women; and there might be more rational planning of the family size etc.

The process of development could thus bring about several changes through inter-related factors. These changes may be of several types. They may be material and easily descramble, such as a rise in the income level and greater availability of food. Changes may also occur in ways of thinking, in one's attitude to family norms, women's emancipation, child

labour etc. Finally, changes may take place in the social system, such as changes in the system of communication due to technological innovation.

Another point to be emphasized in this regard is that in the process of development, especially that which is deliberately introduced, total development is aimed at rather than the development of isolated individual factors. It is essential to have a unified approach to development, which reflects 'a consciousness of the conceptual and empirical inter-relatedness of all aspects of human life'.<sup>4</sup> The general experience is that deficiency in any of the important factors may seriously retard the overall growth of a system. One sided emphasis on economic development or the sectoral approach to development has often led to undesirable consequences. For example, in Kenya, though the rate of economic development has been quite high by any standard (an annual increase of 6.9 percent in the gross domestic product during 1964-70), the growing economy has made the rich richer and the poor poorer.<sup>5</sup> An example of rapid economic development on the one hand and slow social development on the other is provided in recent times by the petroleum producing countries of the Middle East. In Iran, for example, the rate of increase in the gross national product (GNP) during 1971-72 was 14.2 percent. This increase was 30.3 percent in 1972-73.<sup>6</sup> Iran's oil revenue

was increased at a tremendous rate, from 5 billion US dollars in 1971 to 23 billion US dollars in 1974.<sup>7</sup> In 1975 it went up to 25 billion US dollars. Economic growth was achieved in Iran in a comparatively short period of time. But in spite of her best efforts, Iran has not been able to achieve the same spectacular progress in the field of social development, which is a slow process, as is revealed by statistics on some of the indicators. The rate of literacy in Iran in 1975 was only 42.1 percent. The rates of male and female literacy in the same year were 58.5 and 41.5 percent respectively.<sup>8</sup>

It may, therefore, be considered that development is a very complex process and there is no simple input-output law governing total development, nor is it an inevitable biological process in there is a built-in- which there is a built-in-mechanism for the growth.<sup>9</sup>

### **EGYPTIAN ECONOMY BEFORE THE ADVENT OF NASSER**

Despite some progress in the scope and intensity of economic activities and growth during the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a comprehensively planned and properly executed programme of economic development did not materialize in Egypt until after 1952. Since then, far reaching institutional changes have assisted in building the modern socio-economic infrastructure requisite for sustained or self-

generating economic growth. Concomitantly, however, population growth has soared and greatly attenuated the successes of Egypt's ambitious economic development programme. As the rate of economic growth has risen quite high in recent years, so also has that of population growth; thus, realization of the government's basic goal to improve individual living standards has suffered repeated set backs.

Two clear phases may be discerned in the economic history of modern Egypt: the pre-revolution phase—which began in 1805 under Mohammed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt and ended in 1952, and the post –revolution phase –which began with the July 1952 Revolution and is still continuing.

### **ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY OF NASSER**

Economic policy in the Middle East is dominated by the bureaucracy. This dominance is the result of three specific factors. First, the states of the region rely upon their bureaucracies to plan, co-ordinate, implement and maintain elaborate economic development plans. Secondly, the states of the region, regardless of their economic and political philosophies, possess large public sector organizations that control at minimum the allocations of state's natural resources. Thirdly,

the states of the region have manifested an increasing desire to regulate the economic activities of their citizens.

Before, July 1952 Revolution, the Egyptian economy was not growing at what could be considered a reasonable rate. A high population growth rate was coupled with almost stable real national income. The average annual rate of growth of per capita income, stated at constant prices (1953=100) was very small and equaled 0.01 percent during the period 1937-1952. The only year before 1952 in which the economy flourished were the war years. Thereafter the economy assumed the previous state of relative stagnation with a declining rate of growth of per capita income during 1947-52.<sup>10</sup>

During the period 1937-47 national income at constant prices increased at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent, the corresponding average annual rate of population increased was 1.77 percent, yielding an average annual increase in per capita income in excess of 1.5 percent.<sup>11</sup> Even though World War II gave some impetus to industry, stimulated employment in the big cities, and brought some prosperity to the nation's economy, these effects were temporary and could not be maintained after the war ended. Between 1947 and 1952, due primarily to inflation and widespread unemployment, the average annual rate of increase in national

income fell to only one percent, and per capita income decreased by one-half of one percent.<sup>12</sup> The post war dip of death rates, after over a decade of gradual decline, set off a spiraling increase in population which flooded the labour market and greatly intensified economic deterioration. By 1952, the population reached 21.6 million; per capita income decreased sharply and living standards declined to marginal levels.

Throughout this period the Egyptian economy remained substantially agrarian. In 1952, over 65 percent of the population derived its livelihood from agriculture. 70 percent of the country's small industrial labour force worked in factories depending upon raw agricultural products, and two-third of the nation's capital was invested in agriculture. For the same year, 93 percent of the country's exports were agricultural, and because the greatest proportion of the land was tied to cotton production, a third of Egypt's imports consisted of food and other agricultural productions.<sup>13</sup>

The full impact of the pressure of population upon agricultural resources may be seen by comparing the growth of each. During the first half of this century, the population doubled while the cultivated area increased by only one sixth and the crop area by one third. In 1907 the population of Egypt amounted to 11,3 million, the cultivated area was 5.3

million feddans,<sup>14</sup> and the cropped area (with more than one crop per year in some areas) was 7.7 million feddans. The population grew to 22 million in 1952; the cultivated area reached 5.7 million feddans and the cropped area 9.3 million feddans.<sup>15</sup>

Egypt's agricultural problems were further aggravated by inequality in the distribution of land and income. In 1952, 93.9 percent of small land owners possessed 33.5 percent of the total land, whereas 6.1 percent of the land lords possessed 66.5 percent of the land in the form of large estates. The instability in the rights of property did not encourage the tenants or small land owners to undertake capital improvements.<sup>16</sup>

A number of estimates have been made of Egypt's national income before the revolution; the following estimates were given by Charles Issawi:

The first attempt, in 1922, put the total at £ 301 million pounds, but this figure has been criticized as too high and alternative figures of 270 million and 200 million were suggested. Another rough estimate gave a figure of £265 million for 1925. For the 1930's the following figures are available (£ E): 185 million in 1935, 180-200 million in 1938-39, 220 million in 1939 and 168 million in 1939. Post war estimates range from 504 million and 600 million in 1945 to 860 million in 1950. A series



prepared by National planning Committee put gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices at £E193 million in 1938, 660 million in 1945 and 858 million in 1950; at 1950 prices the figures were £E 634 million, 668 million and 558 million respectively.

The general trend indicated by these data is confirmed by estimates made by two Egyptian economists who put annual per capita income, at 1913 prices as follows (£E): 7.6 in 1880-97, 12.4 in 1913, 12.2 in 1921-28, 8.2 in 1930-33, 9.6 in 1935-39 and 9.4 in 1940-49. A French economists figures (also at 1913 prices) were, 12.4 for 1913, 8.0 in 1937, 7.5 in 1945 and 8.2 in 1948.<sup>17</sup>

Summarizing the whole economic scenario of Egypt before 1952 it can be said that by discouraging industrial growth and the rational exploitation of scanty natural resources, foreign occupation and dynastic rule based on the vested interests severely handicapped the growth of Egypt's economy before 1952. Without industry to absorb the increase in population, an inevitable imbalance in growth among the sectors of economy led to disguised unemployment and under-employment. It also reduced the individual share of the limited services available such as health and education, which in turn reduced productivity and curtailed the level of income. Annual average per capita product in 1952 was 86

dollars. This per capita income represented less than one tenth that of Canada, Switzerland or the United States, whose averages for the same period were over 1000 dollars. Egypt's per capita income amounted to one-third the average of most countries which were themselves in the process of development, such as Argentina (460 dollars). It exceeded in per capita income only Pakistan (70 dollars) and India (60 dollars).<sup>18</sup> Mounting population pressure virtually stabilized real national income prior to 1932. Computed at constant prices (1953=100) the average annual per capita income growth rate was only 0.01 percent between 1937 and 1952.<sup>19</sup>

#### **PLANNED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING THE NASSER ERA :**

In 1952, the immediate aims of the revolutionary officers were clear: to get rid of the monarchy, eliminate foreign especially British influence and reform Egyptian society. The 1952 revolution demarks considerable changes in long run economic structure of Egypt and its political framework. It was not until that year that the systematic drive for development was launched.

Egypt's growth experience in the second half of the twentieth century started well for the economy, at least in certain aspects. Egypt was

enjoying surplus of sterling reserve accumulated during the war years. Moreover the Korean War caused a rise in forces of cotton; the Egyptian economy was growing during the first two years of this period at an annual growth rate of 7-8 percent. However, such growth rate could not be maintained for long. A sharp decline was registered during the period 1952-1954 followed by a slow recovery in 1955-56. An examination of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country at that time would make it difficult to expect a continuation of the rapid rate of growth achieved in the immediate first war period. With a per capita income not exceeding 37 Egyptian pounds and massive illiteracy among the working age population, both indicating the poor quality of human capital in the country as well as exclusive reliance on the private sector and foreign investment and no active part for the government in promoting economic growth, it is hardly surprising that the high rate of growth that marked the immediate post war period could not be maintained for long.<sup>20</sup>

With the new regime several measures were introduced in the effort to transform the economy into 'State socialism' with planning as the major instrument for development. The principle objective of the Egyptian plan was to double national income over a period of ten years(1960-70) with a 40 percent increase by the end of the first phase of

the plan (1965). This aimed at an annual growth rate of 7 percent during the first five years plan. Another objective to be accomplished along with the increase in national income, was to secure more equitable distribution of income.

On the social dimension, developmental efforts aimed at the following important general objectives. First, achieving the highest possible rate of employment, recognizing that every citizen has a right to work. Second, educating individuals, offering medical care and other social services. Third, helping individuals to participate in decision making in matters of public concern, on the basis of quality of opportunity. Finally, reaching a level of sufficiency where every citizen could enjoy a reasonable standard of living.

It was also realized that most of the Egypt's economic development problem were attributed to the rapid increase in population resulting from the great increase in birth rates over death rates. Therefore all efforts exerted for the development of national economy and the promotion of the standard of living would be impeded by the accelerated population growth unless it was placed within the framework of the resources and possibilities available.

The members of the Revolutionary council which overthrew King Farouk in 1952 did not then have any definite economic ideology, other than unhappiness about the privileged position of the wealthy landed elite. President Nasser and other leaders started in the early 1950s that the policy of the government was to eliminate the special privileges of the wealthy, but otherwise to encourage the private sector in every way possible. The comprehensive agrarian reform measures of 1952 and 1961 were primarily designed to achieve the former objective by setting maximum limits on individual land ownership and expropriating the remainder. As for the later objective several changes were made in the tariffs: the duties were raised on competing manufactured goods and abolished or reduced on raw materials and equipments. Law number 430 was passed in 1953 to exempt new approved companies from income tax for seven years, and plant expansions were exempted from tax for five years. A more liberal attitude was also exhibited towards foreign capital in four laws approved in 1953 and 1954. Under these laws, foreign investors were allowed to have majority control of companies operating in Egypt, rather than only 49 percent according to the 1947 law, and provisions regarding transfer of profits and original capital abroad were also eased. The mining and quarrying law of 1953 was considerably more liberal than

that of 1948 in that it permitted the granting of new concessions to foreign as well as domestic petroleum companies and allowed longer extensions.<sup>21</sup>

In the beginning of the post-revolutionary era (between 1952-1960) the revolutionary government's economic policies have been directed at balanced development and growth of the country's human, agricultural and industrial resources. Persistently high rates of population growth greatly intensified the demand for basic goods and services such as food products, which constituted a sizeable portion of Egypt's import trade and health and educational services, which were declared to be basic rights of all Egyptians. Thus, the expansion of public services and agricultural development was accorded special attention in the 1950's. Success in these sectors, together with improvements in transportation and communication, provided valuable support to the more fundamental goal of developing light and heavy industries.

After 1956 witnessed the maturation of certain trends, which were embryonic during the period 1952-56, but come to full bloom year later. Signs for state activism in promoting socio-economic development could be easily seen in many of the government measures that succeeded each other rapidly during these years. Such sign included the establishment of

the two councils which merged together in the permanent council for production and services that pioneer the efforts to carry out a number of industrial projects and the setting up of a national planning committee within the council of ministers in 1955 which paved the way for the adoption of sectoral and comprehensive plans between 1957 and 1965. More radical measures of agrarian reforms and nationalization of large foreign and Egyptian large and medium size enterprises were introduced successively in 1956, 1957, 1961 and 1964.<sup>22</sup> All these actions led to the expansion of the public sector which came to dominate the largest part of the economy outside the agriculture. The expansion of the public sector was also due to public investments, which resulted in the establishment of a large number of state owned enterprises, particularly in manufacturing. The government undertook almost exclusively infrastructure investments. One of the major infrastructure projects during this period was the building of Aswan high dam with Soviet aid. It was hoped that it would enable the country to increase its agricultural production through cultivation of desert land, providing much needed irrigation to agriculture in Upper Egypt besides generating more electricity for both industrial and domestic consumption.

The rate of total investment during the period 1952-1960 fluctuated between 14 and 17 percent. Productive investment-total investment minus investment in services and public utilities as a ratio of national income did not exceed to 10 percent.<sup>23</sup> However realizing their socio-economic importance, investment in housing, education, health and other social services amounted to more than 40 percent of the total investment for the year 1952-53 and to about one half of the total investment by 1956-57. However, beginning with 1957-58 the share of the public service sector declined sharply until by 1959-1960 it reached less than 30 percent of the total investment. The share of social overhead outlays, such as roads, bridges and means of transportation, was also high, rising from 16 percent of total investment in 1952-53 to over 20 percent in 1959-60.<sup>24</sup>

With respect to investment allocation for the productive sectors, industry and electricity took first priority. Comparison of the relative shares of agriculture and industry-electricity (all non-agricultural production) to national income and investment is given in (table 4.1) and shows that the industry and electricity sector's contribution to national income increased from 18.8 percent in 1952 to 25 percent in 1960, agriculture's contribution fluctuated around 33 percent throughout the period. This picture is reversed with regard to investment, that is ,the



portion of total investment allocated to agriculture rose from 11.5 to 18.4 percent, while the allocated to industry and electricity fluctuated around 30 percent. Over the entire period 1952-1960, investment in agriculture totaled \$462.6 million while those in industry and electricity amounted to \$1011.1 million. Increments in income for the two sectors were 374.3 and 434.7 respectively, yielding a ratio of income to investment of 75 percent for agriculture and 43 percent for industry and electricity.<sup>25</sup> By 1960, the percentage of the labour force in agriculture was 54.3 while in industry it was 10.2.<sup>26</sup>

**TABLE 4.1****PERCENTAGE SHARE OF AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND  
ELECTRICITY IN INCOME AND INVESTMENT**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Industry and Electricity</b>
<b>Income</b>		
1952-53	31.3	18.8
1953-54	30.0	19.7
1954-55	32.7	19.7
1955-56	32.4	20.4
1956-57	35.1	21.0
1957-58	33.8	22.7
1958-59	31.5	24.5
1959-60	31.4	24.5
1960-60	29.5	25.0
<b>Investment</b>		
1952-53	11.5	29.8
1953-54	11.2	29.1
1954-55	10.5	28.0
1955-56	10.8	34.1
1956-57	13.2	26.8
1957-58	13.1	26.2
1958-59	14.3	30.1
1959-60	17.2	32.4
1960-61	18.4	32.3

The years 1956-61 witnessed a growing participation of the government in the economic life of the country, both through government acquisitions and through government regulations and controls. The wave of comprehensive nationalization was foreshadowed in 1960, when disagreement arose with the bank of Misr group over the direction of private investment, the result being the group's nationalization. The laws of July 1961 decreed a sweeping nationalization of the private sector, including the leading navigation company, Cotton Pressing establishments, the gas and electricity company of Alexandria, the Cairo Tramway company, all bank and insurance companies, and 42 large industrial transport, commercial financial and land reclamation companies. Nearly half of all cotton exporting firms was nationalized, as were 82 other companies. The stock exchange and the cotton futures market were closed down, and individuals and corporations were prohibited from owning more than £10,000 in shares in each of 148 major companies. Imports could only be made through government owned companies and commercial agencies must be at least 25 percent government owned. All public works on behalf of government departments and agencies valued at £30,000 or over, must be undertaken by companies with at least 50 percent government equity participation.

The results of all these acts of nationalization was that the share of the government sector in the national income may have risen from less than 20 percent in 1959 to 40 percent in 1963 and 50 percent by 1967. The Egyptian government share in industrial value added was 64 percent by 1967. The Egyptian government share in industrial value added was 64 percent and in firms with ten or more employees it was 90 percent. Private enterprise remained significant only in retail trade, handicrafts and repair services, housing, the service sector, and agriculture and in the smaller less modern industrial plants.<sup>27</sup>

During the period 1952-60, the Egyptian population increased from 21.8 million, to 26.1 million and per capita real income increased from 86 to 117 dollars. The average annual compounded rate of growth of national income at constant prices was 4.89 percent and that of per capita income at constant prices was 2.37 percent. The population growth rate was 2.5 percent for the same period thus, growth of economy was capable of meeting the rate of population growth.<sup>28</sup>

The first four years of the post-revolutionary phase from 1952 to 1956, saw the economy almost entirely in private hands with state's role limited to infrastructure investments and the provision of social services. The 1952 revolution brought Nasser to power but at first the new

government seemed to accentuate rather than diminish the relative weight of the private sectors. Private industry demanded and obtained lower taxes and more protection from the world economy, through the mechanism of lowering of duties in imported raw materials and capital goods and higher tariffs on other imports which resulted in lower costs and higher prices, hence higher profits. In addition the flow of foreign capital into the indigenous economy was encouraged, allowing foreign businessmen to hold majority interests in Egyptian companies.

One of the first elements of change was the agrarian reform, which set limits on the extent of rural land holdings and offered incentives for formation of the cooperatives.

From 1957 to 1960, policy options changed and there was a decided new impetus towards progressive rationalization of the economy. In this period the major foreign owned enterprises were nationalized- French and British companies in particular- and so were Egyptian banks. At the same time the first five year plan for agriculture and industry were launched as well as general plans for economic and social development. In the wake of these measures capital formation in Egypt came rapidly under the control of the government authorities.<sup>29</sup>

By the end of 1959 Egypt, Nasser and his Finance minister Dr. Abdul Moneinet Kaissouny, ready for a new move towards socialism, but this time they were going to take a deeply reluctant Syria at least part of the way with them. In Egypt the move began in February 1960 with the nationalization of the bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt. In June 1960, the press was nationalized, but the really big step was taken in June and July 1961. In a series of decrees the government took over the entire import trade of the country and a large part of the export trade including cotton, which is the biggest item in Egypt's exports. All banks and insurance companies were nationalized and about 300 industrial and trading establishments were taken over either wholly or partly by the state. A highly progressive taxation system was introduced with the declared objective of making £E 5,000 a year, the maximum income in Egypt. In July 1960 a comprehensive five year plan for 1960-1965 was launched, this was to be followed by a second five year plan for 1960-1965 was launched, this was to be followed by a second five year plan for 1965-70 with the target of doubling the national income by 1970. The 1958 five year plan for industry, which already had considerable success in speeding up industrialization, especially in light industry, was absorbed into new five year plan, which now covered the agricultural sector as well

. This time eighty percent of the £E 1,643 million to be invested would be undertaken by the public sector. About fifty percent could be invested would be undertaken by the public sector. About fifty percent could be allocated to industry and twenty five percent to increasing the agricultural potential.<sup>30</sup>

From 1961 to 1973 the Egyptian economy became an almost completely planned system and the private sector was relegated to a marginal role. In that period emphasis was placed on the productive sectors, with priority being given to industry. A ten-year plan for comprehensive social and economic development was initiated to cover the period 1960-1970 and it was initially aimed at doubling the national income within a decade. In the context of rapid population increase, late president Nasser passed the following remarks on that occasion:

In 1959, the planning experts maintained it was possible to double the national income in twenty years and the issue was discussed in the council of Ministers at several meetings.

We said that we could not wait for twenty years because by that time the population would increase by about fifteen million. If we double the national income in twenty years we would achieve nothing, we would merely have met the requirements of the newly born and failed to raise the

standard of those who are actually living. Moreover, we would fail in finding work for those who are presently unemployed or the coming generation. Thus we have to double the income in ten years.<sup>31</sup>

During the period (1961-1973), infrastructure, mining and basic manufacturing, banking and insurances, all imports and three- quarters of exports came under the control of the public sector, while only domestic commerce, real estate, construction and light industry remained in the hands of the private sector. An important innovation of this phase, perhaps the one that more than any other would condition subsequent development, was the implementation of a policy of social welfare devised to government income distribution and guarantee a minimum subsistence level to the population. The decisive element in this strategy was, and still is, the policy of price controls and the system of subsidies.<sup>32</sup>

Table 4.2 indicates that during the period of rapid industrialization, GDP growth accelerated to an annual rate of 10 percent while the share of GDP absorbed by investment rose to 16.8 percent. This trend was accompanied by a rise in the deficit of goods and services which went upto 4.1 percent of GDP. After 1967, however, the year of the war with Israel and the closer of the Suez Canal, the economic expansion slowed down.



**TABLE 4.2****AGGREGATE DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE, 1952-53 TO 1973-76**

Period (yearly averages)	GDP rate of growth at current prices	Expenditure as percentage of GDP			Deficit for goods and services as percentage of GDP
		Gross Investment	Public Consumption	Private Consumption	
1952/53 1957/58	7.1	14.2	17.0	69.9	1.2
1958/59 1965/66	10.1	16.8	19.7	68.5	4.1
1966/67 1971/72	6.2	13.5	23.9	66.5	3.9
1973- 1976	15.3	21.2	25.4	66.3	12.9

Source: Egyptian Ministry of Planning, CAPMAS, World bank Estimates as cited by Aliboni, R. et al (ed.), Egypt's Economic potential, op. cit, table 1.1 p., 21.

Between the two Arab-Israel War (1967-73), the Egyptian economy experienced an arrest of the tumultuous growth of previous years. A number of structural problems thus came to the surface, both domestic and external in nature, which would later prompt the changes introduced by President Sadat under the 'Open Door Economic Policy' (ODEP).<sup>33</sup>

In spite of endless challenges and difficulties," the first five year plan (1960-61 to 1964-65) realized an average annual compound rate of growth in the national income at 1961 constant prices of 6.5 percent. The growth rate achieved was one of the highest among developing countries during the same period.<sup>34</sup>

The investment pattern outlined by the first five year plan was a significant departure from previous years. The proportion of total investment allocated to the industry related production sectors ( including basic industry; electricity and construction ) rose from about 30 percent in 1960's to 42.1 percent in 1960-61 and 59 percent in 1964-65. The five year average percent allocation to these sectors was over 50 percent of total investment, the average for agriculture for the same period was 7.8 percent, for transportation and communication, 20.7 percent and for all public services, including housing 20.8 percent.

The growth rate of the national income in 1965-66 amounted to 4.4 percent, but dropped to 0.7 percent during 1966-67 due to adverse conditions in agriculture, mining and industry. The annual growth rates in national income and per capita real income are shown in table 4.3, the rate of approximately 3.7 percent in per capita income during the first five year plan (1960-65) was significantly higher than that of 2.4 percent between 1952 and 1960. Continuously high rates of population increase, however pushed the growth rate of per capita income down to 1.7 percent in 1965-66 and to -2.2 percent in 1966-67.<sup>35</sup>

**TABLE -4.3**

**ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN NATIONAL AND PER  
CAPITA INCOME\***

Period	Growth rate	
	National income (%)	Real per capita income (%)
1952-1960	4.9	2.4
1960-1965	6.5	3.7
1965-1966	4.5	1.7
1966-1967	0.7	-2.2

\*Average annual compounded growth rates for period at constant prices.

Source : Ministry of Planning, Follow up and Evaluation, p.69.

Rapid population growth also nullified efforts to raise the level of productive employment. Despite considerable expansion of employment opportunities, which brought an increase in the size of the labour force from less than 7.7 million employed persons in 1960 to 7.9 million in 1965, 8.1 million in 1966 and 8.5 million in 1967, however the ratio of the employed persons to total population persisted at 27 percent level. Though there were no significant variation in the distribution of the Egyptian labour force among the various sectors during the 1960's , public service sector, however registered a dramatic increase of 19.3 percent of the active labour force, a symptom of over-saturation in government jobs. Unemployment, perhaps a more sensitive index of the flood of jobseekers, was reported at 6.9 percent of the labour force in 1965, 7.1 percent in 1966 and 8.9 percent in 1967, not to mention disguised unemployment in various sectors.<sup>36</sup>

## GROWTH OF INDUSTRY SINCE 1952

Egyptian government was forced on a determined course to industrialization by the realization that the race between population and cropped area seemed to be losing one despite the potentially fantastic expansion of cultivation after completion of the High dam. Though getting off to a slow start in 1952, industrial production increased dramatically between 1956 and 1961, and even more dramatically during the first five year plan. Nationalization was major instrument for providing the capital so desperately needed for initiating and expanding industry. During the 1960's , industry and business underwent a process which some writers term "Eghptianisation" whereby the government gained controlling interests but left considerable room for individual initiative and influence.

From the outset, Egypt was faced with the critical problem of capital formation, since the rate of population increase adversely affected the ability of the country to accumulate savings. Since the income of the majority of Egypt's people was low,<sup>37</sup> it was difficult to abstain from consumption in order to increase savings. In fact consumption increased during the five year plan by 46.9 percent.<sup>38</sup> The rate of saving during the

first plan reached 13.7 percent of the national income and averaged 13.5 percent during 1965-67. Consequently, population growth and population characteristics tended to reduce the amount of savings that could be set aside for capital formation.

Although industrialization efforts had already begun in Egypt early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it is only since 1945 that production levels in industry have increased systematically, if with some fluctuations and that the industrial sector has increased its share of GDP by a significant amount (Table 4.10) During the period 1952-1972, industrial production has been increasing at a rate of 11.4 percent annually except in the periods 1964-68 and 1971-72 when there were two major slowdowns. In 1952, industrial production did not exceed £E232 million, while in 1970-72 it surpassed £E 424 million. Since 1952 the share of industrial sector in the national income has risen from about 3percent to about 22 percent in 1970-71.<sup>39</sup>

**TABLE 4.4**

**CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY TO GDP AT CONSTANT PRICES  
( IN MILLIONS OF EGYPTIAN POUNDS)**

<b>(at constant 1954 prices)</b>			<b>Year</b>	<b>(at constant 1959/60) factor costs</b>		
<b>Industry in GDP</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Annual rate of increase</b>		<b>Industry in GDP</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Annual rate of increase</b>
91	100	-	1960/61	285.6	111.4	11.4
92	101.1	1.1	1961/62	309.9	120.9	8.5
101	111.1	9.8	1962/63	329.2	128.4	6.2
113	124.2	11.9	1963/64	369.6	144.2	12.3
126	138.5	11.5	1964/65	385.0	150.2	4.1
133	146.1	5.6	1965/66	394.3	153.8	2.4
132	145.0	-0.8	1966/67	397.1	154.9	0.7
132	145.0	0.0	1967/68	378.4	147.6	-4.8
134	147.2	1.5	1968/69	415.6	162.1	9.8
146	160.4	8.9	1969/70	442.4	172.6	6.4
140	100.0	-				
				<b>(At constant 1969/70) Factor costs</b>		
143	102.2	2.1	1969/70	542.0	100.0	-
152	108.6	6.3	1970/70	600.2	110.7	10.7
163	116.4	7.2	1971/72	615.9	113.6	2.6
174	124.3	6.7	1972	615.4	113.5	-
190	135.7	9.2				
				<b>(At constant 1972) Factor costs</b>		
202	144.3	6.3	1972	589.3	100.0	-
213	152.1	5.4	1973	602.6	102.2	2.2
<b>(At constant 1959/69) Factor cost</b>						
256.3	100.0	-	1975	773.6	121.2	(11.9)

World Bank, Arab Republic of Egypt, Economic Management in a Period of Transition, Vol.3, 1978, p.67.

Advancement in industry is considered as the most important means for economic growth in Egypt. Amongst the advantages of industrialization are raising the standard of living, the diversification of the economy, the production of industrial goods, creation of more opportunities of work not only in industry but also in the subsidiary services attached to the development in industry and raising the productivity of manpower.

Investment in the industry (excluding electricity and construction) was £E 962 million during the period 1959-60 to 1969-70. The most important existing industries at the beginning of the fifties were those of sugar, spinning and weaving, cement and fertilizers, production in these industries has increased many times due to the expansion and establishment of new industrial units. Many important industries have been promoted such as chemical and plastics. Industrial planning takes into account the demands of heavy industrial products in addition to those for consumer goods.

Major industries were concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Egypt. More than 22 percent of the industrial establishments were in Cairo alone during 1960-61. As early as the first five year plan (1960-65)



one of the aims of the industrial planning was to distribute industry wherever possible among different regions of the country. This was partly achieved in the first plan and thereafter.

*Industrial growth has been quite satisfactory since the launching of the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP) by President Anwar al-Sadat. In 1979 the value of industrial output (measured at 1975 prices) rose by more than 10 percent, whilst the 1975-79 average was over 7 percent<sup>40</sup> It is difficult to chart the current progress of Egypt's industrial sector because of lack of data but recent trends may be seen in Table 4.5\.* The relative weight of the basic consumption goods (food stuff, textiles) has fallen rapidly; whereas the importance of intermediate and semi-finished produce has risen /Consumer durables and investment goods are also increasing in importance.

**TABLE 4.5****COMPOSITION OF GROSS VALUES ADDED BY  
CATEGORIES OF INDUSTRIES ( IN PERCENTAGES)**

<b>Category</b>	<b>1947</b>	<b>1966/67</b>	<b>1969/70</b>	<b>1975</b>
A. Basic consumer goods	79.9	55.0	51.6	49.7
B. Intermediate industries	19.7	38.2	40.6	40.6
C. Consumer durables/equipments	0.5	6.8	7.4	9.3

Source : World bank 1978, op.cit. vol.3.p.71.

**Role of Subsidies in the Egyptian economy:**

Subsidies played a crucial role in Egypt's public finance and in the Egyptian economy in general. The relative weight of subsidies (for consumer goods in particular) increased steadily throughout the 1970s \*(Table 4.6) since 1973 expenditure on subsidies has increased sharply and constantly in concomitance with the drastic increases in world prices, which strongly influence the subsidies. Apart from rice all the major subsidies foodstuff are largely or totally imported, and the import share for those not totally imported has been growing. Food subsidies may be categorized as 'direct' subsidies, which are put under the head of the 'cost of living subsidies' item of the government budget, i.e. subsidies for wheat, flour etc, and as 'implicit' subsidies, which consist of the losses borne by the government owing to the difference between domestic production costs and the selling price to the consumer, as in the case of rice subsidy.

TABLE 4.6

**COST OF LIVING SUBSIDIES, 1973 TO 1979  
(MILLIONS OF EGYPTIAN POUNDS)**

S. No.	Head	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
1	General authority for supply commodity(GAS)	115.5	337.2	449.3	352.4	407.2	434.7	995.7
2	Others	15.3	91.1	131.0	105.8	88.6	246.1	292.7
3	Total	130.8	428.3	580.3	458.2	495.8	680.8	1288.4
4	Percentage share GASC *(itm 1 /item 3)	88.3	78.7	77.4	76.9	82.1	63.9	77.3

Source: Egyptian Ministry of Finance

The second category also includes subsidies on non-food items, such as electricity, gasoline, automobiles and so on. This second item does not appear in the state budget as a subsidy; instead it takes the form of losses for public enterprises and is thus to be considered a form of price administration.

Subsidy expenditure as a share of the overall budget deficit has grown steadily and now represents more than 14 percent of total public expenditure. This fact, along with some other considerations, had sparked an intense and widespread debate amongst Egyptian politician and

scholars on the consequences of the subsidies for the Egyptian economy and on the necessity or desirability of eliminating them.

Subsidies are important because they play a key role:

- (i) In determining the distribution of the income (and because they are essential for the maintenance of subsistence level income for the bulk of the population).
- (ii) In determining the structure of relative prices and their allocative role.
- (iii) In determining the performance of the inflation process.
- (iv) As a determinant of the state's budget deficit and its financing (almost exclusively by liquidity creation)
- (v) And because of the repercussions on the country's balance of payment.

Maintenance of subsidy system is considered a necessity for socio-political as well as income distribution reasons. However, the damage this system does to the Egyptian economy is becoming more and more evident. As far as income distribution is concerned, the subsidy system can neither alter nor minimize the income gap between the rich and the poor-no doubts it possibly keeps the living standards at a subsistence level. Further, it should be noted that the present subsidies system also

covers non-subsistence goods from which even, and the case of subsidies for gasoline, automobiles and electricity only the higher income group benefit.

As far as the impact of subsidies on the relative price structure is concerned, official sources themselves admit that they project an excessively low prices, which do not cover even the operational costs and give rise to a distorted cost structure for services (considered as production inputs).<sup>41</sup> The present system of subsidies is thus a factor which contributes to a poor allocation of resources and is therefore a hindrance to greater productive efficiency and an impediment to gain in *competitiveness for industrial sector*. Subsidies also affect adversely the terms of trade between agricultural and industrial sectors.<sup>42</sup>

Keeping the prices of farm products much lower than the prevailing international market prices discourages farm production and encourages migration from countryside to urban areas, with a whole series of easily imaginable negative consequences. In the long run, the maintenance of subsidies may increase the system's inflationary tendencies in that it does not permit sufficient growth of productivity, owing to its perverse effects on the allocation of resources. Taking all these considerations together then, the existing subsidy system, conceived to protect the real living

standards of the poor, risk aggravating their problems because of its inflationary potential which does nothing to help narrow the gap between the poor and the rich classes.

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30. The dissolution of the union with Syria in 1961 forced Egypt to carry out the plan from a smaller base than originally intended, two cotton worm plagues one in 1961 which ruined one third of the crop and cost Egypt E70 million in foreign exchange earnings, and the other in 1966-67 which greatly reduced the production of cotton-affected the Egyptian economy badly. See Shanawany, H. Economic development, Op cit. p.152.

31. Shanawany, H. Economic development, Ibid.

32. Ibid, pp. 152-153.

33. Ibid, p.155.

34. According to world bank figures for 1979 the annual per capita income in Egypt was 480 dollars, well below that of Morocco (740) and Tunisia (1,120) and at the other end of the scale from Kuwait, the richest of the Arab countries, with its annual income of 17,000 dollars per head. See Ibid. p.84.

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# *CHAPTER-V*

## **CHAPTER-V**

### **i. EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRACY IN THE POST NASSER ERA: TRANSITION FROM STATE CONTROL TO LIBERALIZATION:**

On Nasser's death his successor, Anwar-Al-Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt in 1971. He was immediately made aware of the shadow which his administration would permanently operate under. Anwar Sadat had been completely eclipsed by Nasser. Sadat was neither a charismatic nor popular leader and lacked political legitimacy.

After pledging to continue Nasser's policies, the new government altered its course towards Sadat's own agenda. It started with the arrest of ninety one "Nasserites" some of who held high position in government, on charges of treason. The largest change made to government structure was the drafting of the 1971 permanent constitution which laid out Egypt's future. The constitution defined Egypt as a democratic socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people". It further called on Islamic jurisprudence to be the principle source of legislation in the country, and the President was defined as the most powerful member of the government<sup>1</sup>

Under the 1971 constitution, the president is nominated by a one-third vote of people's Assembly, with approval by a two-thirds vote of the same body, and elected by popular referendum.

The people's Assembly was composed of 448 delegates. Seats in the Assembly are allocated by party according to the share of the vote each party gets in each election district. Only parties that receive at least 8 percent of the vote nationwide are represented in the Assembly. Seats remaining after proportional distribution go to the party with the most votes nationwide. Delegates served five year terms. Under the constitution the president can dissolve the Assembly at any time, but this action must be approved by popular referendum and a new election held within 60 days. The people's Assembly has important constitutional powers in addition to the nomination of the president. It shares with the president the authority to propose legislation and approves the government's general policy and budget. Assembly deputies have the right to question ministers, the prime Minister, and even the president. The Assembly also has the power to pass a vote of no confidence in any cabinet minister.<sup>2</sup>

The power of the President stemmed, in great part, from the enormous constitutional authority and customary prerogatives in his office. Perhaps the foremost key to the President's power in Egypt in his

wide powers of appointment and dismissal; most important was the right to appoint the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the Chief of the armed forces, but in a highly bureaucratic society, President patronage extended over a much wider scope of positions including public sector managers, newspaper editors, judges and party leaders. Sadat's right to appoint loyal followers to the strategic levers of state power and to dismiss those who incurred his displeasure was a main source of elite dereference to the President. As chief executive the President also stood at the top of a legal chain of command which entitled him to obedience from the civil and military bureaucracies. The Prime Minister was merely the President's Chief assistant and the Cabinet a 'staff' expected to turn his general policy into detailed legislation and executive action.<sup>3</sup>

This constitution contained one of the very noticeable differences between Egypt under Nasser, and its future. The mention of Islam was a radical alteration of the accepted secularism of the Nasser regime. Sadat attempted to use Islam as a means of gaining much needed political and popular legitimacy. He took on the title of the Believer President" had television coverage of his attendance at daily prayers pushed for increased Islamic programming in the media as well as established religious classes in school. The Sadat government funded the construction of new mosque



used Islamic rhetoric in public statements and promoted the formation of Islamic student organization in schools and universities nationwide.<sup>4</sup>

Sadat's 1971 Rectification Revolution, as it would come to be known, steered Egypt down a new path. The Sadat administration would dramatically change course away from Nasserist policy. In 1972 Sadat began a dialogue with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and later that year Sadat would order the removal of all Soviet advisers currently residing in Egypt. At this time Egypt's economy was in shambles as a result of the 1967 war with Israel. Oil reserves from the Israeli occupied Sinai Peninsula were lost; the Suez Canal remained closed due to Nasser's scuttling blockade, the United States refused communication with Egypt and the Soviet Union failed to produce any aid to the country. Yet by 1973 Egypt's military had reached a state of rebuild readiness and Sadat's next plan went into effect. In 1973 the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai and began the Yom Kippur or Ramadan war. The resulting peace treaty, brokered by the United States; returned control of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.<sup>5</sup>

Immediately following the war Sadat began his policy of economic reforms, the Infitah or the Open Door Policy. The president was quoted as saying "just as the crossing had brought victory on the battlefield; so this

second crossing will bring victory on the home front in the shape of prosperity for all". This policy, which was formally adopted in 1974 as a country's main developmental strategy, represents the outcome of developments on the regional and the international level.<sup>6</sup>

At the regional level the oil boom that took place in many neighboring countries following the war of 1973 stimulated a growing perception that Egypt might be able to benefit from some of this sudden wealth as a mean of solving some of its chronic economic problems. Arab aid as well as ever increasing volume of remittances send from Egyptian working in oil exporting countries, was apparently two strong temptations for capital needy. Egypt to brush aside. Logically the utilization such resources required important policy changes from the part of Egypt that involved all the reconsideration of radical principles, both as a guiding orientation of country's internal development as well as for the outlook of entire region.<sup>7</sup>

At the international level the cold war atmosphere that had made it possible for some small countries to acquire certain degree of independence of will, and even to play off one super power against another over matter such as receipt of aid was changing in favour of an atmosphere in which the super power were looking for more certain line

of divide and were not inclined to take serious risk. This was also happening at a time when Middle East and oil had become more critically vital to the west, and when a renewed strategic interest in the Middle East had therefore being taking place. Thus the official presentation of the main aim of Infitah reflected by itself the importance of these three groups of factors the domestic, the regional and the international which combine Egyptian human resources with Arab money and the Western know-how for the benefit of Egyptian development.<sup>8</sup>

The initial experience of this new Open Door Policy was not altogether positive politically and socially it posed serious internal problems. Private investment foreign and domestic was not readily forthcoming. When it did come, it sought access to the domestic market and concentrated on relatively short term, quick” turn around situation that were highly profitable and avoided risk exposure. In spite of initial setback, the economic recovery initiated in 1974 was sustained and substantial vitality returned to the Egyptian economy. The GDP growth rate which had averaged around 4 percent annually between 1967 and 1974 increase to an annual average of over 13 percent between 1975 and 1978. Liberalization permitted a sufficient degree of flexibility to make adjustment in the operation of the economy. However, fundamental

reform in the basic economic policies of Egypt remained elusive and by 1978 there were signs that the economy's growth was once again slowing. The fiscal situation, after improving for two consecutive years again deteriorated in 1978 and in 1979. In 1980 more than half of the overall deficit had to be bank financed, contributing a roughly 30 percent increase to the money supply. Fiscal 1981 and 1982 showed comparable increases in money supply, 43 percent and 35 percent respectively. Thus, extensive liquidity in the economy and government deficit spending contribution to an accelerating rate of inflation.<sup>9</sup>

On the external side, the balance of payments continued to show strength and improvement with a small deficit on current accounts through 1980. Oil exports, worker remittances; and Suez Canal revenues remained the big elements in this vastly improved situation. Capital inflows for 1981, mostly from foreign assistance and foreign private investment exceeded \$ 2 billion Even so, in the latter part of 1981, events the assassination of Sadat, a troubled world economy, the "oil glut" and a high and growing level of imports –placed Egypt in severe straits in its foreign exchange balances worker remittances and tourism receipts fell sharply and Canal and oil earnings fell far short of expectations(although they did register modest growth); Declining exports and rising imports led

to a 30 percent increase (over the 1980 level) in the trade deficit, ballooning to over \$ 5 billion.<sup>10</sup>

## **BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER SADAT**

Since the Open Door Economic Policy was formally adopted in the mid-seventies, the role of the Egyptian public bureaucracy has undergone several changes. Such changes, however, do not amount to a retrenchment of the state” as some observers have interpreted them. The state bureaucracy is still large and expanding, both in terms of personnel and expenditure, and the control functions assumed by the bureaucracy have by no means declined. In the economic sphere, the public sector has not really given way to the private sector (except in the special case of commerce and finance), but the state has merely chosen to cooperate with international capital. This has signified a transformation of the state role from a developmental one to a production-oriented one (seeking profit and cutting down on welfare activities within the joint public sector/ international capital enterprises). However, the welfare functions of the state bureaucracy towards the society at large (education and health, food subsidies, etc.) have not been significantly curtailed although the state has become increasingly dependent on external sources for financing them.<sup>11</sup>

Bureaucracy both in terms of size and the low performance were the new feature of the well entrenched Egyptian bureaucracy. However, during the seventies and especially following the war of 1973 quantitative growth and qualitative decline both accelerated simultaneously and to an unprecedented degree that threatens to produce very serious organizational and political repercussions. This situation has, created at least two major ironies. The first is in the fact that the impetus of bureaucratic growth (which acquired sizeable dimensions under Nasser) is now continuing under its own momentum, even though the role of the state especially in the economic field has declined noticeably under the Open Door Policy. The other irony is that, for a variety of organizational and political reasons, the performance of the Egyptian bureaucracy has declined sharply in quality, just at a time when the desire, under unfait, to encourage investments-especially from Arab and foreign sources-actually requires a more innovative, flexible and efficient bureaucracy.<sup>12</sup>

Contrary to many expectations, the Egyptian bureaucracy has not slowed down its expansion in terms of personnel or expenditure as a result of adopting the Open Door Policy (infatih) in 1974. Public employment continues its phenomenal growth: in 1986/87 the state employed some five million people out of a labour force of some 13 million (of which

about 500,000 were in the armed forces and about two million were working abroad).

This means that at least 40% and most likely more, of the civilian labour force, resident in the country, work for the state.<sup>19</sup> Of these 3.4 million were in the civil service (roughly evenly divided between central and local government) and 1.6 million were in the Public sector, just under half of them engaged in industry. Bureaucratic expenses also remain very high. Out of a total public expenditure of some \$ E20 billion in 1986/87 budget. £E3.865 millions was earmarked for wages and salaries, and £E8.670 million was allocated for other current expenditure (including £E1.746 million for subsidies). This compares with £E7.467 million, earmarked for investments and £E2.317 million for capital transfers (payment of domestic and external debts, financing deficits, etc.).<sup>13</sup> Itemized figures are available for the period 1977 to 1980/81, and their analysis reveals some very interesting characteristics of the bureaucratic growth that has taken place.

Bureaucratic personnel grew noticeably even after the adoption of infitah. In only three years from 1977 to 1980/81, employment in the bureaucratic machine increased from 1,911,000 to 2,474,000 i.e. by 29.6% or some 10% per annum. This is about four times the population

growth rate during that period (2.6%) and actually surpasses the rate of bureaucratic growth even at the highest stage of “socialist transformation in the sixties, when it reached about 8.5% annually.<sup>14</sup> Bureaucratic growth did not take place however, in an even way across all sectors. In spite of the rhetoric about decentralization and local government, employment in the central bureaucracy increased during the same period by 60.4% whereas it increased only by 28.7% in local government.<sup>15</sup> These general figures shows that some specific employment in public welfare services grew by only 5.4% and in public economic organizations by only 4.1%. This reveals that the “Conventional” rather than the Developmental” bureaucracy has received the main bulk of the new recruits. The growth in public personnel also tended to be proportionately larger at the top echelons of each category of the bureaucracy: thus monitorial posts (to include governors) grew by 48.4%, under secretaries by 132.1%, and directors general by 126.1%. However, higher posts in general increased by 25.9%. In the remaining categories, although middle management positions had increased by 155.7%, the lower executive and administrative posts had grown by only 114.5%.

Looking at the expansion by sector we find that it was unfavourable to several development’ sectors. With the exception of the industry and



petroleum sector where personnel grew by 145.2% (partly due to the expansion in the petroleum industry following the “oil boom”), the largest expansion between 1977 and 1980/81 took place in law and order sectors (defense, police and justice) by 212.6% in insurance by 163.1% in supplies and commerce by 142.1 % and in Presidential services by 140.3%. The lowest growth rates were in electricity and energy, 63.4%; in culture and information, 67.8%; in tourism and aviation 113.1%; in agriculture and irrigation, 116.0 %; and in education, research, and youth by 120.8%. Thus in general, the growth in personnel has been on the whole more favourable to law and order, “sovereignty” and other control and “repressive” organs of the state bureaucracy than it has been to the developmental” and social welfare sectors (with the exception of oil and some industries).<sup>16</sup>

Public expenditure in general did not decline either, as a result of the adoption of the Open Door Policy. If anything the percentage of total public expenditure of GDP had grown from 48.7% in 1976 to 62.9% in 1981/82 (at current prices). This indicates that the economic role of the state bureaucracy had actually grown under *infitah*, especially with regard to income distribution. Total public consumption had indeed grown in the four years following *infitah* (1976 to 1980/81) from £E3.2 billion (i.e., by

84%). Not all of the increase was due to expansion in development activity but was caused rather by the huge growth of the law and order” and repressive organs of the state (e.g. Central Security Forces. State Security Investigation, State Security Courts, and the so-called “Morals Courts”, the armed forces, etc.) Expenditures on law and order grew from £E91.5 million in 1976 to £E241 million in 1980/81 /(i.e., by 263 % at current prices, and by 139.6% at fixed prices). There share of total public consumption increased from 3.6% in 1976 to 4.1% in 1980 /81%. Expenditure on the armed forces increased by 153% during the same period although its share of total public expenditure had decreased from 22.6% in 1976, to 18.2% in 1980/81. This remained a high percentage and military expenditures was in any case, soon to resume its upward climb. By contrast, expenditure on education remained unchanged and its share of total bulic consumption stayed almost the same. 10.9% in 1976, and 11.0% in 1980/81. Expenditure on public health deceased, however; its index number in fixed prices dropping from 340 in 1976 (1962/63 =100) to 273 in 1980/81, while its share of total public consumption remained the same in 1980/81 as it had been in 1976.

The general conclusion applicable to both 1976 and 1980/81 is that expenditure on law and order was in both years about double the

expenditure on education and health (26.2%; 12.9% in 1976, and 22.2% '12.9% in 1980/81). The political and developmental implications of this are significant, as the first type of expenditure represents the "repressive" function of the state, whereas the second represents its role in reproducing the labour force and improving its productivity.<sup>17</sup>

It can be concluded that, the Open Door Policy notwithstanding; the Egyptian bureaucracy has continued to expand in terms of personnel and expenditure. This expansion, however, has been more remarkable in areas related to the "control" or repressive functions of the state than it has been in areas related to its "service" or socio economic functions. The figures surveyed above confirm that the role of the state bureaucracy has by no means declined, although it has witnessed some important changes.

On 6<sup>th</sup> October 1981 Sadat was assassinated by a group of soldiers passing in front of his reviewing stand at a military parade marking the anniversary of the 1973 war. Despite Sadat's violent end, power passed relatively smoothly to Husni Mubarak, who was the vice president.

In a speech to the people's Assembly in November 1981, Mubarak outlined the principles of his government's policy and spoke about the future he wanted for Egypt. Infitah would continue, and there would be no

return to the restrictive days of Nasser. Mubarak called for an *infitah* of production, however, rather than of consumption, that would benefit all of society and not just the wealthy few. Food subsidies would remain, and imports of unnecessary luxury goods would be curtailed. Opposition parties would be allowed. The peace treaty with Israel would be observed. Thus, Mubarak sought to chart a middle course between the conflicting legacies of Nasser and Sadat. Since 1981 Mubarak has allowed more overt political activity. Slowly, parties and newspapers began to function again, and political opponents jailed by Sadat were released were released.<sup>18</sup>

President Mubarak who inherited a complex legacy from the Nasser and Sadat eras, and with its *mélange* of policies and institutions that date back to the period of socialist transformation or else to the days of the 'Open Door Policy. The social base of the state that Mubarak inherited can not be separated from the realignment of classes that took place under *infitah*, and which brought to the fore an alliance between elements from the pre-revolutionary semi-aristocracy, the state bourgeoisie of the 1960's and the commercial/financial cliques of the *infitah* era. Yet, it should be clear that the role of the state bourgeoisie has not really been seriously reduced, since the state continues to allocate to itself a significant

proportion of national resources. In particular a large expansion in the control and repressive organs of the state has been taking place since the 1970s as already indicated, e.g. the Central Security Forces. State Security Courts and 'Morals' Courts, the Public Prosecutor's functions as well as the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the state information machine in general. Furthermore, much of the country's growth in bureaucratic expenditure in recent years has been directed to the country's higher political and administrative echelons.<sup>19</sup>

The first parliamentary elections held under the new regime took place in May of that year, according to a rather curious new electoral law, based on proportional representation. According to this law, no parties were allowed representation in Parliament unless they obtained at least eight per cent of all national votes(i.e. some 423,000 votes in the 1984 elections) All votes and (and seats) acquired by those political parties that did not reach the required percentage, were added automatically to those of the winning party, which also monopolised the thirty seats allocated exclusively for women in the People's. Assembly (this provision for Women's representation was cancelled in the 1987 elections). The ruling National Democratic Party achieved 72.9 per cent of the votes and 87 per cent of the seats in the People's Assembly (total number of seats 448), the

right wing Wafel Party 15 per cent of the Votes and 13 percent of the seats. The elections made it clear, therefore, that the ruling party, headed by Mubarak himself, was well in control. But the extent to which this control was actually responsible for the results of the elections remained controversial for quite some time. One obvious thing was that the ruling party fared much better in the countryside, where the government's grip over local government and the security machine in tighter. The opposition, by contrast, registered impressive victories in the large cities, gaining 38.4 per cent of all votes in Cairo, 32.7 per cent in Alexandria, 36 per cent in Suez, and as much as 53.3 per cent of all votes in Port Said.<sup>20</sup>

Mubarak made a point of saying that he was neither a Nasser nor a Sadat, but whether he intended to be something in between these two or something all his own, has remained somewhat of an open question. It could safely be said that with the 1984 elections Mubarak had established himself well in power. Yet he has not found it necessary or possible to rid the regime of several of the 'Sadat factions'. In principle the president enjoys tremendous powers, especially under the existing 'emergency laws' that were passed after the assassination on Sadat in 1981, yet Mubarak has chosen not to use them, either to change the composition of the ruling elite, or to make important shifts in the socio-economic system

along the lines of Nasser's 'Socialist transformation' or Sadat's policy of Infitah. He continues to middle through, pursuing basically the same policies (infitah and 'peace') and relying on the same political party. Although political & liberalization has progressed noticeably, the 'Sadatists' alliance is most intent on preventing real competition.<sup>21</sup>

The economic liberalization that started with Sadat's Economic Open Door Policy' spluttered along for a long time but accelerated during late 1990s. The fear of evoking another mass uprising like that of January 1977 at long continued to make it impolitic for Mubarak to proceed with drastic cuts in subsidies. Because the capitalist developed countries that dominated the IMF and World Bank shared the goal of preserving political stability, these institutions muted their expectations for reform. The IMF and the Paris club of international creditors recurrently reached agreements with Cairo that provided financial relief without the normal stringent demands relating to subsidies, and Egypt was admitted to the World Trade Organization signifying its integration into a liberal global economic system in 1995. After 1996, the process proceeded faster, particularly under the government of Prime Minister Atif Ubayd, which came to office in 1999 with a strong commitment to liberal economic policies. The artificially high exchange rates for the Egyptian pound of the

Nasser era had been modified over the years, and the transition to floating rates determined by the market finally went into effect in 2003. Expected to provide a boon for exports, this deeply cut into the purchasing power of ordinary people. The regime's goal of privatizing state owned enterprises also proceeded slowly. But the mid 1990s few companies had been sold to private entrepreneurs. The process proceeded more seriously from 1996 on but by 2000, about 60 percent of the business designated for privatization still were state owned.<sup>22</sup>



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# *CONCLUSION*

## **CONCLUSION**

Bureaucracy is an idea as well as an embodiment of a structural arrangement. It has been defended as a necessity and at the same time vigorously condemned. As a result of controversies surrounding it, bureaucracy, has come to mean different things to different people.

Bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon. It existed in elaborate forms thousands of years ago in Egypt and Rome and in rather sophisticated forms in China and India in ancient times. With the dawn of modern era, the trend towards the process of bureaucratization had greatly accelerated. In contemporary society, bureaucracy has become a dominant institution, indeed the institution that epitomizes the modern era.

In a more traditional sense, the term 'bureaucracy' is derived from the Latin word 'bureau' which means 'desk' and Greek word 'cracy' which means 'rule'. Thus, it means desk rule or desk government. In French 'La Bure' means a cloth used on table of public authorities. From tablecloth, the table covered by cloth got the name 'bureau' Later 'bureau' began to be used for the office room where table is kept. Thus, by 18<sup>th</sup> century the term began to be used to refer to a place where officials work.

The suffix 'cratic, is derived from the Greek word which means 'rules'.

Thus, 'bureaucracy' refers to rule by officials.

A bureaucratic system is monastic with a single line of command and control. It is characterized by a hierarchy of superior and subordinate relations in which a person at the top assumes all authority and issues general orders to initiate actions. Orders reach to the lowest subordinates through a series of layers or rungs. A status and reward system closely follows these hierarchies. A bureaucracy is an activity by a group of officials arranged on the basis of activity to be performed in an accountable & responsible manner. It is a hierarchical chain organized vertically, disciplined and depending on the degree of centralization. In essence, bureaucracy is a rational distribution of activities in which there is a complete authority to issue the command and in a manner laid down by the rules, Written documents and files are important elements in bureaucracy it is a system, which induces officials to be methodical, prudent and disciplined, and whose behavior is highly reliable. The obligation of an office and the relationship among officials are impersonal.

The modern state is a welfare state, which has to make an arrangement for education, health, housing and various others amenities

for the people. With the expansion of the activities of the state, bureaucracy has also expanded the spheres of administration of a country depending upon the caliber and integrity of the bureaucracy.

Max Weber (1864-1920) a German Sociologist was the first social scientist to have systematically studied the bureaucracy. He provided a structural identification of the bureaucratic form of organization and discussed facets of its behaviors. In nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, he drew the picture on studies of ancient bureaucracy in Egypt, Germany, Rome and Europe. For his study, he used an ideal type approach. The ideal type is neither a description of reality nor a statement of normative preference. Max Weber was the first to observe and write on bureaucracy, which developed in Germany during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He considered them to be efficient, rational and honest, a big improvement over the haphazard administration that they replaced.

From the perspective of the officials, Weber observed that office holding is a “vocation” that it is a calling, requiring prescribed courses of training for a long period of time and having examinations which are a prerequisite for employment. He is to be loyal to the office he holds, not to a patron. By virtue of his position the officials enjoy high social esteem. The official is appointed by a superior official. He is not elected

normally; he works for the agency for life. He receives a salary and pension when he retires. The official pursues a career within the bureaucracy, moving up to more responsible positions according to his experience and ability.

Max Weber developed a typology of authority and distinguished three pure types, traditional, charismatic and legal. He regarded bureaucracy sustained, legal, and sanctified by purest type of exercise legal authority as the most effective form of organization.

Weber sets out an ideal type of bureaucracy, characterized by an elaborate hierarchical division of labour directed by explicit rules impersonally applied, staffed by full time life time professionals, who do not in any sense own the means of administration or their jobs or the sources of their funds and live off a salary and not form income derived directly from the performance of their jobs. These features are normally found in the public service in the offices of private firms, universities and so on.

Weber used the method of interpretative understanding for constructing ideal type. These are made use of for comparing complex events and processes. Weber placed his ideal type within a broader framework. He defined sociology as the study of social action. Within this

context, power means the ability to enforce one's will on others despite resistance on their part. Authority means legitimate and regular use of power. Thus, the capacity to exercise control is justified and it appears to be fair. Various types of authorities are based on different types of social actions. The traditional authority may be patrimonial or feudal in nature. The charismatic authority has traits of a revolutionary leader as he changes everything in his own way.

Egypt has a very colorful history. The pharaohs were considered divine and they ruled over a highly stratified society. The first pyramid was built in the 27<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Over the next 500 years the movement only got grander. Monarchical power was at its greatest during the 4<sup>th</sup> dynasty when Chops and Mycerinus built the Great pyramid of Giza. Pharaonic Egypt was the cradle of bureaucratic systems with levels of hierarchies and division of labor. Under the Pharaohs who considered themselves as endowed with divine attributes, Egypt reached the zenith of its achievements during the old kingdom which began, with the unification of upper Egypt with the lower by Menes. A highly centralized government with the divine Pharaoh at the top assisted by a minister and helped by a 'government council' and an elaborate hierarchy which practiced considerable delegation and specialization, was able to create



engineering marvels like the pyramids besides controlling and directing the flow of and flooding of the Nile, irrigating the farms and increase the fertility of the soil. In those glorious achievements the officialdom that participated consisted of mixture members of the royal family, Priests holders of various administrative positions. Certain degree of professionalization and training to master reading and writing and arithmetic was there. Some offices had a tendency to become hereditary and were often subject to purchase. Efficiency must have been the secret of their success. There were also evidence of inefficiency in this period, red tape, abuse, bribery, extortion and laziness. Above all there was the concept of total ownership of the land and the people including the officials by the God King, the pharaoh.

The second most important period of administrative significance was the Arab-Islamic period which began in 639 AD and ended with the Ottomans by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which was characterized by an appointed Diwan or a wali, a kind of viceroy ruling on behalf of an external Caliph or sultan. During this period various services began to emerge under the auspices of the state from time to time showing distinct hierarchies of army and other services 'men of sword and men of pen' During the mamluks the native military hierarchy developed often in

conflict with other bureaucrats owing allegiance to the sultan. Allegiance to a civil or a military hierarchy was common, despite the fact that all were in the name of the state and often there was some overlapping. During the Ottoman rule from 1517 AD the rulers and the higher level bureaucracy were controlling large number of Egyptian scribe's soldiers and revenue collectors. Centralization of authority and suppression of any initiative from the lower ranks was the practice as the ruler was virtually far away. Real loyalty and allegiance was to the local hierarchical superior in the employment of an emerging modern state.

The distinct influence of modern European state on the emergence of a state bureaucracy was felt after the short lived Napoleon occupation (1778-1801) A revival of national sentiment with the ideas of political and administrative reform at all levels of the government open to Egyptians on equal footing on the basis of intellectual and ethical criteria was the result of this European exposure.

Mohammed Ali who ruled for years after French occupation first came as a viceroy of the Ottomans and later emerged as the proponent of a developmental nationalism. He was also the initiator of a series of administrative reform. However, like the pharaohs and later rulers, he too felt the need for centralized authority. This was because immediately

before his arrival the country was in a state of confusion. Mohammed Ali was able to launch an era of reconstruction, improved irrigation systems and redesigned and rationalized administrative hierarchies all owing allegiance to him.

· Mohammad Ali sought to transform rural agricultural Egypt into an industrial society with a modern military apparatus. He mobilized nation's human and material resources into his own hands, creating a state controlled economy in the near east with Egypt as its center. To manage his varied enterprises he wanted an efficient but subservient civil service. Detailed division of the country into administrative units under generational jurisdiction with deeper and wider hierarchies took place. His periodic inspections tours of the countryside checking on cultivation, irrigation, conduct of civil servants, public accounts, and every detail of what may be called the beginnings of a development administration in Egypt set the tone for a modern authoritarian state. Administrative responsibilities were carried out by six principal departments (diwans) interior, treasury, marine, public instruction and public works, foreign affairs and commerce. As he launched his industrialization projects a new diwan was appointed to supervise textile industry Extension of industrial

revolution to many areas with state initiatives led to the creation of a new class of 'public sector employees.

In an effort to draw upon the Egyptian population for his technical and administrative staff he set up schools in Egypt and sent several hundred young men to European institutions to study civil administration. Recruitment for higher education on the basis of competition and merit rather than on ethnic origin or religion was emphasized. Training was emphasized especially for technical subjects and specialization, which became part of the expanding state machinery. Though Mohammad Ali's vision did not continue after his death, the foundation of an educated merit oriented civil service was laid down firmly during his regime.

Mohammad Ali proceeded to impose a new order in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The new order became the basic framework for that country's drive towards modernity for the next hundred years. It aimed first at the organization of a modern army, and required reform and innovation in several areas of state activity, agriculture, administration, education and industry. Mohammed Ali inaugurated policies that changed the patterns of landownership and agriculture in order to increase productivity and yield greater wealth to the state. He introduced a system of state education in order to provide the trained and

skilled manpower required by the service of his state, and especially his armed forces. He reformed the administration in order to secure efficient, strict and economical control over the functions of state and government. He embarked upon an ambitious programme of industrialization which produced the first state factories in Egypt in order to make his armed forces self sufficient in materials and supplies.

Mohammed Ali's method of government and administration were absolute and strictly centralized. All power delegated by authority of the Sultan in Egypt was vested in him. Contrary to previous Ottoman governors appointed by Sultan to Egypt, Mohammed Ali appeared original in so far as he imposed his authority over all other power groups in the country. There were no longer such contenders for power with viceroy as the Shaikh-al-Balad, the mamluk chief, or the religious leader from the Azhar, Instead of delegating the command of his troops to Albanian or other officers, Mohammed Ali placed his sons. Tossun, Ibrahim and Ismail at their head. His youngest son Saeed Pasha, commanded the naval forces; his grandson; Abbas was in charge of the Cairo government. Other members of his family filled military and civil administrative positions in the conquered dominions, especially Syria and Hijaz. He centralized the control of the various provinces in Egypt by

reorganizing their administration into governors, subgovernors, inspectors and mayors in a chain of command relationship.

It is commonly under said that Europeans began their penetration of Egypt in earnest, by financial manipulation and exploitation of the local ruler's extravagances and ambition. His successors, Ismail did little to alter the administrative habits of Egypt, for he soon became embroiled in international financial controversy to a degree that brought the European powers closer and closer to political control over the country.

British occupation which began in 1882 gradually found the need to produce clerks for the civil service towards which the education system was reoriented. Higher echelons of the bureaucracy excluded Egyptians who were to be content with lower level government positions. Throughout his long tenure of office Lord Comer sedulously kept down every independent Egyptian and filled all the high posts with ciphers, with the result that the natural leaders of the people had no opportunity of leading the people. In 1898 of the 10,600 Egyptians in the Civil Service only 45 received a monthly salary of 70 Egyptians pounds or more. Whereas 47 out of 455 Britons received that much. However unlike in India, the British were satisfied by having a tight control at the center and

left the provinces to the Egyptians who were for centuries used to such arrangement.

The growing nationalist movement and the accompanying grants of autonomy meant the steady elimination of foreigners from the civil service and its Egyptianization. This process was accelerated by the British declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922. By the time of independence, Egypt was in full control of most of public employment and the educational system was geared towards producing civil servants for the state. There were conscious efforts to improve the recruitment system which culminated in inviting A.P. Sinker who was the chairman of the British Civil Service Commission to study the Egyptian system of governance. As a result of his report a Civil Service Commission was established in October, 1951, with a mandate to regulate personnel recruitment.

As far as Egypt is concerned it is probably common place that on the eve of the 1952 Revolution the need for serious administrative reform was widely felt. After the revolution, problems of the bureaucracy became more complicated, since, in addition to its traditional and rather mechanical tasks the administration was now charged with new and increasingly development oriented responsibilities that required

flexibility, innovation, and the application of higher levels of technology. The heavy burden of traditions and the rising expectations of the people added to the complexity of the situation and made the need for radical reforms even more urgent.

In 1952, the first step in this direction was the consolidation of the Diwan Al Muwazafin as a central civil service commission. It was given the right to refer to the legislature in case of dispute with the Ministry of Finance to which it was attached, and from which it attempted to gain independence. The Diwan produced several reports of benefit and 1957 and 1958 prepared plan for the classification of posts and for work simplification. To fulfill the latter task a central administration was created by the Diwan to be helped by local committees in all ministrers but its performance was not found satisfactory. To revive this, The whole Diwan was affiliated to the presidency in 1959 and its entire role was reconsidered. It was now called upon not just to confine itself to problems of the implementation of laws and improvement of procedures, but also to proceed to the preparation of able civil servants and the raising of performance rates in the administration .

A significant development took place in February, 1963, when the Presidential Council commissioned a General Committee and a Technical



Secretariat to reconsider the structure and functioning of the government machinery and to recommend projects for its reorganization. One of the results merging from the efforts of this team was the creation of a new central body under the name of the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, (C.A.O.A.) in 1964 which was meant to be more powerful in status and possessing a wider sphere of competence than its predecessor.

In order to be able to carry out these functions CAO A was given the right to supervise the application of laws and statues relating to personnel affairs and the activities of organs engaged in personnel training. It was also granted right to check proposals for organization and reorganization and proposals for budgetary arrangements related to personnel, before their final endorsement. It could also take part in designing organizational charts and specifying performance rates. It could demand, and inspect, data and statistics from different public bodies.

A new kind of training need however, was becoming increasingly persistent with the Egyptianization and nationalization of the late fifties and early sixties. This was the need to train personnel of the new public bodies in entrepreneurial (or business) administration. For this purpose,

the National Institute for Management Development (NIMD) was created in 1961 aiming at conducting training programs in areas related to management development. While its main task was to train business and industrial managers in general and specialized areas, it was also to carry out research and provide consultancy. Three types of training programs were offered by the NIMD, top management programs, specialized programs and sector programs. Until 1969 N.I.M.D. had offered training to 966 administrative officers. A management consultancy section was created to diagnose problem and suggest alternative solutions, and follow them up.

Yet another type of training appeared in the mid sixties. A committee was created in 1965 to plan and direct Executive Conference Programmes (ECP) . These were tailor made programmes drawn up according to the needs and interests of the participants. They dealt with certain Problem area's through exposition of experts views and discussion of possible solutions.

A Central Agency for training was established in 1967 to supervise technical and vocational training. Training was also offered at the Institute of Labour Administration, the Institute of Banking Studies, the Arabs Society for Business Administration, the Arab Center for Research and

. Administration, the Public Relation Society and by other professional and associational institutes.

The post revolutionary phase also saw an expansion in the role of bureaucracy as Egypt embarked on a major nationalization drive and the expansion of the public sector. The economic profile before 1952 showed that Egypt's economy was dominated by agricultural sector. Early attempts at industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries failed. Foreign indebtedness was a serious problem, and the British power integrated Egypt as an agricultural colonial unit into an international political economic system. By discouraging industrial growth and the conservation of scanty natural resources, foreign occupation and dynastic rule based on vested interests severely handicapped the growth of Egypt's economy before 1952.

In the beginning of the post revolutionary era the revolutionary government's economic policies were directed at balanced development and growth of the country's human, agricultural and industrial resources. Persistently high rates of population growth greatly intensified the demand for basic goods and services such as food products, which constituted a sizable portion of Egypt's import trade and health and educational services, which were declared to be basic rights of all

Egyptians. Thus, the expansion of public services and agricultural development was accorded special attention in the 1950's. Success in these sectors, together with improvements in transportation and communication, provided valuable support to the more fundamental goal of developing light and heavy industries.

The first four years of the post revolutionary phase from 1952 to 1956. Saw the economy almost entirely in private hands with the state's role limited to infrastructure investments and the provision of social services. From 1957 to 1960, policy options changed and there was a decided new impetus towards progressive nationalization of the economy. In this period the major foreign owned enterprises were nationalized. During the period 1961-1973 infrastructure, mining and basic manufacturing banking and insurance, all imports and three-quarters of exports came under the control of the public sector. Domestic commerce, real estate, construction and light industry remained in the hands of the private sector. An important innovation of this phase, perhaps the one that more than any other would condition subsequent development, was the implementation of a policy of social welfare devised to govern income distribution and guarantee a minimum subsistence level to the population. During the same period, the Egyptian economy became an almost

completely planned system and the private sector was relegated to a marginal role. In this period emphasis was placed on the productive sectors, with priority being given to industry.

On Nasser's death his successor, Anwar-Al-Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt in 1971. After pledging to continue Nasser's policies, the new government altered its course towards Sadat's own agenda. The largest change made to government structure was the drafting of the 1971 permanent constitution which laid out Egypt's future. The constitution defined Egypt as a democratic socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people. It further called on Islamic jurisprudence to be the principle source of legislation in the country, and the President was defined as the most powerful member of the government.

The power of the President stemmed, in great part, from the enormous constitutional authority and customary prerogatives in his office. Perhaps the foremost key to the President's power in Egypt in his wide powers of appointment and dismissal; most important was the right to appoint the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the Chief of the armed forces, but in a highly bureaucratic society, President patronage extended over a much wider scope of positions including public sector managers, newspaper editors, judges and party leaders. Sadat's right to appoint loyal

followers to the strategic levers of state power and to dismiss those who incurred his displeasure was a main source of elite dereference to the President. As chief executive the President also stood at the top of a legal chain of command which entitled him to obedience from the civil and military bureaucracies. The Prime Minister was merely the President's Chief assistant and the Cabinet a 'staff' expected to turn his general policy into detailed legislation and executive action.

In 1973 Sadat initiated the famous Open Door Policy the *Infitah*, wherein the economic policies of the Nasser era were completely reversed. Since the Open Door economic policy was formally adopted in the mid-seventies, the role of the Egyptian public bureaucracy has undergone several changes. Such changes, however, do not amount to a retrenchment of the state as some observers have interpreted them. The state bureaucracy is still large and expanding, both in terms of personnel and expenditure, and the control functions assumed by the bureaucracy have by no means declined. In the economic sphere, the public sector has not really given way to the private sector (except in the special case of commerce and finance), but the state has merely chosen to cooperate with international capital. This has signified a transformation of the state role from a developmental one to a production-oriented one (seeking profit

and cutting down on welfare activities within the joint public sector/international capital enterprises). However, the welfare functions of the state bureaucracy towards the society at large (education and health, food subsidies, etc.) have not been significantly curtailed although the state has become increasingly dependent on external sources for financing them.

Bureaucracy both in terms of size and the low performance were the new feature of the well entrenched Egyptian bureaucracy. However during the seventies and especially following the war of 1973 quantitative growth and qualitative decline both accelerated simultaneously and to an unprecedented degree that threatens to produce very serious organizational and political repercussions. This situation has, created at least two major ironies. The first is in the fact that the impetus of bureaucratic growth (which acquired sizeable dimensions under Nasser) is now continuing under its own momentum, even though the role of the state especially in the economic field has declined noticeably under the open door policy. The other irony is that, for a variety of organizational and political reasons, the performance of the Egyptian bureaucracy has declined sharply in quality, just at a time when the desire, under unfavourable conditions, to encourage investments-especially from Arab and foreign sources-actually requires a more innovative, flexible and efficient bureaucracy.

It can be concluded that, the open door policy notwithstanding the Egyptian bureaucracy has continued to expand in terms of personnel and expenditure. This expansion, however, has been more remarkable in areas related to the “control” or repressive functions of the state of the state than it has been in areas related to its “service” or socio economic functions. The figures surveyed above confirm that the role of the state bureaucracy has by no means declined, although it has witnessed some important changes.

President Mubarak inherited a complex legacy from the Nasser and Sadat eras, with its mélange of policies and institutions that date back to the period of socialist transformation or else to the days of the open door policy. The social base of the state that Mubarak inherited can not be separated from the realignment of classes that took place under *infitah*, and which brought to the fore an alliance between elements from the pre-revolutionary semi-aristocracy, the state bourgeoisie of the 1960’s and the commercial/financial cliques of the *infitah* era. Yet it should be clear that the role of the state bourgeoisie has not really been seriously reduced, since the state continues to allocate to itself a significant proportion of national resources. In particular a large expansion in the control and repressive organs of the state has been taking place since the 1970s as



already indicated, e.g. the Central Security Forces. State Security Courts and 'Morals' Courts, the Public Prosecutor's functions as well as the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the state information machine in general. Furthermore, much of the country's growth in bureaucratic expenditure in recent years has been directed to the country's higher political and administrative echelons.

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